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ABSTRACT 
This s tudy is ab out Antarctic affairs during the twentieth 
century . The images most often ass oc iated wit h t his subject 
t hroughout this per iod f ocus on sc ience . Apart from a brief 
interlude in t he 1940's and early 1 950's , and again in the late 
1970's and 1 980's , p ol itical c ons iderat ions have been p ortraye d in 
t he bac kground and of l ittle account . These images als o  dep ic t  
Antarct ic affairs a s  unique - separated from e vents and f orces 
arising elsewhere in the world. The view is put f orward in t his 
t hesis that t hes e  images are in imp ortant respec ts defic ient :  
p olitical fact ors have been more signif ic ant than t hese dominant 
images suggest and Antarctic affairs ha ve not occurred in 
isolat ion. 
The study begins by examining Antarct ic affairs during t he first 
four decades of the twentieth century - a per iod c ommonl y divide d 
int o  t he "her oic age" from ar ound the turn of t he centur y t o  t he 
end of Worl d War I and t he "air age" dur ing t he interwar years .  
The dominant image associate d wit h t his period f ocuses on 
sc ientif ic activit y and expl oration in t he reg ion. The argument 
here is presented, however, that significant p ol it ical and 
ec onomic fact ors concerned wit h t he par t it ion of Antarct ica , which 
occurred between 1908 and 1939 when f ive c ountries asserted claims 
to ab out 85 per cent of t he reg ion, must also be brought int o  
vii 
fo cus to achieve a more complete and accurate pict ure o f  Antarct ic 
affairs. It is also argued t hat this partit ion was an expression 
and ext ens ion o f  two under ly ing s tructural forces of world 
politics whic h firs t became o perat ive during t he c lo s ing years of 
t he nineteenth century: t he Second Industrial Revo lut ion and the 
New Imperialism. 
The study cont inues in t he 1940's and 1950's wit h  an e xamin at ion 
of the o rig ins of t he Antarc t ic Treaty o f  195 9. The dom inant image 
a s sociated with this era port ra ys a se ries of e vents connecte d  
with the Internat ional Geo phys ical Year which le d directly t o  t he 
s igning of the Treaty . The pic ture presented is one o f  "the 
t riumph of science over po lit ics . "  The argument of this s tu dy is 
t hat this image is superf i�ia l  and mis leading. It o verlooks t he 
interplay of political and s trategic cons iderat ions which wer e ,  in 
turn, co ns equences of bas ic structural changes in world po lit ics 
which impac ted on Antarctic affairs following t he outbreak o f  
Wo rld War II, such a s  the rise of t he United S tates and t he Soviet 
Union to sup erpowe r status and t he intensif icat ion of rivalr y 
between these co unt ries after 1947 to become t he Cold War . 
The third period under review in t his s tu dy is t he two decades , o r  
so, fo llowing the signing of t he Antarctic Treat y and its ent r y  
into force in 1961. This pe rio d of Antar ctic affairs is general ly 
po rtra ye d as a t ime of reg ional peace and order . The dominant 
image associated wi t h  t his era sketches a picture of the Treaty 
p ro viding a bluepr int for science with the ensuing scientif ic 
activity engendering 
that this image is 
viii 
Pax Antarctica. 
one-sided. Left 
It is argued in this study 
out of account is the 
continuing conflict-management function of the Treaty and its 
attendant arrangements - the central one of which is the Antarctic 
Treaty Consulative Meeting. This Meeting can be viewed as a form 
of international organization, and several mechanisms of it have 
played an important part in the management of conflict pertaining 
to Antarctica and thereby also contributed to regional peace and 
order. It is also shown how a structural change in world politics 
again began to impact on Antarctic affairs during the late 1970's 
as the world entered "the era of interdependence", 
Antarctica became entangled in a number of global issues concerned 
with resource scarcity, North-South relations and environmental 
conservation. 
In sum, it is proposed that (i) political factors have played a 
significant part in Antarctic affairs throughout the twentieth 
century, and (ii) structural changes in world politics have 
impacted upon Antarctic affairs throughout the same period. On 
this view, it is concluded that Antarctic affairs have been an 
integral part of world politics. Accordingly, they must be 
considered in this way and not sui generis as commonly asserted. 
This means that Antarctic affairs cannot be assessed realistically 
unless they are ranged firmly against the past and analysed in the 
light of structural forces in world politics. 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
This is a study of Antarctic affairs during the twentieth century . 
In the late 1970's and 1980's , increased int erest in the 
exploitation of Antarctica's marine-living and mineral resources 
resulted in Antarctic issues gaining wider attention as an item on 
the international political agenda . Controversy concerning the 
environmental impact of , and the distribution of benefits and 
costs from resource exploitation in the region arose amongst and 
within various countries, 
organizations. By 1983, 
international and transnational 
The Economist reported , 'Beneath its 
prodigious icecap, 
,1 
the frozen continent is becoming a hot 
potato . 
Prior to these events with their obvious political dimensions , the 
images most often associated with Antarctic affairs are those of 
science. During the first four decades of the twentieth century , 
Antarctic affairs have been commonly divided into two ages: the 
" heroic age" from the turn of the century to the end of World War 
I and the "air age" during the interwar years . The dominant image 
associated with this era focuses on science and exploration with 
the achievements of such Antarctic explorers and scientists as 
Shackleton , Amundsen, Scott , David, Mawson , Byrd and Ellsworth 
afforded prominence in accounts of mankind's activity in the 
southernmost region of the world . 
1 "Icebox hot ting up" , The Economist , October 8 ,  1983 , p 49 .  
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The 1940's and 1950's witnessed a change in the nature of 
Antarctic affairs. Overlapping sovereignty claims to Antarctic 
territory by Britain, Argentina and Chile resulted in an 
acrimonious political controversy between the three countries. 
Antarctica became the subject and scene of international discord. 
The dominant image associated with this era portrays a series of 
events connected with a major international scientific activity -
the International Geophysical Year (I.G.Y.) - as dissipating this 
controversy. The image presented depicts three scenes: first, the 
success of the Antarctic program of the I. G.Y. leading the twelve 
countries involved, including the rival claimants, to decide to 
continue their scientific cooperation in the region; second, the 
need therefore arising to establish an international legal 
agreement that would provid� a stable basis for such activities; 
and third, the resulting Antarctic Treaty of 1959 designed to 
foster regional cooperation and harmony. Put simply, the origins 
of the Antarctic Treaty are presented in this image as "the 
triumph of science over politics. " 
The next two decades following the entry into force of the 
Antarctic Treaty in 1961 are generally portrayed as a period of 
regional peace and order. The dominant image associated with this 
era sketches a picture of the Treaty providing a blueprint for 
science with the ensuing scientific activity engendering Pax 
Antarctica. 
3 
In these ways, then, the three dominant images of Antarctic 
affairs during the first eight decades of the twentieth century 
focus on science. Apart from the claims controversy in the 1940's 
and early 1950's, political considerations have been portrayed 
very much in the background and of little account. Moreover, these 
images depict Antarctic affairs as unique - separated from events 
and forces arising elsewhere in the world. It is the central 
argument of this thesis that these images are in important 
respects deficient. This argument is structured upon two initial, 
interlinked propositions: (i) it may be argued that political 
factors have been more significant than the dominant images of 
Antarctic affairs suggest; and (ii) Antarctic affairs have not 
occurred in isolation, removed or divorced from world politics and 
the basic structural forces that have shaped the modern world. In 
other words, a valid assessment of Antarctic affairs during the 
twentieth century must take full account of both political factors 
and underlying structural forces. Without either, our 
understanding of the course of events to do with this region of 
the world is shallow. 
The topic of the study merits attention because of the dual and 
reciprocal function of history. Given that the stakes involved in 
Antarctic resource exploitation alluded to earlier are high, there 
is a compelling case for a reassessment of Antarctic affairs 
during the twentieth century to place this contemporary issue in 
proper perspective for although 'the past is intelligible to us 
4 
only in the light of the present • • • we can fully understand the 
present only in the light of the 
,2 past .  It is this 
interrelationship , or dialogue , between past and present which 
Carr has termed the dual function of history . And clearly , witho ut 
a well-grounded understanding of the past, pol icy cons tructed in 
accord with even the best blueprints for such values as 
international order , dis tributive justice or environmental 
conservation in Antarctica is like the proverbial ho use built on 
shifting sand . 
It must be emphasized , at once , that it is not the purpose of  this 
study to prescribe solutions to any current Antarctic problems or 
to canvass policy opt ions . Moreover , while the two propositions 
upon which the argument of this thesis is structured imply that 
important political aspect s  have hitherto been largely neglected 
in s tudies of Antarctic affairs , this viewpoint is not meant t o  
belittle the pas t  labour o f  scholars in the field . International 
lawyers ,  geographers , natural scientists and his torians who have 
toiled in the field use differing frames of reference which offer 
insights in exchange for limitations in approach . In o ther words , 
every way of seeing is also a way of no t seeing . What is 
remarkable, howeve r ,  is that political s cientis t s  have shown 
relatively little interest in Antarctic affairs . Of cours e ,  a 
single s tudy such as this by no means redresses this neglect 
2 E . H . Carr , What Is History? , Macmillan, London ,  196 1 ,  p49 . 
Emphasis added . 
5 
and what follows is not a comprehensive analysis o f  the politics 
of Ant arctic affairs . The s tudy has merely an iconoclas tic or 
debunking objective , seeking in Berger' s terms , to unmask 
pretensions and to penetrate verbal smoke screens ' to the 
f i ,3 unadmitted and o ften unpleasant mainsprings 0 act on.  
The thesis is organized in an essentially chronological manner . 
Apart from this introductory chapter ,  there are three subs tantive 
chapters and a concluding chapter. Chapter 2 is concerned with 
Antarctic affairs during the firs t  four decades of the twentieth 
century and discusses the partition o f  Antarctica that occurred 
between 1908 and 1939 . It consists largely of a synthesis o f  
secondary sources,  although government documents ,  newpaper 
reports , and published personal letters have also been used . 
Chapter 3 examines Antarctic affairs in the 1 940's and 1950' s .  It  
seeks to  explain the origins of the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 . In 
this chapter , government report s  and official documents have been 
the major sources used - mos t  notably those published in Foreign 
Relations of the United States , The Department o f  S ta te Bulletin 
and various United S tates Congres sional report s  and hearing s .  In 
addi tion , the Annals of the International Geophy sical Year was an 
indispensib1e source of the argument developed in this chapter . 
The Treaty era from the beginning of the 1960's to the early 
1980's is the period under review in Chapter 4 .  It looks at the 
3 P Berger , Invitation to Sociology , Penguin , Harmond sworth , 
1972 , p 51, 55 . 
\ 
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way the Treaty and its attendant arrangements contributed to 
regional peace and order in Antarctica. Again, a variety of 
sources have been used in this chapter including secondary 
4 material, official documentation and newpaper reports. A final 
Chapter 5 brings the threads of the argument together into 
conclusions. 
Before turning to discuss the partition of Antarctica, it is 
necessary to define the areal configuration of the region. The 
Antarctic continent is the remotest, coldest, driest, windiest and 
5 most lifeless continent on Earth. Covering about fourteen million 
square kilometres, approximately the size of the combined areas of 
the United States and Australia, it is separated from the 
neighbouring continents of South America, Australia and Africa by 
broad expanses of ocean. The most distinctive feature of the 
continent is that between 95 and 98 per cent of its surface is 
buried beneath an immense ice-sheet which in places may be more 
4 Personal interviews with several Australian diplomats who had 
been involved in Antarctic affairs were also conducted. The 
secretive way in which the Australian government has treated 
Antarctic affairs meant, however, that the interviewees' 
comments were very circumspect. Nevertheless, the exercise 
provided useful information of a contextual and confirmative 
nature. The Australian government's predilection for secrecy 
about Australia's involvement in Antarctic affairs during the 
twentieth century also meant that Australian archival material 
was not available to be sifted - access to this material having 
been denied to the author of this study. 
5 For a detailed account of the areal configuration and distinct­
ive features of Antarctica see, Polar Regions Atlas, U.S. 
Central Intelligence Agency, May, 1978; and J.F.Lovering and 
J. R. V. Prescott, Last of Lands • • • Antarctica, Melbourne 
University Press, Carlton, Victoria, 1979. 
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than 4 , 500 metres thick. But the continent of Antarctica is only 
part (albeit a large one) of the region. The Antarctic or Southern 
Ocean which surrounds the continent is also part of the region. 
The generally accepted northern boundary of this Southern Ocean is 
what is known as the Antarctic Convergence which lies between 
latitudes 500 and 600 South where the northward flowing Antarctic 
cold surface water impinges on the warmer Subantarctic surface 
waters. The nomenclature "Southern Ocean" or "Antarctic Ocean" is 
frequently neglected by geographers, and maps tend to show the 
Pacific, Atlantic and Indian Oceans extending south to the margins 
of the Antarctic continent. As Lovering and Prescott point out, 
however, 'The artifice may be geographically convenient, but it 
cannot be supported in that it hides the essential unity of the 
circumpolar ring of water ar�und the Antarctic continent which is 
better termed the 6 Southern or Antarctic Ocean.' In this study, 
then, the term. "Antarctica" will refer to the region comprising 
both the continent and the Southern or Antarctic Ocean, plus the 
islands contained therein.7 
, 6 Lovering and Prescott, op.cit. , p 26.  
7 See Map, p 179. 
8 
CHAPTER 2 THE PARTITION OF ANTARCTICA 
Antarctic affairs , from the closing years of the nineteenth 
century till the outbreak of World War II in 1939 , have been 
commonly divided into t wo ages : the " heroic age" from around 1895 
to the end of Word War I and the "air age" during the interwar 
years . The predominant image associated with these t wo ages 
concerns science and exploration . Much has been writ ten about the 
period and , as one writer remarks , many of the scientists  and 
explorers involved in Antarctica during these times appear larger 
than life-size because of the risks they undertook and the tasks 
they achieved . 1 Before discussing this image however , it is 
necessary to outline mankind' s  earlier thoughts about , and 
activities in , Antarctica . This brief excursion provides the 
historical perspective necessary to an understanding of Antarctic 
2 affairs during the twentieth century . 
2.1 Early History 
The existence of the Antarctic continent had first  been postulated 
by the ancient Greeks , Indeed , the term "Antarctic" is derived 
1 C . Hartley Grattan ,  The Southwest Pacific Since 1900 : A Modern 
History - Australia , New Zealand , The Islands , Antarctica , The 
University of Michigan Press , Ann Arbor ,  1963 , p 592 . 
2 As Magdoff rightly points out , ' Stages of history rarely , if 
ever come in neat packages : the roo ts of new historical periods 
begin to form in earlier eras , while many aspect s  of an older 
phase linger on and help shape the new . '  H . Magdoff , 
Imperialism: From the Colonial Age to the Present , Monthly 
Review Press , New York , 197 8 ,  p 21 . 
9 
from the Greek words anti and arktos which together mean "opposite 
the bear" (or opposite the Northern pole marked by the 
constellation Arktos, or Ursa Major). Cartographers during the 
Middle Ages also postulated about the existence of a southern 
continent, Terra Australis Incognita, but although the British 
explorer James Cook circumnavigated Antarctica from 1772 till 
o ' 1775, penetrating as far south as latitude 71 10 South (or less 
than 19 degrees from the South Pole) in search of this southern 
continent, it was not until the third decade of the nineteenth 
century that the first sightings of the Antarctic mainland were 
documented. 
The first sighting, itself, is a matter of great controversy with 
Britain, the United States�nd the Soviet Union all claiming the 
honour by one of their nationals. In the official British view, 
the first person to see the Antarctic continent was Edward 
Bransfield, R.N., when he discovered the northern extremity of the 
Antarctic Penisu1ar on January 20, 1820.3 The American contender 
was Nathaniel Palmer who, on November 17, 1820, is also said to 
have first sighted the Antarctic 4 Peninsular. According to the 
official Soviet view however, the discoverer of the Continent was 
Admiral Bellingshausen who led a Russian expedition which 
3 International Court of Justice Pleadings, Antarctic Cases 
(United Kingdom v. Argentina; United Kingdom v. Chile), p 12. 
4 W. Sullivan, Quest for a Continent, Secker & Warburg, London 
1957, pp 23-24. 
\ 
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circumnavigated Antarctica between 1819 and 1821  and who is said 
to have sighted the mainland several times during January and 
February , 1820 . 
These "discoveries" of the Antarctic continent were followed by 
Weddell's discovery in 1823 of the sea which now bears his name , 
and three expeditions mounted during the late 1830 ' s  and early 
1840's from France ( d'Urville) ,  the United S tates (Wilke s )  and 
5 Britain (Ross)  all in search of the South Magnetic Pole . Although 
not one of these expeditions located the South Magnetic Pole , each 
discovered significant areas of Antarctica - the Adelie Coas t  
( named after d'Urville's wife ) , Wilkes Land , the Ros s  Sea and the 
Ross Ice Shelf . 
Then ensued a fifty year hiatus in Antarctic affairs when interest 
in the region waned . It was not until the 1890's that interest in 
Antarctica revived and the first four decades of the twentieth 
century witnessed a surge of activity pertaining to the region 
the so-called "heroic age" and "air age" of Antarctic affairs. 
2.2 The Dollinant Image: Science and Exploration 
The "heroic age" of Antarctic affairs derives its name from a 
series of pathbreaking exploratory and scientific expeditions to 
5 The three government sponsored expeditions were triggered by 
scientific developments during the 1830's in the field of 
electromagnetism by the German mathematician Gauss . It was 
thought that the expeditions would gain knowledge useful in 
the production of accurate magnetic maps which , in turn , were 
ne8essary for accurate navigational purposes . See , P . Siple , 
90 South , G . P . Putnam's Sons , New York, 1959 , p 25 . 
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Antarctica . For example , on Januar y  24 , 1895 Bull's Norwegian 
expedition effected the first landing on the Antarctic mainland . 6 
This was followed by Gerlache's Belgian expedition of  1897-99 
which was the first  to winter ( on board ship ) in the region , while 
Borchgrevink's  British sponsored expedition of 1898-1900 was the 
first to winter on the continent itself . Bruce ' s  British 
expedition of 1902-04 saw the establishment of the first permanent 
research station and in 1909 , a party from Shackleton's British 
expedition of  1907-09 (led by the Australian geologis t  David) 
first located the region of the South Magnetic Pole . The 
geographic South Pole was first reached in December , 1911 by 
Amundsen's  Norwegian expedition of 1910-12 . 
Other expeditions during this period between 1895 and 1917 
included Scott's  two British expeditions (1901-03 and 1911-13 ) ;  
Drygalski's German expedition (1901-03) ; Nordenskjold's  Swedish 
expedition (1901-03 ) ;  Charco t ' s  two French expeditions (1903-05 
and 1908-10 ) ; Shirase's Japanese expedition (1911-12) ;  Mawson' s 
Australasian expedition (1911-14) and Shackleton's second 
expedition (1914-16) .  
The " air age" of Antarct ic affair s  derives its name from the use 
of aircraft as a means to explore the region. The Aus tralian 
adventurer Wilkins ( with his pilot Eielson) made the fir s t  flight 
,in Antarctica over the Antarct ic Peninsula in 1928 . In the 
6 Two members of Bull's expedit ion, Borchgrevink and Kristensen 
both claim to have been the first the s tep ashore . See , 
' 
R . A . Swan , Australia in the Antarct ic, Melbourne Universit y  
Pres s ,  Parkville , 1961 ,  p 84 . 
1 2  
following season, further preliminary surveys and reconnaissance 
by air were conducted by Wilkins . Also in 1929 , the American naval 
aviator Byrd ( during the first of three large-scale expeditions 
which spanned the 1930's)  was the first to fly over the South 
Pole . His fellow countryman, Ellsworth , became the first to cro s s  
the continent b y  aeroplane in 1935 . Other expeditions which 
utilized aircraft were Riiser-Larsen's Norvegia expedition o f  
1929-30 , Mawson's joint Briti sh ,  Aus tralian and New Zealand 
expedition of 1929-3 1 , Rymill's British expedition of 1 934-37 and 
Ritscher's German expedition of 1938-39 . 
Because science and exploration were the objective s  of these 
expeditions , science and exploration have become the dominant 
image of Antarctic affairs during this period . Grattan writes , for 
example , 
'While to understand the his tory of Antarctica attention must  be 
gi ven to whaling and politics to enforce the idea that there has 
been more to it than heroic struggle in the snow and ice , the fact 
remains that the most  memorable transactions were indeed in 
exploration and scientific work . In the long run they became the 
dominant expressions of humanity's interest in Antarctica , though 
the ancient se7pents of economics and politics continued to lurk 
in the shadows . '  
Other writers sketch a similar image . They do so , however , not by 
what they write , but by what they o mi t .  Sullivan, Lovering and 
Prescott , Lewis , Mitchell and Tinker for example , all refer to 
these ages of Antarctic affairs and there accounts are replete 
7 Grattan, op . cit . ,  p 592 . 
1 3  
8 with epic tales of ris k,  endurance ,  valour , ambition and tragedy . 
However , little , if any, prominence is afforded to political and 
economic factors in these s tudies thereby conveying the 
impression, as with Grattan , that such considerations were very 
much in the background . 
This image is deficient , however . Interpretations which focus on 
science and exploration during this period have a shallow depth of 
field . Political and economic factors were significant , too , in 
shaping Antarctic affairs during the first four decades of the 
twentieth century . They were associated with the partition of 
Antarctica which occurred between 1908 and 1939 when five 
countries asserted claims to about 85 per cent of the region . 
In 1908 , Britain was the first country to proclaim sovereignty in 
the Antarctic when South Georgia , the South Orkneys , the South 
Shetlands , the South Sandwich Is lands and Graham Land on the 
Antarctic Peninsular were , by Royal Letters Patent , formally 
constituted Dependencies of the Colony of the Falkland Islands and 
placed under its government . Nine years later , in 1917 , Britain 
amended the definition of lands comprised in the Falkland Islands 
Dependencies so as to include all islands and territories situated 
8 Sullivan, o p . cit . ,  pp 43-7 4 ;  J . F . Lovering and J . R . V . Presco t t , 
op . ciS.,  pp 122-13 8 ; B .Mitchell and J.Tinker , Antarctica and 
i ts resources , Earthscan , London , 1980 , pp 7-8; R . S .Lewis , From 
Vinland to Mars , Quadrangle ,  New York, 1976 ,  pp 79-85 . 
between longitudes 
14  
° and 50 West , and south of latitude 50
° 
South; and all islands and territories situated between longit udes 
50° and 80° West , and south of latitude 58 ° South . Thus Britain's 
claim in Antarct ica took the form of a pie-shaped wedge , or 
sector , that extended to a point at the South Pole . 
A similar sector was claimed in 1923 by a British Order-in-Council 
which established the Ross  Dependency under New Zealand 
administration. This sector incl uded all the area south of 
latitude 600 South between logitudes 1600 East and 150° Wes t .  
France followed suit in the following year by claiming Adelie Land 
in the neighbo urhood of 140
0 East , 66° South , and in 1 933  a 
British Order-in-Co uncil es tablished the Aus t ralian Antarctic 
Territory ( under the administration of Australia) which 
constituted all the islands and territorie s  o ther than Ad�lie Land 
situated o 0 between longitudes 45 East and 160 Eas t ,  and south of  
latitude 60° South . 
Subsequently , Norwar y asserted its rights in Antarctica on January 
1 4 ,  193 9 ,  b y  claiming sovereignty over the region extending from 
the eastern boundary of the British Falkland Islands Dependencies 
at longitude ° 20 West to the wes tern boundary of the Australian 
Antarctic Territory at longitude 45° Eas t . The question 
immediately arises : How and why did this partition of Antarctica 
take place and in what way were political and economic factors 
significant . ?  
15  
2.3 The Initial Annexation 
The first point to emphasize is that the initial proclamation of 
sovereignty in Antarctica by Britain in 1908 resulted from a 
constellation of developments pertaining to the whaling industry . 
Leaving aside several financially unsuccessful expeditions to the 
Antarctic during the 1890 ' s  by Norwegian and Scottish interests , 
the start of Antarctic whaling can be said to have commenced in 
1904 when the Compania Argentina de Pesca S .A .  established 
operations at Grytviken , South Georgia - much to the concern of 
the Governor of the nearby Falkland Islands who immediately 
informed the British Foreign Office , Colonial Office and Admiralty 
9 
about the company' s  p resence on the island . 
The following year the Norwegian manager of the Argentine company , 
C .A . Larsen , and the Norwegian manager of a newly established 
Chilean whaling company , arrived in Sandefjord , Norway ( the 
whaling capital of the world) to buy whale catchers and 
9 The Compa�!a Argentina de Pesca S .A .  was constituted in 
Buenos Aires in 1904 . The principal shareholders were mostly 
immigrant businessmen from Norway , Sweden and the United 
States . The whaling manage r, C .A . Larsen , was a Norwegian who 
had been in charge of several whaling expeditions to Antarctic 
waters during the 1890' s  and early 1900 ' s . In their history of 
modern whaling , Tonnessen and Johnsen contend that it was news 
of abundant whale stocks bought to Buenos Aires by Larsen 
( following an il17fated expedition) that ' fired the 
imagination of local business tycoons' to establish the 
company. See J.N . Tonnessen and A . O .Johnsen , The History of 
Modern Whaling, translated from the Norwegian by R . I .  
Christopherson, C . Hurst & Co . Ltd . , London , Australian 
National University Press , Canberra , 1982 , p 160 . 
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equipment . 10 Their optimis tic reports concerning the prospects of 
whaling in the Antarctic resulted in a Norwegian whaling company 
venturing to the Falkland Islands and the South Shetlands . It was 
in connection with this enterprise that the Norwegian government 
addressed an inquiry to Britain concerning the sovereignty of  
° territories in the area bet ween longitudes 35 and 80
° West and 
latitudes 45° and 65 ° South - in o ther words , the area covering 
South Georgia , the South Shetlands ,  the South Orkneys and the 
northern part of Graham Land on the Antarctic Peninsula . On May 
16 , 1906 , the British Foreign Secretary , Sir Edward Grey , informed 
Norway's Minis ter in London , Fridtjof Nansen, that according to 
information from the Colonial Office and the Admiralty , all three 
archipelagos and Graham Land were B . . h 
. 1 1  Th r1t1s possess10ns . us , 
these territories 'may be said to have been annexed by Britain for 
the first time in 1906, and this was done by the s troke of a pen 
in the Colonial Offic�. , 12 
10 The manager of the Chilean whaling company was A.A.Andresen 
who had previously been involved in coastal trade in southern 
Chile . In 1905 , he formed the Sociedad Bellernera de 
Magallanes (with British capital ) and in the following year 
discovered the magnificent harbour of Deception Island in the 
South Shetlands .  This harbour became the centre of whaling 
operations in the western Antarctic . See , Tonnessen and 
Johnsen , op . cit . ,  p 157; E .W . Hunter Christie , The Antarctic 
Problem, George Allen & Unwin Ltd . ,  London , 195 1 ,  p 280 . 
11  Tonnessen and Johnsen , op.cit . ,  pp 179-180 . Britain also 
informed Norway that 'Norwegian whalers should apply to the 
Governor of the Falkland Islands for any facilities that they 
might need . '  See, International Court of Jus tice Pleadings , 
Antarctic Cases • • .  , op . cit . ,  p 15 . 
12 Tonnessen and Johnsen , op . cit.,  p 1 80 . 
\ 
1 7  
lhese developments led the Governor o f  the Falkland Islands to 
issue on October 5 ,  1906 , an Ordinance to regulate the whale 
fishery of the Colony of the Falkland Islands (The Whale Fishery 
Ordinance of 1906 ) . lhe ordinance made the taking of whales 
without licence in the four areas of the Falkland Island s , the 
South Orkneys , the South Shetlands and Graham Land unlawful . 13 It 
also established the boundary for the area within which each 
licence holder had the right to catch and settled how many whale s  
each licence holder could catch . 14 Subsequent to this , Britain 
then made specific provision for t he government of South Georgia , 
the South Shetland s , the South Orkneys , the South Sandwich Islands 
and Graham Land as dependencies of the Falkland Islands through 
the Letters Patent of 1908 . 
There are several reasons that explain why Britain issued the 
Letters Patent . First , these dependencies had become increasingly 
important as source s  of a valuable raw material - whale oil . The 
following table illustrates this by comparing whaling catches in 
13 Whaling in South Georgia was controlled though separat e  
arrangements dating from January 1 ,  1906 , when the Compania 
Argentina de Pesca S .A.  was granted a lease of 500 acres of 
land . See , International Court o f  Justice Pleadings , Antarctic 
Cases • • •  , op . cit . ,  p 17.  
14 Tonnessen and Johnson, op . cit . ,  pp 180-181 . 
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Antarctic waters with those in the northern seas . 
TABLE 2 . 1: CATCH IN THE ANTARCTIC & NORTHERN SEAS , 1904-10 
Season 
1904-05 
1905-06 
1906 -07  
1907-08 
1908-09 
1909-10 
Year 
1905 
1906 
1907 
1908 
1909 
1910 
ANTARCTIC 
Shore Stations/ 
Floating Factories Catchers Whales 
1 1 95 
3 5 7 12 
4 8 1 , 112 
7 14 2 , 312  
10  21 4 , 125 
13 3 7  6 , 099 
NORTHERN SEAS 
( not including East Asia) 
- Catchers 
82 
79 
80 
8 1  
7 8  
8 3  
Whales 
3 , 53 6  
2 , 7 6 6  
3 , 432 
3 , 248  
3 , 958 
3 , 448 
Source : Tonnessen and Johnsen, op . ci t . ,  p 176 . 
Barrels 
2 , 87 0  
19 , 100 
2 7 , 7 19 
60 , 7 6 0  
9 4 , 50 6  
157 ,592 
Barrels 
108 , 050 
8 1 , 145 
100 , 100  
9 5 , 36 0  
120 , 050 
112 , 34 7  
\ 
These statis tics indicate that within four seasons ( i . e .  by 1907-
08) , 41 . 50 per cent of whales caught in these two whaling areas 
came from Antarctic waters while 38 . 9  per cent of whale oil 
barrels were obtained from the south . It has been sugges te d  that 
overexp10itation and the consequent decline of northern fisheries 
both caused and emphasized this rise of whaling in Antarctic 
1 9  
waters . 1S Moreover , this change was greatly facilitated by several 
technological develop ments in the latter part of the nineteenth 
century . One such development was the ironclad s team-driven 
( subsequently diesel-driven) catcher which had the strength , speed 
and manoeuvrability to catch the abundant rorqual whales in 
southern waters .  Another development was the harpoon gun fitted 
with an explosive device which brought a swift death to a stricken 
whale in contradis tinction to the time-consuming , more dangerous 
"old method" which essentially involved "playing" the stricken 
1 6  whale until it died from loss of blood o r  shock. 
An additional factor of great significance in explaining the 
increasing importance of whaling in Antarctic waters was the 
15  See , P .J . Beck, " Securing the dominant "'Place in the Wan 
Antarctic Sun" for the British Empire: the policy of extending 
British control over Antarctica , "  Australian Journal o f  
Politics and History, Vol . 29 ,  No . 3 ,  1983, p 450, and 
G .Jackson , The British Whaling Trade , Adam & Charles Black , 
London, 197 8 .  
1 6  Rorqual whales  ( such as the blue whale , the fin whale , the 
humpback whale and the sei whale )  were abundant at this time 
because , prior to the technological developments mentioned 
above , they were more difficult to catch than the so-called 
right whales . Right whales were "right" because they were 
slow swimming ( therefore easier to catch that the fast­
swimming rorquals) ,  very fat ( thus giving a high oil yield) 
and continued to float after being killed (whereas rorquals 
sank) . By the latter half of the nineteenth century , the 
s tocks of right whales had been deci mated to such an extent 
that they no longer provided the basis for profitable whaling 
operations . With the development of the ironclad s team 
catcher, the harpoon gun and various other associated 
technological innovations , the nature of whaling changed to 
become the so-called "modern method" based on the catching 
of rorquals . See , Tonnessen and Johnsen , op . cit . , pp 6-7 , 
and Jackson, op . cit. , pp 157-169 . 
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escalating de mand for whaling products , especially whale oil , 
which was used in the manufacture of soap and margarine and as a 
fibre dressing , lubricant and fuel for lighting . 1 7  Tonnessen and 
Johnsen concur about the importance of this factor , al though they 
contest the view ( mentioned earlier) that the decline of northern 
fisheries directly caused the rise of whaling in the south . As 
Table 2 . 1  indicates , even during the vigorous increase in the 
south of the first six years , operations in the north remained 
s table . They maintain , and produce supporting s tatistics , that the 
reason had to do with the abundance of stocks in Antarctic waters 
whereby it was possible , using the same mater ial, to catch three 
to four times more than in the north , thereby creating a greater 
margin of profit (no twithstanding increased costs of 
transportation , processing and labour related to operations at the 
18 other end of the world) .  
The increas ing importance of the Falkland Islands Dependencies as 
sources of whale oil is , as it s tands , however , an insufficient 
reason to explain why Britain issued the Letters Patent of 1908 . 
17  Beck , op . cit. , p 450 . This increase in demand for whale oil 
is reflected in its increase in price in 1906 from £15 to L23 
per barrel after more than a decade of low prices .  The 
commodity maintained this high level for 10 years ,  apart from 
an acute slump to £20 in 1 909 . See , Tonnessen and Johnsen , 
op . c it. , p 1 7 7 . Margarine was invented as a sub stitute for 
butter in the late 1890's by the French chemist Hippolyte 
Mege-Mouries .  For a classic account of the burgeoning 
margarine and soap indus tries in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century and early twentieth century , see , 
C . Wilson, The His tory of Unilever : A Study in Economic Growth 
and Social Change , Vol . l ,  Cassel & Co . ,  London , 1954 . 
18 Tonnessen and Johnsen, op . cit. , pp 176-177 . 
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After all , apart from the Argentine and Chilean based companies 
and one British company ( the South Georgia Co . - an affiliate of 
Salveson & Co . of Leith) which was established in 1908 , all the 
other companies engaged in Antarctic whaling were Norwegian . Thus 
Britain obtained most  of its  supply of whale oil through trade • 
with another country . It is significant to not e  however , that 
Antarctic-based whaling provided attractive opportunities for 
British financiers . Indeed , British financiers provided mos t  of 
the capital necessary for Antarctic whaling because very few of 
the sixty Norwegian companies operating as this time could finance 
the required forward investment 1 9  and immense inventory cost s . 
There was , in brief , a marriage of British capital resources and 
Norwegian skilled ( and cheap) labour and this was the nature of 
so-called "British" whaling during the first half of the twentieth 
20 century . In this way Britain secured its  supply of whale oil and 
at the same time entered into a new field of investment . 
As indicated above , Antarctic whaling a t  this time had a greater 
margin of profit compared to whaling in northern seas . Although 
statistics concerning the profitability of Antarctic whaling 
companies are not available for the period 1 906-08, it is 
reasonable to infer that during these years a turnabout from los s  
o r  marginal profit to high profits occurred . I t  i s  known for 
19 Jackson, op . cit . ,  p 163 ,  P 172 .  
20 Ibid . 
\ 
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example, that in its first season of 1904-05 , Compa�1a Argentina 
de Pesca S .A .  operated at a very s mall profit and that the first 
Nor wegian company to operate in Antarctic waters returned to 
Sandefjord in June, 1906, following a seaso n  which produced a 
deficit result. 21  By 1909-10 , however ,  Comp ania Argentina de P esca 
S .A .  returned a dividend of 40 per cent and in 1910-11  returned a 
dividend of 80 per cent. Similarly , other pioneering companies in 
Antarctic waters ( mostly Norwegian) returned high dividends by 
1909-10 . 22 One Norwegian company provides another example of this 
turnabo ut of fortune . The Sandef jord Whaling Company did not 
declare a dividend for its first two seasons , 1906-08 , b ut in 
1909-12 , 60 per cent, 120 per cent and 100 per  cent respecti vely 
were declare d .  As Tonnessen and Jo hnsen comment, 'That a company 
was in a position to pay - such colossal dividend s  d uring a 
depression in s hipping could only mean that whaling was the mos t  
profitable enterprise . ,23 I n  s hort, therefore , i t  was both 
convenient and profitable for Britain to obtain its whale oil 
requirements via Norway and the Letters Patent of 1908 pro vided a 
legal foundation to control the burgeoning industry . 
One other reason has al so been suggested as a contrib uting factor 
in the issuing of the Letters Patent. Beck notes that Britain was 
21 Tonnessen and Jo hnsen , op. cit.  
22 Ibid . ,  Table 49 , p 7 37 .  
23  Ibid . ,  p 184 . 
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also anxious to pre-empt either French moves in the wake of 
Charcot ' s  voyages in the region of the Antarctic Peninsula or 
Argentine action in the light of reports that it  was intending to 
e stablish a meteorological observatory 
24 there . Although Beck 
provides no evidence to substantiate British anxiety in this 
regard, it is important to note that the Antarctic Peninsula is  on 
one side of a major s trategic and commercial naval rout e  ( the 
Drake Passage ) at the confluence of the Pacific , Southern and 
South Atlantic Oceans . Though it  is  no more than speculation, an 
additional factor in the initial annexation of Antarctic territory 
may well have been a British desire to exclude other foreign 
25 countries from a region deemed important on strategic grounds .  
To summarize so far then, the commencement of whaling in the 
Antarctic led to a series of events which resulted in the initial 
British claim of sovereignty in the region. Clearly,  a crucial 
point in this series of events was the Norwegian inquiry of 1906 
as to the s tatus of territories in the area between longitude 35° 
and 80° West  and latitudes ° 45 and 65° South : by raising the 
ques tion with Britian, Norway directly prompted that country to 
proclaim sovereignty over the area . But why did Norway make this 
inquiry of Bri tain? lfhy did Norway not proclaim sovereignty over 
the area concerned itself? 
,24 Beck,  o p . cit . ,  p 451 . 
25 I t  is important to no te too, that the Panama Canal linking the 
Atlantic Ocean with the Pacific Ocean was not in use until 
1914 . MOreover , the nearby Falkland Islands were strategically 
important as a naval fueling depot . 
24 
The Norwegian scholars Tonnes sen and Johnsen note that Norway's 
action of asking Britain to make clear its position in the region 
was repeated several times in the ensuing years and they suggest 
that the explanation was the lack of Norwegian diplomatic 
26 experience .  Certainly, Norway was a newcomer to the ranks of 
sovereign states , having gained independence from Sweden in 1905 . 
Notwiths tanding this point , however, i t  must be recognized that 
although Norway immediately embarked upon a policy of neutrality 
after gaining statehood , a high priority o f  Norwegian foreign 
policy was to maintain a friendly relationship with Britain , the 
27 predominant naval power . 
The major reasons for this were twofold . Fir s t , a century before , 
Norway ( then under the rule o f  Denmark) had been drawn into a war 
on the side of Napoleon against Britain . This resulted in a 
British blockade of Norway , the seizure of its shipping , and the 
loss of its  major export market ( i . e .  Britain) , all of which 
caused extreme hardship in the Nordic country.  Thus , Norway 
developed a foreign policy tradition oriented toward the Atlantic 
in general , and toward Britain in 28 particular . 
26 Tonnes sen and Johnsen, op . ci t . ,  p 1 7 9 . 
Second , this 
27 Britain had also given diplomatic support to the Norwegian 
government during the union dissolution crisis with Sweden 
during 1905 . See , P .M . Burgess ,  Elite Images  and Foreign 
Policy O¥tcomes :  A Study of Norway,  The Ohio State University 
Press ,  (no date of publication) , p 22 . 
28 See , "A Brief History of Modern Norway's Foreign Policy, " 
Norway Information , Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs , Oslo , Norway, January 1981 ; F . Hodne , "Growth of a 
Dual Economy - The Norwegian Experience 1814-1 9 14 , " Economy 
and History , Vol . XV I ,  1973 , pp 89-9 0 ;  The Scandinavian 
S tates and Finland , Royal Institute of International Affairs , 
London, 1 95 1 ,  pp 1 ,  157,  199 ; Burgess ,  op . ci t . ,  pp  22-23 . 
, 
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eradition was also in accord wi th Norwegian maritime interests  
which had rapidly developed during the last half o f  the nine teenth 
29 century . These maritime interests ( both shipowners and 
exporters ) were able to bring considerable political i nfluence to 
bear on the administration of Norway' s  external a ffairs from their 
key positions in the Norwegian economy . They pressed for a narrow 
concept of the objec tives to be pursued by the Norwegian 
diplomatic and consular services : objec ti ves which concentrated , 
as one writer has observed , 'on looking after Norway's economic 
i nterest to the virtual exclusion of all other activities normally 
30 associated with foreign policy . '  When o ne considers that Britain 
was a major market for Norwegian goods and the major source of 
finance capital for Norway , not only in respect to whaling (as  
indicated earlier ) ,  but also in respect to shipping and 
3 1  manufac ture , it  seems reasonable to suggest that the mai nte nance 
of cordial relations with Bri tain was afforded high priority by 
these influential mari time interests . 
29 By the begi nning of World War I ,  Norway had acquired the 
fourth larges t  mercantile fleet in the world ( after Britain,  
the United S tates and Germany) and by this time , shipping 
alone earned for Norway some 40 per cent of i t s  total export 
incomes . See, Hodne, op.ci t . ,  plOD . 
30 E-W Norman ,  "The Royal Norwegian Ministry o f  Foreign 
Affairs , "  The Times Survey of Foreign Minis tries of the 
Wo rld , selected and edited by Z . Stei ner , Times Books , London ,  
1982. Norman remarks that at this time 'it was generally 
accepted that Norway was to keep clear of all foreign 
political entanglements and that top priority was to be 
given to the promo tion and safeguarding of foreign trade and 
shipping . '  See , ibid. , p 207 . 
31  See , for example , T.K.Derry, A Short His tory of Norway , Alle n  
& Unwin,  Lo ndo n, 1957 , p 202 ; Jackson, o p . cit . ,  p p  163 , 17 2 .  
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Taken together , then, these considerations lead to the conclusion 
that 'lack of  Norwegian diplomatic experience ' is a rather shallow 
explanation of the Norwegian inquiry . A deeper analysis reveals 
Norway's need at the time to be sensitive and responsive to the 
interest s  of Britain . Accordingly , a more plausible explanation of 
the Norwegian inquiry is that Norway did not wish to risk 
antagonizing Britain by making a precipitant claim in Antarctica . 
2.4 Further Developments 
Following the issuing by Britain of the Let ters Patent of 1908 , a 
number of consequential developments pertaining to the partition 
of Antarctica occurred . The major ones  can , for convenience ,  be 
discussed under seven headings . The first was the increasing 
importance of Antarctica , in economic and s trategic terms . In 
part , this s temmed from an increased demand for whale oil which 
magnified the importance of the region as the major source of the 
commodity . Poor harvests of linseed oil (an oil generally 
preferred to whale oil) in 1 9 1 1  and 1 9 12 , together with the 
increased consumption of margarine , caused shortages of oils and 
fats for soap production and thereby increased the demand for 
whale " 1  32  o�  • Furthermore , the introduction of the hydrogenation 
process on an industrial basis between 1 9 1 1  and 1 9 13 (a process 
which transformed whale oil from fluid to a solid and which 
removed most of its unpleasant smell and taste)  also resulted in 
the increased usage of  whale oil such that 'Whaling became , 
32  Tonnessen and Johnsen, op . cit . , pp 232-233 . 
" 
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in effect , an adjunct of the margarine and soap indus tries by 
Moreover , after 1914 , with the onset of World War I ,  whale oil 
became an exceedingly important s trategic material , not only as a 
food (i . e .  margarine) ,  but also as the principal source of 
glycerine . Glycerine , of course , was a vital constituent of 
explosives used in the manufacture of armaments and was obtained 
in soap-making when fatty acids combined with alkalis . 34 
Accordingly , during the course of the war , Britain relaxed the 
regulations which had previously restricted direct British 
commercial operations in Antarctica and encouraged the two British 
33 Jackson , op . cit . ,  p 182 . As the name sugges t s , the hydro­
genation process involves the transformation of unsaturated 
fatty acids and their glycerides to solid fat s  by binding 
hydrogen compounds with the aid of a metal catalyst . Although 
fir s t  patented in 1902 , development to the s tage of 
industrial mas s  production took a decade to achieve . For a 
more detailed account of the app lication of this proces s  to 
the soap and margarine industries , see Tonnes sen and John sen, 
op . cit . ,  pp 227-240 ;  and Wil son , op . cit . ,  pp 125-138 . 
34 For more detailed accounts of the s t rategic importance of  
whale oil during World War I ,  see  Tonnessen and Johnsen , 
op . cit . ,  p 229 ; Jackson , op . cit . ,  p 176 ; Beck, op . cit . ,  
pp 453-454 ; Wilson ,  op . cit . , pp 216-226 ;  and M . W . W . P . Consett ,  
The Triumph of Unarmed Forces , Williams and Norgate , London ,  
1923 , pp 166-179 . 
The strategic value of whale oil continued throughout the 
interwar years and during World War I I .  In the memoirs of the 
British Minis ter for Food during World War II (the Earl of 
Woolton) , an account is given about the importance attributed 
to the acquisition of whale oil supplies ,  largely from the 
Antarcti c ,  by both Britain and Germany. See , The Memoirs of 
the Rt . Hon . The Earl of Woolton , Cassell , London , 195 9 ,  p 237. 
\ 
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35 whaling companies to increase their catches . • In short , then , 
Antarctica became strategically important as the major source of 
whale oil . 
The region' s proximity to Aus tralia , New Zealand , South Africa and 
the Falkland Islands also raised fears in the years immediately 
after World War I that during any future war , enemy submarines and 
aircraft might use Antarctica as a base for raiding operations 
against these  southern parts of the British Empire . Accordingly , 
Antarctica came to be regarded as a significant part of British 
imperial security with the Bri tish Admiralty emphasizing the need 
' to learn the area thoroughly . ,3 6  
3 5  Most exis ting licence-holders in the pre-war period were 
Norwegian , and the subsequent exclusion of British companies 
from particular areas fostered criticisms that , paradoxically , 
the British policy was 'anti-British' in nature . ( See , Beck , 
op . cit . ,  p 45 1 ;  Jackson , op . cit . ,  p 173 ) . Beck makes the 
telling point , however , that to official eyes , the system of 
control served to promote British interests in the Falkland 
Islands Dependencies in the wider sense by securing implicit 
international recognition of British sovereignty . ( See , Beck, 
o p . cit . , pp 451-45 2 ) . In addition , as discussed earlier , 
although most of the whaling firms that operated in the 
Antarctic before 1 9 14 were Norwegian , their chief source of 
capital was Britain . The policy can therefore hardly be 
labelled 'anti-British' , for although it hamstrung some 
British whaling firms , it was not inimical to the interests 
of the British overseas financier.  
36 Cited in Beck , op . cit . ,  p 456 .  See also , The Antarctic Treaty , 
New Zealand Institute of International Affairs , Wellington ,  
1972 ,  p 5 .  
The major naval Battle of the Falklands in December 1 9 14 also 
illus trates the strategic significance of the area where the 
South Atlantic meets the Southern Ocean . 
\ 
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The second development concerns further British initiatives 
p ertaining to  Antarctica . In 1 9 17 , Britain redefined the 
boundaries of the Falkland Island Dependencies , as set out in the 
Letters Patent of 1908 , to make the claim more precise and in line 
with the sector principle which had been employed by Rus sia during 
the previous year in relation to its particular claim in the 
Arctic . Notwiths tanding this action, however , British policy with 
regard to Antarctica at the time was essentially aimless . In 1 9 1 9 , 
however, Brit ain commenced a policy,  the object  of which was to 
extend imperial control gradually over the whole Antarctic region 
while acting 'without undue o stentation' in order to avoid 
counter-claims and international 3 7  disput e .  The principal 
architect of this policy was Leo Amery who , at the time, was Under 
Secretary at the Colonial Offi�e . A fervent advocate of imperial 
development , Amery saw 'Britain as the source of men and money and 
with the Dominions and Britain as mutually interdependent 
markets,38 and he was to become the political heir of Joseph 
Chamberlain and acknowledged leader of the Imperial movement in 
39 Britain.  Serving as First Lord of the Admiralty from 1922-23 and 
Secretary of  State for the Dominions and Colonies from 1924 till 
1929 , Amery' s  keen interest  in Antarctica continued throughout the 
37 For a more detailed account of this policy , see Beck, op . ci t . 
38 Julian Amery , " Introduction , "  The Leo Amery Diaries ,  Vol . 1 :  
1896-1929 , J . Barnes and D .Nicholson ( eds . ) , Hutchinson , 
London , 1980 , p 14 . 
3 9  Ibid . ,  pp 1 3 , 1 5 .  Joseph Chamberlain was British Secretary of 
State for the Colonies from 1895 to 1903 . During his tenure of 
office , Chamberlain was the principal architect of British 
imperiali s t  policies . 
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1920's as Britain sought , in the words of one Foreign Office 
, departmental head , 'to paint the whole Antarctic red as the result 
-
Ii ,40 of a deliberate and settled po cy . 
While Britain was formulating this "gradualis t "  imperial policy , a 
number of events were in train which were to bring these British 
designs into the open with the sorts of consequences that Britain 
had hoped to avoid . These events shall be discussed under the 
third development heading : the introduction of modern pelagic 
whaling in Antarctica . This method of whaling involves the use of 
'mechanically propelled ( steam or motor )  whale catchers in the 
open sea in combination with a floating factory which has no links 
with the shore , and where the whale is reduced on board to oil and 
h d ,41  ot er pro ucts . Apart from two brief episodes of pelagic 
whaling during the 19 12- 13 season off South Orkney - the result of 
extensive pack ice which prevented the floating factories involved 
from mooring close to shore - this method of whaling commenced 
40 Cited in Beck, op . cit . ,  p 459 . An example of Amery's  public 
pronouncements about Antarctica is his 1925 speech delivered 
at the commissioning of the Royal polar research ship 
Discovery . On this occasion , Amery drew a parallel between 
the earlier imperial design in Africa and contemporaneous 
British designs concerning Antarctica . As The Times reported : 
"Just as the developments of Africa had taken place 
within the last generation, so he [Amery] believed we 
[Britain] were on the eve of a period during which our 
outlook upon the Arctic and Antarctica was going to be very 
much changed • • • the Antarctic was of immense interest  
because of  its great and as  yet  undiscovered fishing grounds . 
We were going to live up to our reputation as pioneers by 
developing and safeguarding the natural resources of that 
vast ocean region . '  ( See , The Times , June 15 , 1925 . )  
41  Tonnessen and Johnsen , op . cit . ,  p 324 . Emphasis added . 
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in l\nta�ctic waters in 1923  after the Norwegian whaling pioneer 
C A Larsen had applied for and obtained from Britain in December . . , 
1922 , a licence fo� catching whales outside the area claimed as 
the Falkland Islands Dependencies in the Balleny Islands and Ross 
Sea 42 areas . Larsen had suspended his whaling operations in 
Antarctica in 1914 , and as no further licences or concessions were 
available from Britain for whaling in the Falkland Islands 
Dependencies , he conceived the idea of pelagic whaling in the Ross  
Sea . Wishing to maintain regulatory control of Antarctic 
43 whaling , and seeing the opportunity again to secure implicit 
international recognition ( i . e .  Norway's)  of Bri tish sovereignty 
in another area of Antarctica , Britain granted the licence to 
Larsen and subsequently established by an Order-in-Council of July 
30 , 1923 , the Ross  Dependertcy ,  encompassing the Ross Sea area , 
under New Zealand administration , to provide the legal basis for 
its action . 
The fourth development pertaining to the parti tion of Antarctica 
was the subsequent formal claim by France of Adelie Land in March , 
42 Tonnessen and Johnsen , op . cit . ,  pp 346-347 , 197-198 . Prior 
to Larsen's expedition , almost all modern whaling had been 
conducted from a shore station or from a factory ship which 
was moored in a harbour and supplied with whales by catchers . 
43 It should also be noted tha t there was direct financial gain 
in establishing and maintaining regulatory control of 
Antarctic whaling . This was in the form of revenue from 
licence fees and royalties . In 1914 these yielded �9 , 662  
( or 28 . 2  per cent of Falkland Islands government revenue ) ,  
and in 1917 they yielded £10 , 139 (or 27 . 9  per cent of 
Falkland Islands government revenue) .  See , P . J . Beck , 
"British Antarctic Policy in the Early 20th Century , "  
Polar Record , Vol . 2l ,  No . 134 , 1983 , foo tno te 7 ,  p 48 1 .  
I 
I \ 
' 1  
L 
I i  
' /  
1 
) , " 
32 
I "  
1924 . The , � �oastal portion of this area of Antarctica had been . 
'" 
sfg�ted'.oby the French explorer Dumont d'Urville in 1840 (as 
' . I ,  
mentioned earlier) and this " first discovery" was the basis upon 
� ... .. 1'" t ,  ...;: 1. 
'which the claim rested . It is not clear what motivated France to 
claim Ad�lie Land although the action may well have been related 
to its increasing interest in whaling and other fisheries in that 
the Kerguelen Islands , the Crozet Archipelago , St . Paul and 
Amsterdam Islands ( all remote southern locations in the Indian 
Ocean between South Africa and Australia) were all placed under 
French Fisheries Regulations in decrees issued on November 21 and 
December 30 , 1924 . These islands , together with Adelie Land , were 
also attached to the French Government of Madagascar . 
This French claim was not contested by Britain despite the latter 
country's imperial aims concerning Antarctica . The phraseology of 
a subsequent statement of British policy in the region which was 
released following the 1926 Imperial Conference illustrates this 
point . In this statement , a number of areas were listed as 
'regions to which a British title already exists by virtue of 
discovery' namely : 
' ( i )  
( ii )  
( iii)  
( iv) 
(v) 
(vi )  
(vii ) 
The outlying part of Coats Land , viz . ,  the portion 
not comprised within the Falkland Islands Dependencies . 
Enderby Land . 
Kemp Land . 
Queen Mary Land . 
The area which lies to the west of Adelie Land and 
which on its discovery by the Aus tralian Antarctic 
expedition of 1 9 12 was denominated lnlkes Land . 
King George X4
Land [which is east o f  Adelie Land ] . 
Oates Land . ... 
44 See , D . H.Miller , "National Rights in the Antarctic , "  Foreign 
Affairs , Vol . S ,  No . 3 ,  April , 1927 ; and Imperial Conference 
1926 , Summary of Proceedings , Commonwealth of Australia , 
Parliamentary Paper , 23 March , 1927 , p 22 . 
, , 
33  
Thus Britain excluded Ad�lie Land in this list  of regions which 
extended in an easterly direction from the Falkland Islands 
Dependencies to the Ros s  Dependency . It is also clear that Britain 
knew of France's designs in Antarctica as early as 1 9 12 . In 
December , 1911 , Britain had asked France to clarify its position 
in the region and had been informed in the following April that 
d'Urville had taken possession of Adelie Land for France during 
his voyage of 1840 . The French reply had also indicated that 
France had no intention of renouncing possession of the 
45 territory . 
This French action concerning Antarctica did , however , cause a 
great deal of consternation amongst interested individuals and 
groups in Aus tralia and uncertainty about the boundaries of Ad�lie 
Land resulted in a muted controversy between the two countries 
that lasted until 1938-39 . This controversy even involved 
suggestions that France trade the area for the New Hebrides . 46 
The year 1924 was noteworthy in another important respect , too . In 
April and May of that year , the United States Secretary of State , 
Charles E .  Hughes ,  issued two statements about the s tatus of 
claims to s overeignty in Antarctica . The first  s tatement , 
45 Beck, "Securing the dominant • • •  " op . cit . ,  p 452 .  
4 6  Ibid . , p 458-4 6 1 . See also Document 440 , Department 
Memorandum for Mr . J . McEwen , Minister for External Affairs , 
June 1940 in Documents on Australian Foreign Policy 1937-
49 , Vol . III : January-June 1940 , H . Kenway , H . J .W. Stokes & 
P . G . Edwards ( ed s . ) ,  Australian Government Publishing Service 
Canberra , 1979 , p 496 .  
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contained in an exchange of notes between Hughes and the Norwegian 
Minister in the United S tates , posited that in the polar regions 
where settlement was an impossibility , mere discovery coupled with 
the formal taking of possession 'would afford frail support for a 
reasonable claim to sovereignty, . 47 The second statement , in reply 
to an inquiring citizen , reiterated this position saying that it 
was the opinion of the S tate Department ' that the discovery of 
lands unknown to civilization even when coupled with a formal 
taking of possession , does not support a valid claim of 
sovereignty unless the discovery is followed by an actual 
settlement of the the discovered country . ,48 Accordingly , Hughes 
went on to write that the United States was reluctant to claim 
sovereignty over Wilkes Land despite its discovery ( by Wilkes )  in 
1840 and this notion that actual set tlement was a neces sary 
condition to establish sovereignty (known as the Hughes Doctrine) 
became the keystone of United States policy concerning Antarctic 
claims . It was the fifth major development pertaining to the 
partition of Antarctica and , in short , meant that the United 
States did not recognize the British , French and New Zealand 
claims . 
The sixth development was increasing concern in Australia during 
the 1920 ' s  that the portion of Antarctica adjacent to the 
�7 The Secretary of State [ Charles E .  Hughes ]  to the Norwegian 
Minister [ Bryn] , Foreign Relations of the United States 1924 , 
Vol . 11 ,  U . S . Government Printing Office , Washington, 1939 , 
pp 5 19-520 . 
48 Cited in Miller , op . cit . ,  pp 509-510 . 
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Australian continent should be brought under British or Australian 
control . For example , from 1 9 19 and throughout the 1920's , the 
noted Australian polar explorer Douglas Mawson (with the backing 
of :he Australian scientific community) repeatedly called for the 
49 Bri:ish and Australian governments to act in this way . Following 
the French claim to Ad�lie Land in 1924 , and subsequent Norwegian 
and American activity in Antarctica , the Australian government was 
stirred into action and extended to Antarctica a doctrine of its 
own - a doctrine also employed in regard to the Pacific islands 
south of the equator ' that any land within a conveniently 
undefined distance of Australia should be in British possession to 
insure Australia' s  insulation from the attentions of hostile 
,50 powers . 
In the two years following the 1926 Imperial Conference , the 
Australian liaison officer attached to the British Foreign Office , 
R . G . Casey , took part in discussions with Britain about how best 
Australia might proceed to assume control over parts of 
Antarctica . 51 The Australian Prime Minister at the time , 
49 Swan , op .cit . ,  pp 157 , 175 , 182 . In an address to a Rotary Club 
in Hobart ,  Tasmania in January 1 928 , Mawson claimed that after 
_orld War I ,  the British government 'had invited Australia 
to take control of the part of Antarctica known as the 
Australian Quadrant , but the invitation was not accepted by 
the Commonwealth because Mr .  Hughes [ the Australian Prime 
�nister]  was too busy with political trouble of his own. ' 
Reported in The Times , January 2 0 ,  1 928 . 
50 Grat tan , op . cit� ,  pp 6 14-615 . 
51 �y Dear P .M . : R . G . Casey's Letters to S .M . Bruc e ,  1924-1929 ,  
� . J .Hudson and J . North ( eds . ) ,  Australian Government 
Publishing Service , Canberra , 1980 , p 5 1 . In one episode, in 
August 1928 , Casey urged the British Foreign Office 'to warn 
the Norwegians off' any flag-planting activities in Enderby 
Land or the vicinity . See , p 392 . 
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S .M . Bruce , favoured immediate direct annexation . Britain , however ,  
did not agree ,  favouring i t s  "gradualis t "  policy coupled with its 
desire to avoid 52
 controversy . The outcome of these discussions 
was BANZARE - the British , Australian and New Zealand Antarctic 
Research Expedition of 1929-30 and 1 930-31 led by Mawson. The aims 
of this expedition were fivefold . The first was to locate the 
coastline from Enderby Land (at 450 East )  to King George V Land 
(at 1600 East ) ;  the second was to carry out scientific research; 
the third was to examine the economic resources of the so-called 
Australian quadrant ( and in particular , the whaling 
possibilities ) ; the fourth was to make use o f  the experience and 
knowledge of the personnel who had been associated with the 
Australasian expedition o f  1 9 1 1-14 'before it was too lat e . ,53 It 
is  clear too , that the fifth -aim was to make landings on the 
Antarctic continent to plant the flag and proclaim each area to be 
British . 54 
Using the polar research ship Discovery , the first BANZARE took 
place in the summer of 1929-30 . On January 14 , 1 930 , whils t  
sailing along the coast o f  Enderby Land , the Discovery made 
contact with a Norwegian whaling and exploring expedition using 
the ship Norvegia . The leaders of the two expeditions , Mawson and 
Riiser-Larsen , discussed and compared their programs and agreed to  
avoid duplication of effort by res tricting their respective fields 
52 Beck, " Securing the dominant " , op . cit . ,  p 458 . 
53 Swan, op . cit . ,  p 187 . 
54 Ibid . ,  P 189 . 
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of action. Mawson agreed to s tay east of longitude 45
° Eas t and 
1 Biiser-Larsen agreed to s tay wes t  of that point . 
Following the first BANZARE and the second during the summer of 
1 930-3 1 , the British Dominion Office sought the advice of the Law 
Officers of the Crown concerning the steps to be taken to assert 
British sovereignty over , and to provide Australian administration 
of , that part of the Antarctic continent ( with the exception o f  
Adelie Land) which lies between longitudes 45
0 
East and 1600 
55  Eas t .  Subsequently , on February 7 ,  1933 , a British Order-in-
5 6  Council established the Australian Antarctic Territory , and this 
was followed in June of that year by the Australian Antarctic 
Territory Acceptance Act under Section 122 of the Australian 
57  Constitution . Thus , after more than a decade of prompting by 
interested individuals within the Australian community , and 
protracted diplomatic discussions between Australia and Britain, 
approximately three-sevenths of Antarctica was annexed under 
Australian control .  
Whilst Australian concern about sovereignty claims in Antarctica 
during the 1920' s  was becoming more s trident , Norway ( one of the 
55 Documents Relating to Antarctica , prepared in the Office of 
the Legal Adviser to the Aus tralian Department of Foreign 
Affairs ,  March , 1976 , IV . 7 . I .  As events unfurled ,  the meeting 
between Mawson and Riiser-Larsen decided the future westward 
limit of Australia's Antarctic activities . 
5 6  Statutory Rules and orders Revised 1948 , Vo1 . II ,  p 1034 . 
5 7  Act No . 8  o f  1933 - Commonwealth Act s  1 90 1-19 50 , Vol . 1 ,  p 227 . 
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major pioneering countries in Antarctic exploration and whaling) 
became a claimant of Antarctic territory after two decades '  
acquiescence with respect t o  British claims . This is the seventh 
major development in the partition of Antarctica . On January 1 9 , 
1928 , the Norwegian Foreign Office ordered the Norwegian Minister 
in Britain to inform the British Foreign Office that on December 
1 ,  1927 , the duly empowered Norvegia expedition had taken 
possession of Bouvet Island ( located some 2 , 000 miles South South 
East of South 58 Africa) . This formal Norwegian action was 
precipitated by an announcement several days earlier by the 
British Secretary of State for the Colonies that a Norwegian 
whaling company had 'been granted an exclusive licence to occupy 
certain islands belonging to his Majesty named Bouvet Island and 
Thompson Island . ,59  Britain immediately disputed the Norwegian 
claim, arguing that the British title to Bouvet Island had been 
acquired by virtue of the occupation of the island by a Captain 
Norris in 1825 . Negotiations over the matter took place until 
November , 1928 , when 'after careful review of all the i s sues 
involved , and having regard to the friendly relations existing 
between the two countries , his Majes ty's Government have decided 
to waive the British claim to Bouvet Island in favour of 
60  Norway . '  
58 The Times , January 20 , 1 928 . 
59 Reported in The Times , January 1 8 ,  1 928 . Also, see , The Time s , 
January 24 , 1928 . 
60  The British Foreign Office Under-Secretary (Locker-Lampson) , 
cited in The Times , November 20 , 1928 . 
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But why did Britain waive i t s  claim t o  Bouvet Island and why did 
NorJay decide to annex such territory? In answer to the first part 
of the question , there is evidence to suggest that Britain's 
action was part o f  a bargain concerning what was to become the 
Australian Ant arctic Territory and Norway' s  subsequent claim to 
Queen Maud Land . For example , in the advice given by the Law 
Officers of the Crown to the Bri tish Dominion Office in December , 
1931 ( referred t o  earlier) concerning the s teps to be taken to 
assert British sovereignty ove r ,  and to provide Australian 
administration o f , the Australian quadrant , the writer (H. N . Tait )  
explains that ' great pains have been taken t o  forestall any 
opposition on the part of the Norwegian Government to the action 
now contemplated in connexion with the proposed Australian sector 
and a friendly unders tanding has been reached under which an 
d "  ini i d d N i i ,
6 1 
a JO ng sector s regar e as open to orweg an occupat on. 
Moreover , a pres s  report in 1939 of  a Norwegian government 
statement abou t  the annexation of  Queen Maud Land mentions , too , 
' that the Norwegian expeditions also explored o ther parts of the 
Antarctic , for instance in the Australian dependency , but in 
accordance with the Norwegian Government' s  declaration to the 
British Government in 1929 , Norway will not claim land in 
territories already placed under foreign sovereignty . ,62 The 
territories implied in the latter part of this statement are those 
listed in the statement of British policy in the Antarctic which 
61 Documents Relating to Antarctica, op . cit . ,  IV . 7 . 3 and IV . 7 . 8 .  
Emphasis added . 
62 The Times , January 1 6 ,  1 939 . 
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had been released following the 1926 Imperial Conference . It thus 
s e ccs likely that an unders tanding between Bri tain and Norway 
about their respective interests in the region had been reached by 
1 929 and earlier Bri t ish designs ' to paint the whole Antarctic 
red' had by this tiee been modified . 
In answer to the second par t of the ques tion , i t  is clear that the 
motivation behind the annexation of Bouvet Island was related to 
whaling : s imply the desire to prevent Norwegian whaling interest s  
63  being excluded from areas by the claims of  other countries . This 
'Was also the motivation behind Norway' s annexation of Peter I 
Island ( in the vicinity of longitude 900 Wes t ,  wi thin the 
Antarctic Circle) in 1931 and Queen Maud Land on the continent of 
Antarctica in 1939 . 64 The major s timulus in respect to the latter 
annexation was fear that Germany , through Ri tscher' s  expedition of 
1938-39 , 'Would claim territory in the Norwegian sphere of interes t 
be tween the eas tern boundary of the Falkland Islands Dependencies 
and the wes tern boundary of the Aus tralian Antarctic Terri tory . 
Germany recognized the s trategic importance of whale-oil as a 
63 "Norway in the Antarc tic , "  Norway Information , Royal 
Norwegian Mini stry of Foreign Affairs , January , 1 982 . See 
also , Gra t tan , op . cit . ,  p 600 . 
64 The limi ts o f  the Norwegian claim to Queen ��ud Land are not 
defined to the north or to the south . In this way , Norway 
disavows the so-called " s ector principle' used by o ther 
claimants in the Antarctica and also in the Arctic . The 
reason for this disavowance i s  that the use of the principle 
by Norway in the Antarctic would undercut Norway"'s 
jurisdictional claim in the Arctic to control part of the 
continental shel f in the Barants Sea . This particular Arctic 
claim is contested by the Soviet Union which , in turn , favours 
the sector line . See , Polar Regions Atlas , U . S . Central 
Intelligence Agency , May , 1978 . 
4 1  
vital commodity in a wartime economy . During World War I ,  Germany 
had been menaced by a shor tage of fats and one of the first acts 
of the Nazis following their rise to power in 1933 was to embark 
upon a policy, the aim of  which was to make Germany more self-
sufficient in fat 65 production . Apart from setting up a fat 
monopoly ( the Reichss telle fur Milcherzengnisse , Ole und Fette) 
with powers to control all imports , marketing and production, 
6 6  Germany also ent ered the Antarctic whaling industry . 
In 1936 , the Director of the German Reichsbank and Economics 
Minister (Hjalmar Schacht )  forced Unilever ( the British 
mul tinational company which dominated the whale-oil industry) to 
finance the construction of the German whaling fleet by 
threatening to reduce drastica�ly the company's  margarine quota . 
During the 1937-38 season,  two of the six German whaling 
expeditions in Antarctica were chartered from Norway , one was 
entirely owned by Unilever and of the remaining three , Unilever 
had interests of 50 per cent or more . Thus one of the Nazi 
65 Tonnessen and Johnsen, op . cit . ,  p 370 . 
66 See , The Times , May 4 ,  1 935 ; January 8 ,  1936 . See also , 
Tonnessen and Johnsen , op .cit . ,  pp 394-399 . In their first 
years of operation ( 1 93 6-37 ) ,  Germany had five factory ships 
and thirty-seven catchers .  In seasons 1936-37 , 1 937-38 , 
1938-39 , German crews constituted 2 . 74 per cent , 7 . 89 per 
cent and 10 . 9 1  per cent respectively of the Antarctic whaling 
fleets . As points of comparison , British crews constituted 
4 . 87 per cent , 6 . 01  per cent and 6 . 82 per cent respectively; 
Norwegian crews 82 . 3  per cent , 67 . 8  per cent and 59 . 1  per cent 
respectively ; and Japanese crews 8 . 98 per cent , 1 6 . 89 per cent 
and 21 . 9 8  per cent respectively . See , Tonnessen and Johnsen, 
op .cit . ,  p 742 . 
42 
leaders , Herman Goering , was able to comment on the importance of 
German whaling that foreign capital and Norwegian whalers 'offer 
the possibility of supporting the supply of fats to our people , 
and thereby contributing to the attainment of the great goal of 
freedom in raw materials and food . ,67 
It is obvious that Antarctic's strategic importance as the major 
source of whale oil was recognized by Germany, and Norwegian fear 
of German designs in the region was probably well founded in the 
light of reports of Rit scher's expedition taking possession o f  
"Neu Schwaben1and" (which overlapped part of Queen Maud Land) by 
hoisting the flag in various places and dropping pointed darts 
surmounted by the German flag from aircraft at regular 
68 intervals .  Notwiths tanding these actions , however , it is 
uncertain if any formal , official claim to part of Antarctica was 
ever made by Germany , and the onset of World War II fores talled 
any dispute between Norway and Germany over the territory . 
Thus , after Norway claimed Queen Maud Land in 1939 , only 15 per 
cent of Antarctica , the so-called Pacific sector , remained 
unclaimed . By the end of the first four decades of the twentieth 
century , over 4 1/2 million square miles of land alone (mostly 
covered by ice) had been claimed by just five countries , and two-
thirds of the whole continent had been formally annexed by members 
67 Tonnessen and Johnsen , op . cit . ,  p 398 . 
68 "Swastikas over Antarctic , "  The Times , April 13 , 1 939 . 
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of the British Empire . As Beck points out , however , such 
developments have 'passed virtually unnoticed by mos t  
i ,6 9  his tor ans . When Robinson and Gallagher wri te that  the 
'fabulous artificers who had galvanized America , Australia and 
Asia had come to the last continent'  they are referring to the 
partition of Africa . 70 • When Fieldhouse writes of places , which by 
the 1930's had 'not or had never been under European domination' 
he cites Turkey, parts of Arabia , Persia , Afghanistan , Tibet , 
China , Mongolia , Siam, Japan , a number of small islands , the 
Arctic and the Antarctic . 7l 
In important respects , these eminent his torians are mistaken. 
Antarctica is the last continent . Antarctica , by the end of the 
1 930's had become part of the European formal 7 2  empire and its 
partition was an expression and extension of two underlying 
s tructural forces of world poli tics which first  became operative 
during the closing years of the nineteenth century : the Second 
Indus trial Revolution and the New Imperialism . But before 
explaining the events of the Antarctic par tition, a brief comment 
about these two forces is necessary . 
69 Beck, " Securing the dominant • • •  " ,  op . cit . , p 448 . 
70 R. Robinson and J . Gallagher with A .Denny , Africa and the 
Victorians : The Official Mind of Imperialism, Macmillan , 
London, 1961 , p 472 . 
7 1  D .K.Fieldhouse , Economics and Empire 1830-1 9 14 , Weidenfeld & 
Nicolson , London , 1973 , p 3 .  
72 I t  mus t ,  of cours e ,  be acknowledged that the claims made in 
Antarc tica during this period were no recognized by all 
countries . 
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2.5 The Second Industrial Revolution and the New Imperialism 
The Second Industrial Revolution involved a cluster of innovations 
which 'marked the start of a new upswing , a second cycle of 
industrial growth which is still in course and whose technological 
possibilities are still far from exhausted . , 73 These innovations 
included such advances as the introduction of electricity as a 
source of power , heat and light;  the development of such things as 
the internal-combustion engine , automotive and aeronautical 
devices , synthetics , fibres and plastics , the telephone and 
wireless telegraphy ; the emergence of microbiology and 
bacteriology as new sciences with important implications for 
medicine , hygiene and nutrition; the development of precision 
manufacture , assembly-line production and new methods of retail 
distribution such as the department store and the chain store . The 
steel industry was also revolutionized following the innovations 
of Bessemer , of Siemens and of Thomas and Gilchrist all during the 
late nineteenth century . So , too , was the petroleum industry . In 
short , the age of coal and iron (i . e .  the Firs t  Industrial 
Revolution) 'was succeeded , after 187 0 ,  by the age of s teel and 
electricity , of oil and chemicals . ,74 
The consequences of the Second Industrial Revolution were far-
reaching to say the least . Of course , the provision of an extended 
account of these consequences is an enormously complicated task 
73 D . Landes , The Unbound Prometheus , Cambridge at the University 
Press , 1969 , p 235 . 
74 G . Barraclough , An Introduction to Contemporary History , 
Penguin, Harmondsworth , 1967 , p 44 .  
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well beyond the scope of this s tudy. It is relevant , however ,  to 
sketch three major developments which , in turn, are related to the 
New Imperialism . The first involved the creation of large-scale 
industrial undertakings to facilitate the achievement of economies 
of scale and increased profits . These enlarged industrial 
enterprises sought new sources of basic materials required for the 
increased production of commodities and new markets for their 
distribution . This resulted in the rapid integration of the world 
as various parts of the globe became more interconnected with each 
75 other . The integration of the world was also facilitated by 
improvements in transportation . The third development was a shift 
from a one-nation industrial system ( centred on Britain) to a 
multi-nation industrial system ( including the newly industrialized 
countries - Germany , the United States , even India and Japan) . As 
Landes says , 'Monopoly had given way to competition' and this 
transformation meant that national economic growth 
7 6  international economic struggle and political rivalry . 
entailed 
A major consequence of these developments was the New Imperialism 
- the surge of colonial expansion and quest for " spheres of  
influence" that occurred in the closing decades of  the nineteenth 
75 Ibid . ,  P 55 . 
7 6  Landes , op . cit . , p 239 .  
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7 7  
century and opening decades of the twentieth century . Between 
the years 1876 and 1 9 14 , for example , over 1 1  million square miles 
of terri tory were annexed by the colonial powers of the world , 
mostly in regions of Africa , Asia and the Pacific - one-fifth of 
the Earth's land area and one-tenth of its population had become 
part of the colonial empire o f  the European powers . The most 
renowned annexation concerned Africa . About one-tenth of the 
continent was controlled by European powers in 1 87 6 . During the 
next decade , however , they scrambled to claim five million square 
miles of African territory ( containing over sixty million people) 
and by the end of the century , nine-tenths of the continent had 
78  been brought under European control . 
In Asia , as the nineteenth century drew to a close , attention also 
turned to China where Britain , Russia , France and Germany 
initially sought " spheres of influence" rather than following the 
model of African partition . This manoeuvring drew from the United 
States in 1899 the famous "Open Door" diplomatic notes from 
Secretary of State Hay to Britain , Russia , Germany and France 
demanding equal access and fair treatment for American interests 
77 It is important to note that this surge and quest  was not a 
solely European phenomenon but a world-wide movement involving 
all the indus trialized countries . The five significant 
colonial powers during the preceding three centuries were 
Britain , Portugal , Spain, France and the Netherlands . These 
were joined in the late nineteenth century by such countries 
as Germany, Russia , Italy , Belgium , Denmark , the United 
States and Japan . 
78 Barraclough , op . cit . ,  pp 61-6 2 . 
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in China and enunciating the integrity and inviolability of that 
country . 79  By 1900 � as it turned out � the competition for spheres 
of influence passed as the four foreign powers concerned had 
already come to see that such informal division would be contrary 
80 to their best economic interests . 
Emphasis has been placed on various factors to explain the New 
Imperialism .  Writers such as Magdoff have stress ed the necessity 
of the industrialized countries to control new sources of primary 
8 1  products and new markets for their manufactured good s . This i s  
known as the "imperialism o f  trade" .  Other writers such a s  Hobson , 
Lenin and Hilferding thought that the basic cause o f  the New 
Imperialism was the need of capitalists in the industrialized 
countries to find satisfactory new opportunities in o ther parts o f  
the world for the 82 investment of surplus capital . Still other 
writers have emphasized the decisive role played by s tatesmen and 
79 These "Open Door" notes are noteworthy , no so much in their 
immediate impact on the course of events , but as the first 
occasion on which the United S tates made pronouncements 
concerning international affairs outside the Western 
Hemisphere . 
80 Fieldhouse ,  op . cit . ,  pp 4 15-437 .  
8 1  H.Magdoff , " Imperialism Without Colonies " ,  in Theories of 
Imperialism ,  R. Owen and R . Sutcliffe ( eds . ) , Longman, London,  
1972,  pp 143-1 6 9 . 
82 See , J .A . Hobson , Imperialism : A Study , London, 1902 ; 
R . Hilferding � Finance Capital , edited with an introduction by 
T . Bottomore from translations by M.Watnick and S . Gordon, 
Routledge & Kegan Paul , London, 1981 ; V . I .Lenin , Imperialism : 
the highest  stage of capitalism , Foreign Languages Publishing 
House , Moscow, 1947 . 
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senior civil servants of the industrialized countries who found it 
necessary to annex overseas territories because of their value as 
strategic bases , as symbols of status , or in order to exclude 
other foreign rivals from regions deemed important to established 
national interests . Finally , writers such as Fieldhouse maintain 
that the New Imperialism is shorthand for a diverse set of 
European responses to urgent and varied problems and situations 
which occurred on the periphery of the world , far from Europe and 
beyond its control . These crises on the periphery were engendered 
by the rapidly growing involvement of Europeans in all parts of 
the world . In brief , Europe was pulled into the New Imperialism by 
the magnetic force of the periphery . 83 
Although not one of the " explanations " of the New Imperialism 
adumbrated above is sufficient alone to account for the partition 
of Antarctica , each contains valid elements which are essential to 
an understanding of this course of events pertaining to the 
southernmost region of the world . 
2 . 6  Explaining the Partition 
The initial annexation of Antarctica began , in the main , as a 
response to problems , questions and opportunities in what 
Fieldhouse calls ' the periphery' . For example , the concern of the 
Governor of the Falkland Islands about the operations of the 
83 Fieldhouse , op . cit . , p 8 ,  pp 7 6-84 , 460-463 . Fieldhouse ' s  
study provides a useful summary o f  the various explanations of 
the New Imperialism .  
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Compan!a Argentine de Pesca S .A.  on South Georgia (communicated to 
the British Foreign Office , Colonial Office and Admiralty) , 
coupled wi th the Norwegian inquiry about the sovereignty of 
territories located in what is known as western Antarctica , led to 
the i ssuing of the ordinance to regulate the whale fishery of the 
colony of the Falkland Islands in 1906 and the subsequent Letters 
Pat ent of 1908 , which provided Britain with a legal foundation to 
control the expanding whaling industry. These actions were not the 
product of a precisely calculated imperialist  policy , although 
considerations related to new sources  of the raw material , whale 
oil , ( the imperialism of trade)  and new opportunities for the 
investment of British capital ( the imperialism of capital 
investment) were also evident . 
It i s  important to note at this juncture , that this initial 
annexat ion was also interlinked with the o ther structural force 
operative in the world at the time the Second Industrial 
Revolution . The increased importance of Antarctic whaling during 
the first decade of the twentieth century was engendered in large 
part by the technological developments of the latter part of the 
nineteenth century such as the ironclad steam and diesel catcher 
and the harpoon gun which made the catching of the abundant 
rorqual whales feasible . Thus , as Tonnessen and Johnsen remark , 
'with the introduc tion of the modern method the Industrial 
Revolution had made its entry into whaling . ,�4 The revival of 
84 Tonnessen and Johnsen, op . cit . , p 7 .  
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exploration and scientific activity during the "heroic age "  of 
Antarctic affairs can also be seen as an expression of the Second 
Indus trial Revolution. The orthodox accounts of this period 
rightly trace the origins of the numerous expeditions to 
ini tiatives taken at the turn of the century by national and 
colonial organizations and scientific societies such as the 
British Royal Geographic Society , the British Association, the 
Royal Society and the Australasian Society . But they say little 
else about causes and o rigins and , thus , lack explanatory depth . 
Exploration and science in Antarctica during this era was not an 
isolated phenomenon, as usually implied, but part of a much wider 
force or historical trend - the Second Indus trial Revolution . The 
nature of this revolution was , in the words of Barraclough , 
'deeply scientific ' and when these Antarctic activities are ranged 
agains t  similar activities in the Arctic and other regions of the 
world , and the general contemporaneous developments in various 
fields such as chemis t ry , physics , biology and so forth , it seems 
plausible to conclude that they vere not merely coincidental but 
expressions of the maj or underlying s tructural forc e . aS 
When attention is turned to the major developments relating to the 
partition of Antarctica during the second , third and fourth 
decades of the twentie th century , it is also evident that not one 
of the explanations of the New Imperialism is sufficient , although 
85 Barraclough , op . ci t . ,  pp 43-50 . 
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again, several of them contain some valid elements which provide 
useful insights into the nature of international relations 
pertaining to the region . First , the British annexation of the 
Ross  Dependency under New Zealand administration in 1923 was 
largely the product of a s ituation on the periphery which provided 
an opportunity for a formal claim of sovereignty . The unexpected 
application by the Norwegian whaling pioneer, C .A . Larsen , for a 
licence to engage in untried pelagic whaling in the Ross  Sea 
provided Britain with the opportunity to annex the area and gain 
Norwegian recognition of the claim. But this i s  not a total 
explanation . Factors such as the British desire to maintain 
regulatory control of the increasingly important Antarctic whaling 
industry; the perceived s trategic importance of the region; and 
the "gradualist "  imperial designs to paint Antarctica red , 
instigated by Leo Amery , were also significant . 
The enunciation of the United States' Hughes Doctrine and the 
Norwegian claims to Bouvet Island , Peter I Island and Queen Maud 
Land also involved factors associated with the imperialism of 
trade 86 explanation . The Norwegian claims clearly involved 
considerations concerned to preserve access to whaling areas , but 
rather than being motivated by any positive desire for empire ,  
Norway was more fearful of the economic consequences of exclusion 
86 The French claim to Ad�lie Land may have als9 involved factors 
associated with the " imperialism of trade" . As mentioned 
beforehand , French motivation may have been related to its 
increasing interest in whaling and other fisheries , although 
it must be acknowledged that the evidence supporting this 
conclusion is flimsy . 
(( 'I. 
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by foreign annexation - particularly by Germany . 
An explanation of the Hughes Docrine is somewhat more complex . It 
will be recalled that this doctrine meant : ( i )  that the United 
States made no claims to territory in Antarctica because no 
"actual settlement " could be made even though first discovery 
could be proved ; and ( ii )  the United States would not recognize 
claims by other countries because this condition of " actual 
settlement " was not fulfilled . In short , according to the Hughes 
Doctrine , "first discovery" did not constitute an adequate basis 
for a claim to sovereignty . As indicated earlier , this was to 
remain the keystone of United States' Antarctic policy concerning 
sovereignty in the region despite several occasions during the 
ensuing three decades when it seemed apparent that the United 
States would reverse this policy by contesting British claims in 
th . 87 e regJ.on . 
To writers such as Auburn , the Hughes Doctrine is puzzling . He 
maintains that it 'unsettled all claims without giving the United 
States any benefit'  and 'later worked against American interests 
by requiring a higher standard than that adopted by the actual 
claimants . ,88 Moreover , Auburn finds it 'curious' that a major 
87 For press reports of seemingly impending reversals during 
the years immediately after the enunciation of the Hughes 
Doctrine , See The Times , April 6 ,  1929 , July 2 ,  1 930 . 
88 F . M.Auburn , Antarctic Law and Politics , C . Hurst & Co . ,  London , 
[ Croom-Helm (Australia) ,  Canberra] ,  1982 , p 64 . 
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legal decision by the Permanent Court of International Justice in 
1933 ( the Eastern Greenland case) did not change the United 
89 i h States' policy . But the Hughes Doctr ne is not so puzzling w en 
ranged firmly agains t past  American policies . According to the 
imperialism of trade explanation of the New Imperialism , those 
countries which espoused the economic doctrine of free trade could 
preserve their existing or potential markets or supplies in one of 
two ways : by obtaining international agreement for a "hands off" 
policy coupled with an " open door " for trade ; or by imposing 
whatever degree of political control was necessary to prevent 
90 annexation by some other power . Both strategies were employed by 
9 1  Britain during the nineteenth century , while the former strategy 
was a distinctive feature of United S tates' during the twentieth 
century, following the famous l'Open Door" diplomatic notes of 1899 
89 In the Eastern Greenland case , both Denmark and Norway claimed 
sovereignty of Eastern Greenland . Denmark argued that when 
Norway and Denmark ceased to be in union ( after 1814 ) , Denmark 
had administered the whole of Greenland, explored and settled 
it . Norway, on the other hand , argued that Eastern Greenland 
had not been settled by Denmark and that in 1931 Norwegian 
hunters had hoisted the Norwegian flag in Eastern Greenland 
and occupied it for Norway on the grounds that it was terra 
nullius . The Permanent Court , after a lengthy deliberation , 
ruled in favour of Denmark. In the words of the majority 
judgement , Danish acts of legislation , exploration , mapping , 
etc . ' • • •  show to a sufficient extent - even when separated 
from the history of the preceding periods - the two elements 
necessary to establish a valid title to sovereignty, namely 
the intention and the will to exercise such sovereignty and 
the manifestation of State activity . '  Cited in H.E .Archdale , 
"Legality in the Antarct ic , "  Aus tralian Outlook, Vo1 . 11 ,  
September , 1957 , p 1 2 .  
�o Fieldhouse , op . cit . ,  p 12 . 
91 See , J . Gallagher and R . Robinson , "The Imperialism of Free 
Trade , "  Economic History Review, Second Series , Vol . VI ,  No . 1 ,  
1953 . 
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Indeed , it has been argued that 'the open door policy [ of the 
United States ] had reached the zenith of its vigor' whilst Hughes 
was Secretary of State . 93 For example , the Washington Conference 
of 1921 was designed in part 
recognition of the principle of 
thereby propping up 'a vulnerable 
expansionis t ]  J ,94 apan . Hughes 
to gain formal international 
the "open door "  in the Far Eas t , 
China against a mighty [ and 
also applied the "open door" 
principle in the Middle East . During the Lausanne Conference , 
which was convened in 1922 to write a new peace treaty with 
Turkey, Hughes persuaded Britain to give up an agreement with 
France concerning restricted access to the Mesopotamian oil fields 
and to recognize the principle of the "open door " , thus allowing 
American companies the opportunity to share in the development of 
95 the valuable and important resources of the region . 
Against this background , coupled with Hughes' t endency to frame 
American interests in terms of general principles , the Hughes 
Doctrine can be seen as an extension of the "open door" into 
92 See pages 46-47 , this chapter . 
93 M . J .Pusey , Charles Evans Hughes , Volume Two , Macmillan , New 
York , 1952 , p 503 . Hughes became Secretary of State in March , 
1921 and relinquished the position in 1925 . 
94 B . Glad , Charles Evans Hughes and the Illusions of Innocence ,  
University of Illinois Press ,  Urbana , 1966 , p 305 . 
95 Ibid . ,  pp 308-310 . 
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Antarctica . 96  Viewed in this light , the Hughes Doctrine preserved 
American access to all of Antarctica by denying recogni tion o f  
c laims by other countries . I n  o ther word s , United States' acce s s  
was n o t  restricted t o  only parts  o f  the region b y  virtue o f  claims 
based on the " first  discovery" of such areas as Wilkes Land and a 
c ontested Antarctic Peninsular . The benefit to be gained from such 
a policy (as  in the case of the Mesopotamian oil fields )  was the 
opportunity to s ecure resources from all of the region if and 
whenever they were discovered and/or became valuable . In sum , 
then , the imperialism of trade explanation provides a useful 
insight to help understand the Hughes Doctrine - when firmly 
ranged against past American policies it falls in line as part of 
Unit ed States .... ambitions to e stablish an "open door" international 
97 order to exploit  its  growing economic power . 
Finally, the e stablishment of the Australian Antarctic Territory 
can largely be explained in t erms of three sets of factors . First , 
strategic and security considerations were clearly important with 
Antarctica b eing perceived by Australia as a proximate 
geographical area from which foreign powers should be  excluded by 
preemptive annexations . Second , Brit ish "gradualist "  designs to 
extend control over most ,  if not all , of the region dovetailed 
96 On Hughes .... t endency to frame American interests in terms of  
general principles , see Glad , ibid . ,  pp 318-320 . 
9 7  For a discussion about American ambitions t o  establish an 
"open door" international order see , G . Stedman Jones , "The 
History of US Imperialism, "  Ideology in Social Science , 
R.Blackburn ( ed . ) ,  Fontana/Collins , Glasgow, 1977 , p 228 . 
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with Aus t ralian ambitions . Third , the role o f  Douglas Mawson, with 
the backing of the Australian scientific community , must also be 
emphasized as an important fac tor . His speeches and writings which 
urged the Australian government to make a claim in the region 
helped shape public a� political opinion for more than a decade . 
All in all then, the partit ion o f  Antarctica involved the same 
sorts of political and economic factors which have been emphasized 
in explanations of the New Imperialism : problems , questions and 
opportunities at the periphery; the need the control new sources 
of raw mat erials ;  s trategic , security and diplomatic manoeuvring ; 
opportunities for the profitable investment of capital . From this 
discussion, three conclusions are compelling . Firs t , the partition 
of Antarctica was clearly an extension of the New Imperialism 
the basic underlying structural force that was so distinctive a 
feature of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries . 
Umbrage mus t  therefore be taken with Suter' s  statement that 
Antarctica 'has for so long remained outside the scramble for 
territ ory' because it could not and , to a lesser extent s till 
cannot ,  satisfy any of the main motivations for the acquisition of 
98 territory . He lists the need to  gain raw materials , the belief 
that i t  was necessary to hold onto certain territory as a 
launching point for other invasions or  to  have a defensive or  
protective belt from invasions , and the need to  win greater glory 
98 K . D . Suter , World Lav and the Las t  Wilderness ,  Revised Edition , 
Friends of the Earth , Sydney , 1980 , p 3 2 .  
d , 
� I 
I 
I t 
I 
1 
� 
1 
� 
I 
I 
\ 
I 
, 
5 7  
for one's  country by expanding the size of its empire a s  examples 
of these 'main motivations . ,99 Suter is mistaken, however . The 
first two of  his motivations were important factors involved in 
the partition of Antarctica . 
Second , a valid assessment of  Antarctic affairs during the first 
four decades of the twentieth century must  therefore not only take 
account of scientific and exploratory activities pertaining to the 
region, but also recognize the significance of political and 
economic factors involved in the partition of Antarctica . These 
'ancient serpents '  should not be seen merely 'lurking in the 
shadows' as the dominant image portrays . They need to be brought 
into focus to achieve a more complete and accurate picture of 
Antarctic affairs . 
Third , and finally , it is clear that the dominant image of 
Antarctic affairs during this period , which focuses on science and 
exploration, treats Antarctic affairs in isolation,  divorced from 
world politics and the basic structural forces ( such as the New 
Imperialism and the Second Industrial Revolution) which have 
shaped the modern world . Accordingly, "dominant image " accounts 
lack explanatory depth . Antarctic affairs must  be related to these 
underlying structural forces to achieve greater depth of field not 
only in connection with the political and economic factors 
accented above , but also in connection �ith science and 
exploration . 
99 Ibi d .  
, 
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CHAPTER 3 THE ORIGINS OF THE ANTARCTIC TREATY 
When Norway claimed sovereignty over Queen Maud Land in January 
1939 , this brought to five the number o f  countries which had 
annexed Antarctic territory . Britain , New Zealand , France , 
Aus tralia , together with Norway , had claimed approximately 85 per 
cent of the region . Such act ions had not passed without dispute or 
controversy . The United State s , for example , did not recognize the 
annexations of the five claimant countries and the French claim to 
Adelie Land had resulted in a controversy between that country and 
Australia which had las ted from 1924 till 1938-3 9 . In e ssenc e ,  
however , Antarct i c  affairs during the first four decades o f  the 
twentieth century were conducted without acrimony and the disputes 
and controversies that did ari s e  were generally muted . 
With the onset of World War II , the nature o f  Antarctic affairs 
changed . The 1 9 4 0 ' s  and early 1 9 5 0 ' s  witnessed acrimonious 
relations between Bri tain , Argentina and Chile after the two South 
American countries had laid claims to Antarctic terri tory which 
overlapped the British claim . By 1955 no solution to the dispute 
seemed near and the "Antarctic problem" ( as the wrangle was known) 
appeared intractable . The predominant image of Antarctic affairs 
during the 1 9 5 0 ' s  portrays events in train which were to change 
this situat ion . These event s  were as sociated with the 
International Geophysical Year ( I . G .Y ) , the mos �  complex and most 
comprehensive international scientific activity ever under taken , 
which began in July , 1957 , and concluded in December , 1958 . 
58 
59 
3 . 1  The Dominant Image : The Trimaph of Science 
Antarctica was one of two areas of study selected to receive 
i 1 h i d ri the I G Y and one of the Year's most  spec a emp as s u ng • • • , 
cited accomplishments was the part directly played by scientists 
in showing the way and pressing for a solution to the pre-I . G . Y .  
territorial disputes in the 1 region . It is generally asserted 
that : ( i )  the success of the Antarctic program of the I .G .Y .  
directly led the twelve countries involved to decide t o  continue 
their scientific activities in the region : ( ii)  the need therefore 
arose to establish some international legal arrangement or 
blueprint which would provide a stable basis for such activities ; 
and (iii) ergo the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 and its attendant 
arrangements fostering international cooperation and harmony in 
2 the region . 
1 The other region was outer space . 
2 See , for example , G . deQ . Robin , " International Co-operation and 
Geophysics"  in Antarctic Research , Sir Raymond Priestley , R . J .  
Adie and G . deQ . Robin (eds . ) , Butterworths , London , 1964 , esp . 
pp 258-259 ; R . Bilde r ,  "The Present Legal and Political 
Situation in Antarctica" in The New Nationalism and the Use of 
Common Spaces , J . I . Charney ( ed .) ,  Allanheld , Osman Publishers , 
1982 , p 169 ; R.Woolcott , "The interaction between the Antarctic 
Treaty sys tem and the United Nations system, " text of a paper 
presented on a personal basis by the Australian Ambassador to 
the United Nations at a workshop on the Antarctic Treaty 
system, Beardmore Glacier , Antarctica , 5-13 January , 1985 , 
reprinted in Australian Foreign Affairs Record , Vol . 56 ,  No . 1 ,  
January , 1985 , esp . p 1 8 ;  E .Hambro , "Some Notes on the Future 
of the Antarctic Treaty Collaboration , "  American Journal of 
International Law , Vol . 68 ,  No . 2 ,  April , 1974, pp 218-219 ; 
W . Sullivan , Assault on the Unknown , Hodder & Stoughton , London , 
1961 , pp 413-414 ; W . F . Birch , "Antarctica : Sovereignty and 
Stewardship , "  address by the New Zealand Minister of Science 
to the Christchurch Branch of the New Zealand Institute of 
International Affairs , 14 September , 197 9 ,  reprinted in New 
Zealand Foreign Affairs Review , July-December , 1979 , p 3� 
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Perhaps the mos t  detailed account typifying this assertion about 
the relationship between the I . G . Y .  and the Antarctic Treaty is by 
Coplin, McGowan and O'Leary . They maintOain tha t : 
'While the International Geophysical Year was a success generally , 
and for Antarctic research in particular , scientists and 
government officials raised the ques t ion o f  wha t  would happen once 
the year was over . The Int ernational Council of Scientific Unions 
appointed a permanent Special Commit t e e  on Antarctic Research 
( SCAR) , which consisted o f  delegates from each nation act ively 
engaged in research and repres entatives from various scientific 
commi t tees . Various privat e  subna tional and t ransnational groups 
were able to convince the U . S .  State Department to ini tiate a 
general agreement to make the scientific cooperation in Antarctica 
a long-range effort and were able to persuade o ther government s  to 
accept the U . S .  proposal . As a r esult , in 1 9 5 9  the twelve nat ions 
originally interes ted in the area signed a thirty-year pact 
insuring international scien ti f i c  cooperation in3Antarctica , and precluding mil itary use and territorial claims . ... 
Coplin e t  al continue tha t : 
"'The lesson to be learned f rom this and a number o f  similar 
situations is that international laws and o rganizations can 
develop if there is a sufficient number of private groups with 
technical knowledge and specialization to support cooperation . In 
the case of Antarctica , cooperation was more important and 
desirable to the scientists concerned with research than it was to 
the general mili tary and poli tical leaders o f  the countries 
involved • the salience o f  the i s sue was very high for the 
scientists , while it was lower for o ther national and 
transnational actors . The resul t s  were that the natural bias o f  
scient!sts for cooperation produced a political victory for 
them . ... 
If this account is the mos t  detailed , then perhaps the simplest 
s tatement exemplifying such assertions is Quilty's contention 
3 W . D . Coplin , P . J .McGowan , M . K . O 'Leary , American Foreign Policy : 
An Introduction to Analysis and Evaluation, Duxbury Pres s , 
North Scituate , Massachuse t t s , 1 974 , pp 203-204 . 
4 Ibid . , P 204 . 
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the Antarc tic Treaty] arose from scienti s t s , 
Antarctica has been seen as a continent 
for 
for 
Notwiths tanding their differences , such accounts portray one 
dominant image : the triumph of science over politic s . This image 
is not , however , an accurate portrayal of the origins of the • 
Antarc tic Treaty . It does no t give due emphasis to the interplay 
of political and s trategic considerations which influenced 
Antarctic affairs during the 1940 ' s  and 1950 ' s , nor does it take 
full account of the new pat terns of structural forces which shaped 
world politics at this time . To unders tand how the Antarctic 
Treaty came about one has to first look at the so-called Antarctic 
problem . 
3 . 2  The Antarctic Problem 
The first point to be made is that the Antarc tic problem was not 
just an isolated dispute but part and parcel of a changing world 
situation . The claim by Chile in November , 1 940 , over Territorio 
Antartico Chileno lying between longi tudes 53
° 
Wes t  and 90
° 
Wes t , 
and the claim by Argentina in 1 943 over that part of Antarctica 
° ° 
south of latitude 60 South and lying between longitudes 25 Wes t  
and 680 34' W t i f i I i 1 e s  were expres s  ons 0 an ant -co o n  a movement 
gathering s treng th thoughout the world which sought to abol ish all 
5 P . Quil ty , Interview on A . B . C .  Science Show , 1 �  March , 1983 , 
printed in " Science on radio , "  Search , Vol . 14 ,  No . 5-6 , June­
July , 1983 , p 1 6 7 . 
� .  [� . -
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6 vestiges of European imperial domination . Among the factors which 
" facilitated the ris e  of this movement was ' the weakening grip of 
the European powers' on their colonial possessions largely as a 
consequence of their own discords and rivalrie s , plus the 
concommi tant depletion of their economic 
7 An as sociated resources .  
factor was the relative decline of European power in relation to 
that of the Uni ted States (with i t s  s trong anti-colonial 
tradition) and the Soviet Union ( whos e  hi s t ory offered 
revolutionary nationali s t  movements an al ternative blueprint for 
8 developmen t ) . 
Both Argentina and Chile had shown interest in Antarctica at the 
turn of the century and from 1904 , Argentina had maintained a 
meteorological observatory on Laurie Island in the South Orkney 
Islands . Throughout the intervening years , the two South American 
6 G . Barraclough , An Introduc tion to Contemporary Hi s tory , 
Penguin , Harmondsworth , 1 9 6 7 , pp 153-198 . See al so , E . H . Carr , 
International Relations Between the Two World Wars 1 9 19-1939 , 
Macmillan , London , 1965 , pp 232-25 7 . 
The wes terly limit of 5he Argentine claim was sub sequently ex­
tended to longitude 74 Wes t  by a decree of September 2 ,  1 946 . 
7 Barraclough , op . cit . , pp 153-2 3 2 . See also , W . Roger Loui s , 
Imperialism At Bay , Oxford University Pres s , New York , 1978 . 
Both Argentina and Chile trace their rights to Antarctic 
terri tory to a 1 5 th Century Papal Bull demarcating the sphere 
of influence between Portugal and Spain . The Argentine claim 
is also bas ed on the presumed geological and geographical 
continuation of the Andes mountains through the is land chains 
in the Antarctic region , terri torial proximity and the mainten­
ance of a meteorological s tation on Laurie Is land in the South 
Orkneys since 1904 . See , J . Hane s s ian , "Antarctica : Current 
National Interes t s  and Legal Realit ies , "  American Society of 
International Law , Proceedings , Fifty-second Annual Meeting 
held at Washing ton , D . C . , April 24-2 6 , 1 95 8 , pp 1 52-153 . 
8 Barraclough , op . cit . 
J_. 
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countries were not major participants in Antarctic affairs , 
however , their interes t in the region may well have been rekindled 
by United States' pronouncement s  about the region . In a 
characteristically anti-colonial statement , U . S .  President 
Franklin Roo s evelt advised Argentina and Chile in 1 93 9  that his 
country' s activities in wes t ern Antarctica would be carried out on 
behalf of all the o ther American republics ( notwithstanding 
British calims in the region) and if thi s  sector proved valuable , 
it could be managed under a new form of sovereignty by an inter­
American republic organization9 Furthermore , in 1940 , U . S .  
Secretary of State Cordell Hull stated that the American republics 
needed to have a clearer title to wes tern Antarct ica than non-
Am i . f h d f . 10 Wh er can countr1es or t eir own e ense purpo ses . atever 
aspirations Chile and Argentina had in Antarctica at this time , 
such comments , communicated when relations between the United 
States and Latin American were 'more sincerely friendly than at 
any previous time , '  may well have encouraged the South American 
countries to pres s  their claims in the region . l l  
9 F . D . R . , His Personal Letters 1928-194 5 , Vol . II ,  E . Roosevelt 
( ed . ) ,  Duel l ,  Sloan & Pearce , New York , 1 950 , p 9 0 9 . See als o , 
F .Auburn , Antarc tic Law and Politics , C . Hurs t & Co . ,  London , 
[ Croom-Helm ( Aus tralia) , Canberra ] ,  1 98 2 , p 5 5 .  
1 0  Auburn , ibid . p  56 . 
l I On Uni ted States-Latin American relations during the 1930 ' s , 
see E . H . Carr , op . cit . ,  pp 247-253 . Another factor which may 
have influenced the Argentine and Chilean deci sions to claim 
territory in we stern Antarctica at this time was British 
pre-occupation in World War II . 
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Apart from a small British mili tary force despatched in 1 943 to 
Deception Island in the South Shetlands and to Graham Land on the 
Antarctic Peninsula to ensure that the southern side of the 
strategically important Drake Passage remained secure for Allied 
shipping during World War II , the is sue of overlapping claims in 
wes tern Antarctica did no t assume major proportions until 1946 . 12 
From that year , the newly ins talled Peron government in Argentina , 
seeking ways to re tain the political backing of ultranationali s tic 
groups , s tepped up i t s  activities in and about Antarctica . 13 Also 
linked to this di spute about Antarctica was an older dispute 
between the two countries concerning the Falkland I s lands . Put 
simply , the Argentine government did no t recogni ze British rule in 
the Falkland Islands and therefore did not accept British 
adminis tration in the Falkland Islands D d . 14 epen enc�es . Argentina 
thus protested to Bri tain about the i s suing of Falkland Islands 
and Falkland Island s Dependencies postage stamps and es tabli shed a 
naval base on Gamma Island . Chile also es tablished a naval base on 
Greenwich I sland . Britain subsequently pro tes ted about the s e  
1 2  During the early 1940 ' s , the Argentine government refused to 
break off relations wi th the Axis powers and it was not until 
1944 that Argentina delared war on Germany and Japan . 
Operation Tabarin , as the Bri t i sh force was known , was s ent to 
Deception I sland and Graham Land to 'fores tall any attempted 
Argentine coup in the Antarctic . '  See , E . W . Hunter Chri s tie , 
The Antarctic Problem , Allen & Unwin , London , 1 9 5 1 , p 247 . 
13 E . S . Milensky and S . I . Schwab , " Latin America and Antarctica , "  
Current History , Vol . 82 , No . 481 , February , 1983 . 
14 Argentina first pro tested agains t British claims to the Falk­
land Islands following the raising of the British flag there 
in January , 1833 . Argentina based i t s  own claims to the 
islands , under the name Islas Malvinas , on geographical 
proximity and inheritance from Spain . See , E . W . Hunter 
Christie , op . cit . , pp 264-265 . 
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actions and in 1947 sugges ted that the dispute be brought before 
the International Court of Jus tice at The Hague for set tlement . 
Both Chile and Argentina rejected this proposal , however , and 
relations between Argentina and Britain became particularly tense 
as both countries sent warships in the regio n .  
I n  late 1947 and early 1948 , in the wake of the s e  developments , 
the United States began considering new policy options with 
respect A 0 1 5  0 I h O h O d t 0 th O to ntarct1ca . ne proposa w 1C ga1ne suppor W1 1n 
the U . S .  government at this time was the not ion that Antarc tica 
should be "internationali zed " through the es tablishment of either 
a trusteeship under the auspices of the United Nations or a 
condominium of directly interes ted nation s . 1 6  At thi s time too , 
Britain asked the United States to expre s s  i t s  attitude about the 
prospect that several Latin American countries intended to support 
a resolution at the forthcoming Ninth International Conference of 
American States ( to be held at Bogo ta , Colombia from March 30 to 
May 2 ,  1 9 4 8 )  declaring all European colonies in the Wes tern 
15 The Secretary of the Interior ( Krug ) to the Acting Secretary 
of Stat e ;  Secret Memorandum , Washington , January 8 ,  1 948 , 
Foreign Relations of the Uni ted States 1948 , Vol . I ,  Uni ted 
States Government Printing Office , Washington , 1 9 7 6 , p 962 . 
16 Following the es tablishment of the United Nations , trus teeship 
had also been advocated as a possible solut ion for the 
problems of such widely-separated areas as Pales t ine , Berlin , 
the Italian colonies , and certain Pacific i s land s . See , 
"Paper prepared by the Colonial Policy Review Sub-Commi ttee 
of the Committee on Problems of Dependent Areas , "  Washington , 
April 26 , 1950 , Foreign Relations of the United States 1 952-
1954 , Vol . II ,  United States Government Printing Office , 
Washington , 1 97 9 ,  pp 1086-87 . 
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Hemisphere ,  such a s  the British Antarctic claims , were a danger t o  
the peace and securi ty o f  the 
17 Hemisphere .  The United S tates 
replied that it would oppose a discussion of Antarctic questions 
at the Bogota Conference and also indicated that following a 
review of the Antarctic problem it 'hoped in the near future t o  be 
in a position to discuss i t  in greater detail with the British 
, 18 Government . 
In March , 1948 , the United S tates subsequently advised Britain 
that its current thinking about Antarctica was 'along lines of 
some form of international control such as trusteeship unde r  UN or 
1 9  condominium" and that i t  would welcome any British proposal s . 
The U . S .  also indicated that i t  planned to approach o ther 
interested countries about the proposal believing that i t  o ffered 
the best means of forestalling any embarrassing discussion of 
20 Antarc tic claims at the Bogota Conference . In reply , Bri tain 
proposed a four-power round table discussion between Chile , 
Argentina , the United States and Bri tain to cons i der the Antarctic 
21 problem , however , this sugges tion was quickly shelved • 
1 7  Memorandum of Conversation , by the Secretary of State , 
Washington , February 18 , 1948 , Foreign Relations of the 
United States 1 9 4 8 , op . cit . ,  pp 9 63-65 . 
1 8  Ibid . ,  p 965 . 
1 9  The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom , 
Washington , March 4 ,  1 94 8 , Foreign Relations o f  the United 
States 1 948 , op . c it . ,  pp 965-9 6 6 . 
20 Ibid . 
2 1  The Secretary of State to the Embas sy in the United Kingdom , 
Washington , March 25 , 1 948 , Foreign Relations of the United 
States 1948 , op . cit . ,  p 969 . 
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United S tates ' hopes o f  fores talling a difficult and possibly 
embarrassing discus sion of Antarctic claims at the Bogota 
Conference were not fulfilled , however .  Argentina , Chile and 
Guatemala promoted a resolution at the Conference calling for the 
abolition of all European colonies in the Western Hemisphere such 
as British Honduras , British Guiana , the Falkland Islands and the 
Falkland Islands 2 2  Dependencies . The United States opposed the 
resolution and successfully s teered the passage of an alternative 
resolution which called for the e stablishment of a commi t tee to 
consider the is sue at a later date . 23 In this way , the United 
S tates extricated itself from the rather awkward position o f  
having to either support its La tin American neighbours promoting 
the o riginal r esolution at the expense of its European allies , o r  
vice versa . 
It is not entirely c lear why the United S tates did not approach 
other interes ted countries about the internationalization proposal 
22 E . W . Hunter Christie , op . ci t . ,  p 285 . Plott points out the 
inconsi s t ency between the Argentine and Chilean use of the 
colonial i s sue at Bogota and the reservations regarding the 
non-recognition of European possessions in the Western 
Hemisphere they had made at the Inter-American Conference 
for the Maintenance of Continental Peace and Security held 
at Rio de Janeiro in 1 94 7 . See , B .M . Plott , "The Development 
of Unit ed States Antarctic Policy , "  Ph . D .  thesis , Fletcher 
School of Law and Diplomacy , Tufts university , 1 9 6 9 , p 130 . 
23 Plo t t , ibid . ,  p 1 3 1 . The final act o f  the Bogota Conference , 
however ,  did contain a resolution declaring ' that it is a 
just aspiration of the American Republics that colonialism 
and the o ccupation of American territories by extra-contin­
ental countries should be brought to an end . '  Memorandum 
Prepared in the Bureau o f  Inter-American affairs , Washington , 
25 June , 1 952 , Foreign Relations of the United States 1952-
1 954 , op . cit . , p 1 1 2 9 . 
."'".: , 
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prior t o  the Bogota Conference and thereby try t o  fores tall the 
discussion of Antarctic claims . One reason may well have been 
American preoccupation wi th other problems related t� the 
intensification of rivalry be tween the two superpowers , the Uni ted 
States and the Soviet Union , 24 after 1947 . In general , America ' s  
adversarial relationship with the Soviet Union after World War II 
had been sharpened by such considerations as the threatening 
character of Soviet communi st ideology , the consolidation of 
Soviet control over Eastern Europe , the threatening posture of 
Soviet armed forces against Western Europe and the instransigent 
nature of Soviet negotiating behaviour on a wide range of i s sues . 
In particular , during February and March of 1 948 , while informal 
discussions between the Uni ted States and Britain about the 
Antarctic problem were taking place , momentous events in Europe 
were gathering pace . In February , the Czechoslovakian coali tion 
government headed by President Eduard Benes , and which included 
Jan Masaryk as Foreign Minister , was overthrown in a communis t  
25 coup backed by the Soviet Union . As U . S .  President Truman noted , 
the Czechoslovakian coup ' sent a shock throughout the civilized 
world' and coupled with concern about Soviet behaviour in Germany 
24 On the rise of the Uni ted States and the Soviet Union to 
superpower s tatus and the intensification of their rivalry , 
especially after 1 94 7 , see Barraclough , op . cit . ,  pp 93- 1 23 ; 
A . Fontaine , The History of the Cold War , Vol . I .  1 9 1 7-1950 , 
Pantheon , New York , 1968 ; W . LaFeber , America , Rus sia and the 
Cold War 1945- 1 9 84 , ( 5 th edition) , Alfred A . Knopf , New York , 
1985 ; S .E .Ambrose , Rise to Globalism :  American Foreign Policy , 
Since 1938 , ( Third Revised Edition) , Penguin , Harmondsworth , 
1983 , pp 13-244 . 
Masaryk was subsequently assassinated . 
69 
concerning the Berlin question , the Cold War was clearly warming 
26 up - Indeed ,  by March 1 1 , in the United States ,  Secretary of 
State Marshall described the European s ituation as 'very , very 
serious ' while Averall Harriman warned that 'There are aggressive 
forces in the world coming from the Soviet Union which are just as 
des tructive in their effect on the world and our own way of life 
as Hitler was , and I think are o f  greater menace than Hitler 
,27 was . 
Against this background too , i t  hardly seems surpris ing that 
concern about possible Soviet ambitions in Antarctica began to be 
voiced in the United State s . For example , in a reply to a 
Department of State reques t  for their opinion of the U . S .  policy 
proposing the internationali zation of Antarctica , the Jo int Chiefs 
of Staff expres s ed concern , on the one hand , that it would be 
' impracticable , or in any event dif ficult , to guarantee against 
the active participation o f  our mos t  probable enemies [ i . e .  the 
Soviet Union ] in the control of the Antarctic if trus teeship 
arrangements should be carried throught to completion' and doub t s , 
on the other hand , that it would be pos s ible to exclude the Soviet 
Union from participation in a condominium . 28 In view o f  the 
perceived difficulties wi th the two alternatives of 
26 Cited in Ambros e , op . ci t . , p 142 . 
27 Ci ted in Ambros e ,  ibid . , p 143 . 
28 The Secretary of Defense ( Forre s tal) to the Secretary of 
State , Washington , 12 April , 1948 , Foreign Relations o f  the 
Unit ed States 1948 , op . cit . ,  pp 9 7 1-9 74 . 
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internationalization proposal , the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
accordingly advised that the preferable course from a military 
s tandpoint 'would be to press Uni ted States '  claims to areas of 
Antarctica and to propose submi s s ion of the entire problem of 
Antarctica to jurisdictional determination . ,2 9  Clearly , Cold War 
considerations had entered Antarctic affairs . 30 
During the northern spring and summer of 1948 , discus s ions about 
the Antarctic problem continued between various part s  of the U . S .  
government and by June a policy paper and draft agreement had been 
prepared . The paper recommended that the Uni ted States ' support in 
principle the e s tablishment of an international s tatus for 
Antarctica , in the form of a Uni ted Nations trusteeship or in 
29 Ibid . , P 974 . This advice as sumed that a solution to the 
Antarctic problem was a pre s s ing matter . It was added that if 
this as sumption was no t correct , additional s tudy of the 
mat ter was the appropriate course of action . 
30 It can be argued that this was no t the fir s t  entry of Cold War 
considerations into Antarctic affairs . Immediately after World 
War II , U . S .  mili tary s t rategis t s  had perceived an urgent need 
for training mili tary forces in polar warfare . This need 
stemmed from the exis t ence of a potentially hos tile Soviet 
Union acros s  the Arctic region from the United States . 
Accordingly , a six-ship U . S .  naval exercise ( Operation Nanook) 
was held in Arctic waters in the summer of 1 9 4 6  and a major 
fleet exerci s e  in the same region was scheduled in 1947 . 
Concern within the U . S .  government that this 1947 exercise 
might antagoni ze the Soviet Union resulted in the U . S .  Navy 
shifting i t s  attention to the Antarctic and in August ,  1 94 6 , 
orders were is sued for the mounting of Operation Highjump . 
Among the objectives of Operation Highjump were the training 
of personnel and tes ting of equipment under polar conditions 
and es tablishing the feasibility of constructing air bases on 
ice 'with particular attention to later application of such 
techniques to operation in interior Greenland . '  Sullivan , 
Ques t  for a Continent , McGraw-Hill , New York, 1 95 7 , pp 1 73-
174 . See also , B . Plott , op . cit . ,  pp 1 1 2- 1 1 3 . 
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other suitable form , the terms of which should b e  agreed on b y  the 
United States , Great Britain , Australia , New Zealand , Argentina , 
Chile , France , and Norway before submis sion at the United Nations 
3 1  General Ass embly for approval . I n  order t o  place the United 
States on an equal juridical footing with the other seven 
countries listed above ( all of which had made claims to Antarctic 
territory) i t  was also recommended that after agreement to 
nego tiate an international settlement of the Antarc tic problem had 
been obtained from the s e  countries , the United States should make 
' official claim to areas in Antarctica to which it has be s t  right s 
by virtue of discovery and exploration on the part of i t s  
. I ,32 natl.ona s .  
It was also argued in this policy paper that the Soviet Union 
would probably not make claims in Antarctica on the grounds of 
discoveries made by Bellingshausen during hi s voyage of 1 8 1 9-20 . 
It was sugges ted that a Soviet claim on the basis of prior 
discovery would leave them open to similar claims by other 
countries to is lands in the Arctic which the Soviet considered 
their territory . Moreover , participation in some form of 
international control over the region would leave them open , so it 
was argued , to demands for a similar regime in the Arctic which 
would be contrary to their long standing sector principle of 
31 Paper Prepared by the Policy Planning Staff , Washington , June 
9 ,  1 948 , Foreign Relations of the United States 1948 , op . cit . , 
pp 97 7-987 . 
32 Ibid . ,  P 982 . 
" .  
.� 
7 2  
sovereignty i n  that particular region . I t  was pointed out that 
there was no thing at the time to prevent the Soviet Union from 
sending an expedi tion to the unclaimed Pacific sector o f  
Antarctica , e s tabli shing a base there , conducting explorations and 
then laying claim to territory on the basis of these activi ties . 
It was therefore argued that the United States should claim thi s 
particular sector on the basis of discovery and exploration by 
American citizens , thereby fores talling any Soviet attempt to 
become a territorial claimant by activi ties in this sector ; and 
preventing the Soviet Union and other non-claimant countries from 
asserting a right to participate in discus sions for an 
international regime on the ground s that the United States was not 
33 a claimant . 
On June 2 5 , 1 948 , the U . S .  proposal for the internationalization 
of Antarctica , toge ther with a copy of the draft agreement on 
Antarctica , were handed to Bri tain with the hope tha t they would 
provide a basis for discussion . By early July , Bri tain had 
indicated that while it welcomed the U . S .  proposal , it would 
prefer an eight-power condominium on the grounds that a Uni ted 
Nations trus teeship would give the Soviet Union an opportuni ty to 
34 interfere in Antarctic af fairs . In mid July , the Uni ted S tates 
33 Ibid . ,  p 980 . 
34 The Ambassador in the Uni ted Kingdom ( Douglas ) to the 
Secretary of S tate , London , July 9 ,  1 948 , Foreign Relations 
of the United S tates 1948 , op . cit . ,  pp 9 92-993 . The memorandum 
also reveals that prior to the U . S .  propo sal of June 25 , the 
British Foreign Office had decided to tell Argent ina and Chile 
( continued next page ) 
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also conveyed , by envoy , the internationalization proposal to both 
Chile and Argentina . In discussions in Santiago be tween the u . S .  
envoy , Caspar Green , and the principal Chilean representative , 
Professor Julio Escudero Guzzman , . the lat ter presented for 
consideration a counter-proposal which called for intere s ted 
nations to es tablish a modus vivendi arrangement in Antarctica for 
a period of five or ten years during which all claims and right s 
35 ,.ould be frozen and scientific cooperation encouraged . 
But the United States pres s ed on wi th i ts own propo sal and in 
early Augus t Aus tralia , New Zealand , France and Norway were 
approached for their opinions . Several weeks later , on August 28 , 
the U . S .  Depar tment of State is sued a pres s  s tatement explaining 
that the U . S .  government had approached the governments o f  
Argentina , Aus tralia , Chile , France , New Zealand , Norway and 
Bri tain informally wi th a sugges tion that a solution for the 
that if they would submit Antarctic claims to the Internation­
al Court of Jus tice , Britain would no t pre s s  i t s  claims in 
certain di sputed areas . I t  was reported that the Foreign 
Office con templa ted trying to hold the South She tland s and 
South Orkneys while yielding elsewhere . The mat ter had reached 
Cabinet level for approval but was wi thdrawn when the Foreign 
Office learned of the U . S .  proposals of June 2 5 . 
35 The Ambas sador in Chile ( Bower s )  to the Secre tary of State , 
Santiago , July 1 9 ,  1948 , Foreign Relations of the Uni ted 
S tates 1948 , op . ci t . , p 995 . This Chilean counter-proposal 
became known as the "Escudero Declaration" and according to a 
Chilean diplom.at serving in the United States during the early 
1950's , it was modelled on an agreement of 1 908 between 
Russia , Germany , Denmark and Sweden for the maintenance of the 
status quo in the Bal tic . See , Confident ial Memorandum of 
Conversa tion , Sep tember 7 ,  1950 , Foreign Relations of the 
United S tates 1948 , op . cit . ,  p 9 1 8 . 
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terri torial problem of Antarctica be discussed . The statement went 
on to say : 
'It is the viewpoint of the Depar tment of S tate that the solution 
should be such as to promote scientific inves tigation and research 
in the area . The Department of State has sugges ted that this can 
perhaps be done most effectively and the problem of conflict ing 
claims at the same time solved through agreement upon some form of 
internationalization . The Department of State expects that the 
question is one which will require an extended exchange of views , 
consideration of sugges tions and probably reconciliation of 
varying viewpoints . Until such exchange of views and neces sary 
further s tudy is completed , it is not believed that any useful 
purpose could be accomplished by a conference 0�
6 the sub ject and no such conference is contemplated at present . '  
This press release , issued because public statement s  regarding the 
Antarctic discus sions had already been made by the British Foreign 
Office and the Chilean Foreign Ministry , elicited a number of 
reactions . First , South Africa brought to American attention i t s  
interes t  i n  Antarctica and registered i t s  hope that an opportuni ty 
would be provided for it to comment in detail on any proposal s 
about the internationali zation of the 37 region . Belgium also 
called to the attention of the U . S .  Department of State Belgian 
exploration activities in Antarc tica in 1898-99 and indicated that 
i t , too , was entitled to participate in the settlement of the 
Antarctic 38 problem . Similarly , in early 1 949 , the All Union 
36 Department of State Press Release No . 689 , August 28 , 1948 , 
quoted in The Depar tment of State Bulletin , Vol . 1 9 ,  No . 47 9 , 
September 5 ,  1948 , p 301 . 
37 Memorandum of Conversation , Washington , October 1 ,  1948 , 
Foreign Relations of the Uni ted S tates 1948 , · o p . cit . ,  
pp 1007-1009 . 
38 Edi torial No te , Foreign Relations of the United S tates 1 948 , 
op . ci t . ,  p 1010 . 
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Geographical Society of the U . S . S . R .  adopted a resolution 
demanding Soviet par ticipation in all international decisions 
concerning Antarctica by right , it was claimed , of the prior 
discovery of the Antarctic cont inent by Russian explorers in the 
years 1819-2 1 . 39 Despite its non-o fficial s tatus , the Soviet 
notice indicated to the United States the desirability of coming 
to an agreement on the Antarctic problem as promptly as possible 
since it was assumed that i t  would 'be followed in due course by 
some official action . ,40 But prompt agreement was not forthcoming . 
Although Britain and New Zealand conveyed favourable intere s t  in 
the internationalization proposal , both Argentina and Chile 
rejected it . Norway and France also viewed internationali zation as 
unnecessary and fraught with difficulties , while Australia 
l ,1 1  I ! '  . ,  
. ... ;.: 
i " 
� ... ; 
indicated a desire to cooperate in working out a solution but was 
skeptical about the necessity for internationalization , too . 4 1  , 
In the meantime , when i t  became obvious in late 1948 , that 
responses to the U . S .  proposal were largely negative , Britain 
entered into discussions with Argentina and Chile and secured an 
agreement not to send warships south of latitude 600 South during 
the coming 1 948-49 Antarctic season . It was hoped that this 
39 "Russian Antarctic Claims , "  The Times , February 12 , 1 949 . 
40 Memorandum of Conversation by the Chief of the Division of 
Northern European Af fairs ( Hulley) ,  February 16 , 1 9 4 9 , 
Foreign Relations of the United States 1949 , - Vol . I ,  U . S . 
Government Printing Office , Washing ton , 1 9 7 6 , pp 7 93-795 . 
4 1  Paper Prepared in the Department of State , undated , Foreign 
Relations of the United States 1949 , ibid . ,  pp 800-80 1 .  
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agreement would defuse the tense relations between the rival 
42 claimant s  which had characterized the previous 1 947-48 season . 
Subsequently , Bri tain formally asked the Uni ted States in March , 
1 949 , about the status o f  i t s  internationalization proposal and 
indicated that ' If i t  looks like dying , the British Government 
will contemplate reverting to its proposal to open discussions 
direct with Argentina and Chile for settlement of their respective 
claims . ,43 Clarifying its posit ion , the United States replied that 
it was now using the Chilean (Escudero ) modus vivendi proposal as 
a basis for s tudy and , in turn , requested that i t  be informed in 
advance of any definite British plan to proceed wi th direct 
44 negotiations with Chile and Argentina . 
Six months were to pass before the next major move in the search 
for a solution to the Antarctic problem took place . In September , 
1949 , the Uni ted States handed to Britain for comment copies of a 
draft declaration on Antarctica embodying a modified version o f  
the Chilean modus vivendi , the main points of which provided for : 
( i )  the freezing of all claims and rights in territory 
42 For the text o f  the agreement , see United States Policy with 
Regard to the Antarctic , Editorial Note , Foreign Relations o f  
the United States 1949 , ibid . , p 7 93 .  The agreement was form­
ally reaffirmed each season until 1 955-5 6 . 
43 Memorandum of Conversation , by the Chief of the Division of 
Northern European Affairs ( Hulley ) ,  March 23 ,. 1 94 9 ,  Foreign 
Relations of the United States 1 94 9 ,  ibid . ,  P 7 9 5 . 
44 Ibid . 
I , I 
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south o f  lati tude 600 South for the period o f  the 
declaration ( five or ten year s ) ; 
( i i )  the exchange among the declarant government s  o f  
scientific information regarding Antarctica ; 
( ii i )  the freedom of scientific research in the region for 
all declarant countries ; 
( iv )  the e s tablishment o f  a consultative commit tee con-
45 s i s t ing of one member from each declarant country . 
In the following month , Britain again responded positively to the 
new ini tiative by indicating that the draft agreement 'might 
afford a useful interim policy and would be willing to accept the 
proposals as a bas i s  of discussion if other interes ted powers did 
so too . ,46 The Uni ted States then began informal dis cussions with 
Chile about the modus vivendi in January , 1950 , and a month later 
47 informed Aus t ralia and New Zealand about the new developments .  
In June , 1950 , the Soviet Union made its first official 
45 See Appendix A for the text of this Draft Declaration given 
to Britain in September , 1949 . 
46 Draft Declaration on Antarc tica , Prepared by the Department 
of State , Foreign Relations of the Uni ted States 1949 , op . 
cit . ,  pp 807-809 . Britain als o  sugges ted several refinements 
for , and obj ections to, articles of the Draf t Declaration . 
47 Memorandum by the Officer in Charge of British Commonwealth 
and Northern European Affairs ( Hulley) to the Direc tor of the 
Office of North and Wes t  Coas t  Affairs ( Mills ) ,  January 4 ,  
1 950 and Memorandum o f  Conversation , by Mr . Caspar D .  Green of 
the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European 
Affairs , February 1 7 ,  1950 , Foreign Relations of the Uni ted 
States 1 950 , Vol . I , U . S . Government Printing Office , Washing­
ton , 1 9 7 7 , pp 907-908 . 
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pronouncement about the Antarctic problem in a memorandum 
simultaneous ly addres sed to the United States and six claimant 
countries - Argent ina , Aus tralia , Bri tain , France , New Zealand and 
Norway . 48 The memorandum again asserted the Soviet right to take 
part in any international discussions of the type propo s ed by the 
United S tates in 1948 , and warned that the U . S . S . R .  ' cannot 
recognize as legal any decision regarding the regime of the 
Antarc tic taken without i t s  participation . ,49 Only Argentina and 
Chile replied , rej ecting the right of the U . S . S . R .  to claim 
territory in Antarctica and rej ecting the Soviet demand to 
participate in the discussion of Antarctic problems . At the same 
time , bo th countries also reaf firmed the validity of their own 
Antarc tic c1aims . 50 
The Soviet memorandum was more significant than jus t signalling 
the entry of ano ther " actor" in Antarc tic affairs . The memorandum 
clearly placed the United S tates in ano ther awkward posit ion with 
respect to Antarct ica . Because it had made no terri torial claims 
to parts of Antarctica , the Uni ted States was essentially in the 
48 The memorandum was no t sent to the remaining seventh claimant , 
Chile . At this time , the Soviet Union had not es tabli shed 
formal relations with the South American country . 
4 9  The Embassy of the Soviet Union to the Department of State , 
Memorandum dated 8 June , 1950 , Foreign Relations of the 
Uni ted States 1 950 , op . cit . ,  pp 9 1 1 -9 13 . 
50 Department of S tate Policy Statement , July 1 �  1 9 5 1 , Foreign 
Relations of the Uni ted States 195 1 , Vo1 . I ,  U . S . Government 
Printing Office , Washington , 1979 , p 1 7 28 . Because it had not 
received the of ficial memorandum , Chile ' s  reply to the Sovie t 
Union Was by way of a public statement . 
-
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same category a s  the Soviet Union vis a v i s  the claimants and any 
principle which would have excluded the Soviet Union from 
discus sions about the Antarc tic problem would also have excluded 
the Uni ted States . The Uni ted S tates , accordingly , followed a 
policy of continuing to work toward a modus vivendi . That policy 
also involved maintaining the Hughes Doctrine 'until such t ime as 
there appears a good prospect for making the announcement of U . S . 
claims part of an international arrangement . ,5 1  In other words , 
the United States intended to announce its claims to Antarctica at 
the time formal discussion of a modus vivendi had begun , thereby 
permitting U . S .  participation on 'a basis of equality with o ther 
claimants' and hopefull y ,  excluding the Soviet Union . 5 2  
The United States did not reply to the Soviet memorandum on the 
grounds that whatever arguments the U . S .  'might use to reject the 
Soviet claims to participation , those arguments could be taken by 
the Soviet Union as the criteria it should set about to satisfy in 
53 order to qualify for participation in an Antarctic solution . The 
beginning of the Korean War in late June , 1950 , also meant that 
the United States had more pre s sing mat ters than the Antarctic 
5 1  Department o f  S tate S tatement , July 1 ,  1 95 1 ,  Foreign Relations 
of the United States 195 1 , ibid . ,  P 1 730 . 
52 It was hoped that such timing would minimize any claimant 
criticism . See , ibid . Thi s was essentially the same policy 
s trategy that had been planned for use had the original U . S .  
internationalization proposal of 1 948 been accepted by the 
interes ted countries . 
53 Department of State Statement , July 1 ,  1 95 1 ,  Foreign Relations 
of the United States 1 95 1 ,  ibid . ,  pp 1730- 1 73 1 . 
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problem wi th which to contend , and during the remainder of 1 950 
and throughout 195 1 , little effort was devo ted to a search for a 
solution o ther than intermi t tent draf ting discus sions wi th Bri tain 
54 
and Chile about the proposed modus vivendi . 
While the s e  informal drafting discussions were taking place , the 
Antarctic problem continued . An annual occurrence was the 
es tablishment of mili tary bas e s  in the region by both Argentina 
and Chile and the concommitant formal protest by Britain agains t 
such actions . Furthermore , in 1 9 5 2  and 1953 , several incidents 
took place in wes tern Antarctica which s erved to heighten tension 
between the rival claimants . In February , 1952 , a British party 
intending t o  re-es tablish a survey base at Hope Bay on the 
Antarctic Peninsular was forced to withdraw after sho t s  were fired 
over their heads by a party 55 of armed Argentine s . Argentina 
subsequently informed Britain that the commander of the Argentine 
party had ac ted in error and an assurance was given that the 
commande r' s  instructions had been rectified . Britain , 
5 6  nevertheles s , delivered a s trong protest over the incident . 
54 J . Hane s s ian , "The Antarctic Treaty 1959 , "  The Int ernational 
Comparative Law Quarterly , Vol . 9 ,  1960 , p 447 . 
55 "Argentines Eject a British Party : Incident in Antarctica , "  
The Times , February 2 ,  1 9 5 2 . 
5 6  " Strong British Protes t , "  The Times , February 2 ,  1 9 5 2 . On his 
return to Bueno s Aire s , the Argentine commander ( Captain Dia z )  
was congratulated b y  President Peron . Peron is also reported 
to have reaffirmed that 'Argentine sovereignty will have to be 
re-s tated every year wi th a new ef fort ' and in another speech 
maintained ,  somewhat res ignedly , that 'we defend o ut right s 
( cont inued next page) 
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Following this incident , Chile and the United S tates reached 
agreement regarding the draft modus vivendi , however Chile was 
reluctant to proceed on the grounds that 1 95 2  was a Chilean 
election year and a negative reac tion from Argentina was 
57 expected . The Chilean reticence s talled further developments and 
this si tuation was compounded when the U . S .  Department of Defense 
58 unexpectedly opposed the propo sed draft declaration . 
The second incident , in February , 1953 , concerned the arres t  and 
deportation of two Argentines from Deception Island ( part o f  the 
South Shetland s )  by the Bri tish authorities there . Furthermore , 
several Argentine and Chilean building s  were dismantled . Thes e  
actions sparked vehement protests b y  Argentina and Chile ,  together 
with demands for reparations . In addi tion , Argentina propo sed that 
the dispute be submi tted to the Organization of American States , 
however this was not acceptable to Britain . 59 This second incident 
al so sparked a renewal of Chilean interest in the modus vivendi 
proposal and the South American country sought clarification o f  
the Uni ted States ' posi tion . Although the U . S .  Department of State 
and time will confirm them . We have no undue has te • • • We 
mus t  therefore wait wi th confidence and launch generations o f  
Argentines towards the Antarctic • • • secure of the protect­
ion o f  God , o f  justice and o f  time • • •  ' Extract s  from La 
Nacion , April 26 , 1952 , p 1 and May , 1 95 2 , p 1 ,  cited in-­
G . A . Makin , "Argentine approaches to the Falklands/Malvinas : 
was the resort to violence foreseeable? " International 
Affairs , Vol .  5 9 ,  No . 3 ,  1 983 , pp 3 93-394 . 
57 Hanessian , "The Antarctic Treaty 1 9 5 9 , "  op . ci t . 
58 Ibid . 
59 "Argentine Dispute with Bri tain , "  The Times , Feb . 24 ,  1953 . 
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considered the modus vivendi to be the best form of intermediate 
policy for the Uni ted States , internal agreement again could no t 
60 be reached . The proposal thus became moribund . 
But the Antarctic problem continued to exist , and in May , 1955 , 
Britain submi t ted its case to the International Court of Jus tice 
for arbitration . In December of the previous year , Bri tain had 
s tated in identical no tes to both Argentina and Chile that if the 
two South American countries s till felt unable to negotiate a 
peaceful settlement , reference of the dispute to international 
arbitration could be considered as an alternative . No replies were 
received to these notes by the end of April , 1955 , and Britain 
therefore decided to apply directly to the International Court and 
lay the Bri tish case before i t . In a written Parliamentary answer , 
Bri tish Foreign Secre tary Harold Macmillan explained that by this 
action , Bri tain would at leas t have acquainted the Court with the 
facts of the case and placed on record before the Court and world 
opinion the ground s on which Britain cons idered its sovereignty 
over Antarctic terri tory to be firmly roo ted in international 
6 1  law . 
In formal note s , Argentina and Chile subsequently r e j ected the 
Bri tish proposal to submit the dispute to the International Court . 
This resulted in press speculation in Britain that ' the time for 
60 Hanessian ,  "The Antarctic Trea ty 1959 , "  op . ci t . ,  p 447-448 . 
6 1  "British Application to Hague Court , "  The Times , May 7 ,  1 955 . 
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conciliation , waiting and talking may have passed' and some 
observers predicted that ' i t  may be necessary for Britain to adopt 
a sterner policy to protect her interests in the Antarctic. ,6 2  
.�;< 
:r Compounding this situation was the domestic political turmoil 
} whicb racked Argentina during 1 955 . In June of that yea r ,  an 
attempt was made to oust President Peron from power . Although 
unsuccessful , subsequent moves by Peron so alarmed the Argentine 
army that they turned against him and in September , 1955 , he was 
removed by a 63 coup . After nine and a half years o f  Peronista 
rule , during which time Argentina's nationalis tic designs in 
Antarctica b ecame fervent , the South American country entered into 
a period of military rule . 
Thus , by the middle of the decade , no solution to the Antarctic 
problem seemed nea r .  But events were i n  train which changed this 
situation . These were associated with the International 
Geopbysical Year . 
3 . 3  The International Geophysical Year 
The initial proposal which led to the International Geophysical 
Year was conceived on April 5 ,  1950 , at a dinner party at the 
Maryland home of an eminent American geophysicis t ,  Dr . James 
Allen . One of the guests at the party , Dr . Lloyd Berkner , 
62 -Bri tish Rights in Antarcti c : New Si tuation , �  The Times ,  
August 6 ,  1 955 . 
63 P . Calvocoressi , World Poli tics Since 1945 , ( 3rd edit ion ) , 
Longman , London , 1 9 7 7 , p 4 1 2 . 
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sugges ted that a Third Polar Year be held during 1 9 5 7  and 1 958 .
6 4  
The idea was enthusias tically received b y  the s cienti s t s  at the 
party and it was decided to present this concept of a Third Polar 
Year to a number of international scientific organizations for 
endorsement , support and program development . This was carried out 
and in October , 1 9 5 1 , the pres tigious International Council of 
Scientific Unions ( I . C . S . U . )  approved the planned program of 
65 activities . Moreover , in the following May , I . C . S . U .  set up a 
committee to take charge of coordinating the program . 
64 The Firs t  Polar Year had been held in 1882-83 and involved 
scient i s t s  from twenty countries cooperating in s tudies of 
meteorology,  geomagnetism and auroral physics in the high 
northern latitutdes .  The succes s of this scientific effort 
led , after an agreed fifty year interval , to the Second 
International Polar Year of 1932-33 which involved scient i s ts 
from forty countries s tudying geophysical phenomena in the 
high latitudes of the Northern Hemisphere . The succes s of this 
Second International Polar Year rais ed expectations that a 
Third International Polar Year would be held after another 
fifty year interval - in 1 982-83 . 
Unless directly acknowledged , the ensuing narrative hi s tory 
of the International Geophysical Year is synthesized from the 
following s tudie s :  W . Sullivan , " The International Geophysical 
Years , "  International Conciliation , No . 5 2 1 ,  January ,  1 95 9 ,  
pp 257-336 ; Uni ted States House o f  Representatives Commi ttee 
on International Relations , " The Poli tical Legacy of the 
International Geophys ical Year , " Science , Technology , and 
American Diplomac y ,  Vol . I , U . S . Government Printing Office , 
Washington , 1 9 7 7 , pp 293-360 ; W . W . Atwood , Jr . ,  " The Inter­
national Geophys ical Year : A Twentie th-Century Achievement in 
International Cooperation , "  The Department of State Bulle tin , 
Vol . XXXV , No . 9 1 0 ,  December 3 ,  1 9 5 6 , pp 880-886 ; W . W . Atwood , 
Jr . ,  " The International Geophysical Year in Retrospect , "  The 
Department of State Bulle tin , Vol . XL ,  No . 1037 , May 1 1 ,  1 9 5 9 , 
pp 682-68 9 ; Plot t ,  op . cit . ,  pp 143-19 1 .  
65 The I . C . S . U .  is a nongovernmental organization which helps to 
coordinate international activi ties in science . During this 
period of the early 1 9 5 0 ' s  it compri s ed thir teen internation­
al scientific unions plus forty-five member nations . 
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There were three major reasons advanced at the time for sugges ting 
that a Third Polar Year was an idea whos e  time had come sooner , 
rather than later . First , the existing basic geophysical data had 
been largely exploi ted and new data was required . Second , the 
development of new communications sys tems and travel at supersonic 
speeds posed problems which required new information about the 
earth and i t s  upper atmo sphere . And third , it was predic ted that 
1957-58 would witne s s  a period of unusual solar activity , 
therefore presenting an unparalleled opportunity for scienti s t s  to 
66 observe phenomena that af fect the planet Earth . 
But it was not all plain sailing - there were some dif ficul ties to 
be overcome . Initial responses by invited member nations of the 
I . C . S . U .  to participate in a Third Polar Year were modes t  in 
number . In 1952 , several international organizations , including 
the World Meteorological Organization , cri tici zed the program and 
sugges ted that it should be expanded to encompas s world-wide 
studies rather than focus exclusively on the polar regions . The 
I . C . S . U .  considered these sugges tions and subsequently approved 
the expansion of the program to become the International 
Geophysical Year . Acceptance of the change among the international 
scientific community became widespread . 6 7  Accordingly , the special 
66 W . W . Atwood , Jr . ,  " The International Geophysical Year in 
Retrospect , "  op . cit . ,  pp 682-683 . 
6 7  In February , 1953 , for example , the Uni ted State s '  National 
Commit t ee for the I . G . Y .  WaS formed by the National Academy 
of Sciences which adhered to the I . C . S . U .  on behalf o f  the 
( continued next page) 
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commi ttee set up by the I . C . S . U .  to coordinate the program and to 
ensure that the data collected was available to researchers from 
all nations , was enlarged and in July , 1953 , renamed the Comit e  
Special d e  L 'Annee Geophysique lnternationale ( C . S . A . G . I . ) . 
At the first meeting o f  C . S . A . G . I .  held in Brussels in 1953 , 
delegates from twenty-six countries part icipated - including all 
the major Wes tern countries , plus Czechoslovakia and Yugos lavia . 
At the second mee ting , held in Rome during the following year , 
this number had increased to thirty-eight participating countries 
and it was no table for two significant developments . Firs t , at the 
opening of the meeting , the Soviet Embas sy in Rome not ified 
C . S .A . G . ! .  that the Sovie t Academy o f  Science s  would participate 
in the I . G . Y . , and second , two regions of s tudy - Antarctica and 
outer space - were selected to receive special emphasis during the 
! . G .  Y .  
The exploration o f  outer space invo lved the idea of launching 
earth satellites to monitor such phenomena as extra-terres trial 
radiation , thereby grea tly enhancing scientific knowledge of the 
outer atmosphere , while the selection of Antarctica for special 
attention was justi fied on the ground s that i t s  physical 
United S tates . Subsequently , U . S .  Pres ident Eisenhower ( i )  
designated the Operations Coordinating Board o f  the National 
Security Council as the government agency responsible for 
overseeing and coordina ting broad U . S .  plans and policies for 
the Antarctic phase of the I . G .Y . , and ( i i )  appointed the Sec­
retary of Defense executive agent for logistic support . 
.� , 
8 7  
characteristics were o f  unique interest to the field of 
geophysics . Antarctica , for example , had many significant 
unexplained aspects such as the influence o f  the ice mass on 
atmospheric and oceanographic dynamics and on global weather . Also 
of interest was the prospect of conducting original atmospheric 
experiments from the region during the Antarctic winter to 
determine the physical characteristics of the iono sphere during 
this period of prolonged absence of sunlight . This decision also 
resulted in the es tablishment of a special Antarctic Conference o f  
C . S .A . G . I . , the function of which was to coordinate the activi ties 
of the twelve countries planning to undertake research in the 
region - Argentina , Aus tralia , Belgium ,  Britain , Chil e , France , 
Japan, New Zealand , Norway , South Afrida , the Sovi e t  Union and the 
United States . 
At the first C . S .A . G . I .  Antarctic Conference held in Paris in 
July , 1 955 , the location of sites for I . G . Y .  scientific stations 
was discussed . Two contentious issues immediately aro s e . In the 
first place , the scientific delegates at the Conference became 
concerned when it was discovered that the Argentine and Chilean 
delegations were headed by those countries' respective ambassadors 
in Paris . This appeared to the scientists present as an affront to 
68 the supposed non-poli tical character of the I . G . Y .  In the second 
place , numerous stations were proposed for the Antarctic 
Peninsular region , primarily by Argentina , Chile �nd Britain , for 
"68 Plo t t , op . cit . ,  p 1 6 2 . 
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69 what appeared to be political rather than scientific reasons . 
Wary of the pro j ected increased level of British activity plus the 
Soviet presence , Argentina and Chile presented a joint resolution 
at the final plenary ses sion of the Conference in an at tempt to 
70 pro tect their claims po sitions . This resolution s tated that : 
"The Argentine and Chilean delegations give their accord to the 
recommendations for the co-ordination of existing and new bases , 
with the proviso that agreeing to the goal and spirit o f  the 
resolution taken at the firs t plenary meeting of the Conferenc e ,  
these are temporary measures calculated t o  achieve the bes t 
results of the I . G . Y .  and adopted in the interests of scientific 
development , and that these resolutions do not modify the existing 
s tatus in the Antarc t1£ regarding the relations of the 
participating countries . 
All of the delegations present approved the resolution and 
although not binding their respec tive governments , it consti tuted 
a mutual understanding , or " gentlemen' s  agreement"·, to " f reeze" 
temporarily Antarctic territorial claims at their existing s tatus 
thereby allowing non-claimant participating countries to establish 
s tations anywhere in Antarctica without fear of repercus sions from 
claimants and , at the same time , protec ting claimant participating 
countries agains t  the erosion of their positions . Thi s informal 
understanding resulted in the diminution of overt friction in 
Antarctic affairs during the period leading up to , and including , 
6 9  Ibid . , p 163 . 
70 Ibid . , P 164 . 
7 1  First C . S .A . G . ! .  Antarctic Conference ( Paris , 6-10 July , 
1 9 55 ) , Annals of the International Geophysical Year , Vol .  lIB , 
1 95 9 ,  p 409 . 
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the I . G . Y . , al though countries such a s  Aus tralia were particularly 
per turbed about the location of Soviet s tations on Aus tralian-
7 2  
claimed terri tory . 
By the time the I . G . Y .  was underway , then , in 1 957 , some fifty 
stations were manned in Antarctica by scient i s ts from the twelve 
countries with programs in the region , whil s t  world-wide , over 
1 0 , 000 scient i s ts and technicians from an eventual s ixty-seven 
participating countries worked at 2 , 500 stat ions by the time the 
I . G . Y .  ended on December 3 1 ,  1 9 58 . The resul t s  of the program were 
considerable and i t s  overall success widely acclaimed . In areas 
such as aurora and airglow, cosmic rays , geomagnetism ,  glaciology , 
gravity measurement , ionospheric physi c s , meteorology , nuclear 
radiation , oceanography , seismology , solar activity and upper 
72 Plott , o p . c it . , pp 1 65-16 6 . 
In Australia at this time , there was much speculation about 
the po ssible mili tary value of Soviet bases in Antarc tica . 
The Melbourne Argus o f  January 1 1 ,  1 95 6 , commented that the 
Antarctic ' could become the s trategic centre from which ai r 
and naval fleets could control vital sea lanes around the far 
corners of Africa , South America and Aus tralia . '  Ci ted in 
R . A . Swan , Australia in the Antarctic , Melbourne University 
Press , Parkville , 1 96 1 , p 374. Australian concern about the 
presence of an unfriendly power in Antarctica has a long 
history . In the 1920' s ,  as discussed in Chapter 2 ,  Aus tralia 
sought to ensure that Antarctica became a British possession 
thereby insulating itself from the attentions of ho s t i l e  
powers . Af ter World War I I ,  Aus tralia sought t o  prevent 
Japanese whaling activities in Antarc tica . Although unsuccess­
ful in this endeavour , Australia did secure a clause in the 
1951 Japanese Peace Treaty which required Japan to abjure all 
rights and interests in Antarctica . See , R . N .-Rosecrance , 
Aus tralian Diplomacy and Japan , Melbourne University Press 
On Behalf of the A . N . U . Pres s ,  Parkvill e ,  Vic . , 1 962 , pp 37-
40 , 74-80 , 227 • 
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atmosphere s tudies , major contributions to scientific knowledge 
were obtaine d , while perhaps the single most outstanding 
achievement was the launching of the firs t artificial ear th 
satellites . The fir st , Sputnik I, was launched on Oc tober 4 ,  1957 , 
by the Soviet Union , while the first American satellite , Explorer 
!, was placed in Orbi t on January 3 1 , 1958 . The impac t of this 
achievement was immense , ranging from wonder throughout the world 
to cons ternation in American defense and poli tical circles that 
the Soviet Union had been able to accomplish this remarkable 
73 technological f eat . It heralded the dawn of the Space Age .  
If the launching of the first artificial earth satellites was the 
most outs tanding achievement during the I . G . Y . , then perhaps the 
second mos t  c i t ed accomplishment was the success of the 
international s cient i fic cooperation 
74 in Antarctica . It is one 
thing however , to laud the succes of the I . G . Y .  Antarc tic program ; 
i t  is ano ther to say that thi s success led directly to the signing 
73 The fac t that Sputnik I had been launched by a missile with an 
intercontinental range also clearly demonstrated to the United 
States that the Soviet Union had the capability of firing such 
mi ssiles at American territor y .  This had maj or implications 
for American defense requirements and strategy . See , J . M.  
Gavin , War and Peace in the Space Age , Harper , New York, 1 958 ; 
J . R .Ki llian , Jr . ,  Sputnik , Scientis t s , and Eisenhower , The 
M . I . T .  Pres s , Cambridge , Mass .  1 9 7 7 ; D . D . Eisenhower , Waging 
Peace , Heinemann , London , 1965 , Chapter VIII ; S .Ambrose , 
op . ci t . ,  pp 2 27-229 . 
74 See , for example , United States House of Representatives 
Committee on International Relations , "The Political Legacy 
of the International Geophysical Year , "  op . cit . ,  p 328 ; and 
L .M . Gould , " Emergence of Antarctica : The Mythical Land , "  
Fro zen Future , R . S . Lewis and P .M . Smith ( ed s . ) , Quadrangle 
Books , New York , 1 9 73 , p 2 2 . 
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o f  the Antarctic Treaty . A clos er examination o f  the relationship 
between the I . G . Y .  and the Antarctic Treaty is clearly required . 
3 . 4  The I . G . Y .  and the Antarctic Treaty 
To unders tand the relationship between the I . G . Y .  and the 
: .  Antarctic Treaty , i t  i s  nece s sary t o  backtrack i n  the narrative 
,< 
his tory of the I . G . Y .  to the year , 1 9 5 6 . In early December of that 
year , the U . S .  National Commi tee for the I . G . Y .  held a meeting 
during the course of which several scient i s ts expre s s ed the wish 
that data collected in Antarctica during the I . G . Y .  be completed 
by additional ob servations made after its conclus ion . Moreover , it 
appeared from the ensuing discussion that an extension of 
observations in Antarctica for an additional year would lead to 
more statis tically complete and more general understanding of the 
region' s geophys ics . 7 5  It was therefore decided to send a telegram 
to the General Secretary of C . S . A . G . I .  in France inquiring ' 
whether the C . S . A . G . I .  and the [ twelve ] par t icipating nations 
believe that the I . G . Y .  Antarctic program should be continued for 
an additional year to realize the full scientific benefit of the 
t i d · · , 7 6  Th 1 1 presen nvestment an tra1n1ng . e te egram a so asked , in 
the event of a favourable response to the ini tial inquiry , 
'whether an Antarctic conference might be convened • in the 
late spring of 1957 to consider the character of a potential 
75 Fourth C . S . A . G . I .  Antarctic Conference ( Paris ,  1 3-15 June , 
1 9 5 7 ) ,  Annals of the International Geophysical Year , Vol . lIB , 
1959 , p 475 . 
7 6  Ibid . ,  pp 4 73-4 7 4 . 
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program for such an additional Antarctic I . G . y . ,7 7  
The telegram was passed on to the Adjoint Secretary o f  C . S .A . G . I .  
who firstly informed the French National Commit tee of the U . S .  
inquiry and asked for their comments ;  secondly , convened a meeting 
between a repre s entative of the Bri tish National Commi ttee for the 
I .G .Y .  and Aus t ralian , New Zealand and South African scientific 
officers in London ; and thirdly , circulated the views expressed by 
these groups in letters addres sed to all national organizing 
commit tees participating in the I . G . Y .  
78 Antarctic program . Thes e  
views generally opposed the not ion of an extension to the I . G . Y .  
in Antarctica o n  the grounds that such an action would involve 
fairly large expenses and it was doubted whether the governments 
of counntries would agree to allocate the required funds . It was 
also sugges ted that the recrui tment o f  new personnel would be a 
difficul t problem given that the personnel engaged in the 
Antarctic program intended to return home at the end of 1958 . 
Possible delays in processing I . G .Y .  data collected from 
throughout the world brought about by a year s ' s  extension to the 
7 9  program was also viewed a s  a danger . 
The response s  from the participating national committees were 
' scarce and vague' , and at the request of the U . S .  National 
77 Ibid . 
7 8  Ibid . ,  p 474 • 
. 7 9  Ibid . 
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Commit tee for the I . G .Y . , the issue was placed on the agenda of 
h 1d 1 9 5 7 .
80 
the fourth C . S .A . G . I .  Antarctic Conference e in June , 
There it was recommended that the Bureau of C . S .A . G . I .  at i t s  next 
meeting forward to the I . C . S . U .  Executive Board the 
recommendation : 
'That I . C . S . U .  appoint a scientific commit tee to examine the 
merits of further investigations in the Antarctic covering the 
entire field of science , and to make proposals to I . C . S . U .  on the 
best ways to achieve such program . That in view of the 
desirability of avoiding an interruption in the current series o f  
I . G . Y .  inves tigations i n  Antarctica , I . C . S . U .  takes immediate 
action :ft1 order that the findings be available by the middle of August .  
At this Conference ,  delegates were also invited to express the 
attitudes of their national commit tees toward the U . S .  proposal . 
The delegate s  from Britain , Australia , Chile and South Africa 
indicated that their commit tees were definitely against an 
extension , while the delegates from Belgium and , of course , the 
United States responded favourably toward the proposal . The 
Japanese , French and New Zealand national committees had not taken 
any decision about the mat ter , while the Soviet Committee for the 
I . G . Y .  non-committed1y 'recognized the interes t  of the extension' 
and Argentina had already planned a long term program o f  
geophysical investigations i n  the region but 'recognized that for 
82 other countries the problem is quite different . '  
80 
82 
Ibid . 8 1  Ibid . ,  P 485 .-
Ibid . ,  pp 47 7-478 . Norway , the twelfth participating country 
in the I . G . Y .  Antarctic program , was unable to send represent­
atives to the Conference . The Norwegian atti tude to the prop­
osal was , therefore , not expressed . 
, 
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The Bureau of C . S . A . G . I . , at its meeting in Brussels on June 1 6 , 
passed on the Conferenc e ' s  recommendation to the Secretary-General 
of I . C . S . U .  for discus sion at the I . C . S . U .  Executive Board meeting 
also held in that city at the end of June . The recommendation was 
endorsed , and an I . C . S . U .  ad hoc investigating group , to be 
comprised of a scientific delegate from each o f  the twelve 
national committees conducting or contemplating scientific 
83 activities in the Antarctic , was set up to s tudy the issue . This 
ad hoc group met in Stockholm from September 9 to 1 1 ,  1 9 5 7 . 
Present were delegate s  from eight of the twelve national 
commi t tees and communications were received from the remaining 
four ( the Australian , Belgian , New Zealand and South African) 
84 which had been unable to send representatives .  
At firs t , the general attitude of the mee ting toward the proposal 
to extend the duration of the Antarctic I . G .Y .  program was again 
negative as most national commit tees felt that the financial costs 
85 would be prohibitive . During the second day of the meeting , 
however , this negative atti tude toward the proposal changed 
rapidly after the late arrival of the Soviet delegate who 
'indicated on a map where the Russian Antarctic stations were and 
83 Hanes s ian , "Antarctica : Current National Interests • •  
op . c i t . ,  p 149 . 
, 
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84 Ibid . 
United States House o f  Representatives Committee on Interstate 
and Foreign Commerce , International Geophysical Year , The 
Arctic and Antarc tica , 8 5 th Congress , 2d Session , House Re port 
No . 1 348 , Uni ted States Government Printing Office , Washington , 
1 958 , p 44 . 
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where they wanted to go , said they expected to continue their 
s tudies in the Antarctic , and expressed the opinion that while 
Russia did no t wish to influence o ther countries to go ahead if 
they did not wish to do so , they felt in such case new nations 
should be invited in to carry on the s tudies . ,8 6  As Plott says , 
' this statement of the Soviet delegate proved to have far-reaching 
consequences • since the maj ority of the other nations did not 
wish to give the Soviet Union a free hand in the region , a 
continuation of international scientific operations was thereby 
d ,87 assure • 
Reversing its initial at titude , the I . C . S . U .  ad hoc investigating 
group concluded that there was much to be gained from further 
scientific observations in Antarctica and recommended that the 
I . C . S . U .  establish a commi t tee to organize future scientific 
8 8  research in the region . Events quickly gathered pace . Within a 
fortnight , the I . C . S . U .  decided to es tablish a Special Commi tee on 
Antarctic Research ( SCAR) with a primary task of planning for the 
scientific exploration o f  Antarctica after the I . G . Y .  In Octobe r ,  
invitations to participate i n  SCAR were sent t o  the twelve 
national I . G . Y .  commit tees involved in Antarctic research and to 
several international s cientific unions . 8 9  But the views of the 
86 
88 
Ibid . 87 Plott , op . cit . ,  p 184 . 
Hanessian , "Antarctica : Current National Interests • 
op . cit . 
8 9  Ibid . 
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national I . G . Y .  commi t tees did not necessarily represent the views 
of their respec tive government s  and because government funding was 
required to support future scientific activities in Antarctica , 
the extension of the program in the region was by no means 
guaranteed . 
In November , 1 9 5 5 , the Committee on Inters tate and Foreign 
Commerce of the United States House of Representatives commenced a 
s tudy concerned with the direction and magnitude of U . S .  post-
I . G . Y .  programs should take , the probable achievement s  of the 
I . G .Y . , the continuing emphasis which properly should be placed 
upon geophysical disciplines , and the legislation collaterally 
needed to accomplish the purposes of U . S .  post-I . G . Y .  90 programs . 
The Commi t ttee subsequently reported that there were a number o f  
scientific reasons why ' the Antarctic is best sui ted for the 
continuance of geophysical s tudies . ,9 1  These were to do , for 
example , with Antarctica ' s  'unequaled [ sic ] impor tance in 
supplying a s table platform for the observation of satellites 
having the highly significant north-south orbit '  and the region's 
long summer days and winter nights which aid s tudies of the 
9 2  ionosphere and radio propagation . 
90 United States House of Representatives Commit tee on Inter­
s tate and Foreign Commerce , International Geophysical 
Year • • •  , op . ci t . ,  p 3 .  
Ibid . ,  P 44 . 
Ibid . 
j , 
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But there were other , non-sci entific reasons pressing for the 
extension of the I . G . Y .  Antarctic program .  The Committee concluded 
that although the continuance o f  u . s .  scientific activities in 
Antarctica was 'adequately but tressed by scientific interes ts ' ,  
the Soviet intentions in the regio n ,  as s tated at the Stockholm 
meeting in September , 1957 , ' further emphasizes the need for their 
i , 93 cont nuance . Accordingly , the Committee recommended ' that it 
s traightaway be decided that our activities in the Antarctic will 
continue for another year , that the National Science Foundation 
prepare a budget for additional funds enabling it to continue to 
act as fi scal agent for the scientific studies , and that the 
National Security Council authorize and direct the Defense 
Department to furnish logistical support . ,94 On January 1 7 , 195 8 , 
this recommendation was forwarded to U . S .  President Eisenhower who 
immediately approved it . 
The following month was noteworthy in Antarctic affairs for a 
number of reasons . Firs t ,  the inaugural meeting o f  SCAR was held 
at The Hague from February 3-5 . At this meeting , the British 
delegation relaxed its earlier s tance opposing the extension of 
I . G . Y .  activities in Antarctica b y  giving some indications 
that Britain would continue scientific operations in the 
95 region , too . Second , the Brit i sh Prime Minis ter acknowledged 
93 Ibid . ,  pp 44-45 . 94 Ibid . ,  p 4.5-. 
95 Hanessian , "Antarctica : Current National Interests 
o p . ci t . , pp 156-157 . 
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9 8  
that recent discus sions had taken place between Britain , Australia 
and New Zealand about 'ways and means of ensuring that Antarctica 
. 9 6  did no t remain a potential source of fric tion and conflict . '  
Press speculation at the time hinted at the revival of intere s t  in 
some form of internationalization of Antarctica which would 
9 7  include the participation o f  the Soviet Union . The reports drew 
instantaneous reactions from Argentina and Chile - both countries 
reiterating their Antarc tic claims and rejecting any plans about 
9 8  international control o f  the region . 
The third noteworthy development in Antarctic affairs during 
February , 1 9 5 8 , and ultimately the mos t  significant , was the 
initiation, by the United State s , o f  'quiet , confidential and 
informal conversations ' with interes ted countries aiming to 
persuade them o f  the benefits to be derived from participating in 
9 9  an Antarctic administrative organization . Heading the U . S .  team 
in this ini tiative was Ambassador Paul C .  Daniels , a veteran U . S .  
Foreign Service Officer who specialized in Latin American affairs . 
Daniels had been recalled from retirement by U . S .  Secre tary of 
96 Parliamentary Debates ( Hansard ) - Fifth Series - Vol . 58 2 , 
House of Commons Official Report , Third Session of the 
Forty-first Parliament o f  the United Kingdom o f  Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland - Session 1 9 5 7-5 8 , comprising period 
from 1 0th February- 2 1 s t  February , 1 9 5 8 , Her Majesty ' s  
Stationery Office , London , 1 958 , column 1 033 . 
97 Hanessian , " The Antarctic Treaty 1 9 5 9 , "  op. ci t . ,  pp 452-453 . 
9 8  Ibid . ,  pp 453-455 . 
99 Ibid . , P 455 . 
(. , 
9 9  
State Dulle s  i n  September , 1 957 , to conduct a s tudy of the u . S .  
position in Antarctica with the aim of finding a solution to the 
100 political problems in the region . 
The United Stat e s '  plan outlined at these conversations contained 
seven major elements : free access to Antarctica by all countries 
interes ted in carrying out scientific research ; scientific 
cooperation and exchange of information among the participating 
countrie s ;  the use o f  Antarctica for peaceful purposes only ; the 
non-militarization of the region ; the guaranteed rights of 
unilateral access and inspection by all participating countries to 
all parts of Antarctica ; the freezing of all rights and claims to 
territorial sovereignty in the region ; and the creation of an 
1 0 1  administrative unit . Thus , a s  well a s  including the modus 
vivendi principle , this plan advocated the non-militarization of 
Antarctica together wi th the e stablishment of inspection rights to 
help secure compliance to this provision . 
Despite a conside rable array o f  difficulties raised by several 
interested countries during the course of these informal 
conversations , by April , 1 95 8 ,  the United States felt sufficiently 
100 Plott , op. ci t . ,  p 1 9 3 . It hardly seems coincidental that this 
U . S .  action occurred at the same time ( i . e .  September , 1957 ) 
that the Soviet Union announced its intention , at the S tock­
holm meeting of the I . e . s . u .  ad hoc inves tigating group , to 
continue scientific activities in Antarctica . 
101 Hanessian , " The Antarctic Treaty 1959 , "  op . cit . ,  pp 4 55-45 6 . 
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confident that its initiative would prove successful . A report 
stating that the United S tates government was ' consulting with the 
U . S . S . R .  and o ther nat ions in continuing co-operation in 
Antarctica ' , and quoting the State Depar tment Press Officer as 
saying that the discussions might lead to an international 
Antarctic conference , 
103 Time s . appeare d  in the New York �----��--------
Subsequent to this , in early May , 1 95 8 ,  U . S .  President Eisenhower 
publicly announced that the United States had invited the eleven 
other countries participating in the I .G . Y .  activities in 
Antarctica to confer together to conclude a treaty which would 
have the following peaceful purposes : 
'A. Freedom of scientific investigation throughout 
Antarc tica 
B .  International agreement to ensure that Antarctica 
be used for peaceful purpo ses only . 
C .  Any o ther peaceful purposes not inconsis tent with 
the Charter of the United Nations . , 104 
By early June , all eleven countries had accepted the United States 
102 Australia , for example , had reservations about the e stablish­
ment of an inspection sys tem and administrative machinery , 
while Argentina and Chile were very cautious about the plan . 
See , Hanessian , " The Antarc tic Treaty 1 9 5 9 , "  op . cit . , 
p 456-457 .  
103 " l o G . Y .  Extension Sought , United S tates Consults with Soviet 
and Other Nations on Plan , I I  New York Times , April 23 , 1958 , 
cited in Hanessian , " The Antarctic Treaty 1 95 9 , "  op . ci t . 
104 Text of U . S .  Note reprinted in The Department of State 
Bulletin , Vol . XXXVIII , No . 988 , June 2, 1 958 , pp 9 1 1 -9 1 2 . 
101 
invitation . The U . S .  Department o f  State believed , however , that 
before a formal conference could be held , basic agreement 
concerning such points as free scientific access , the s tatus o f  
claims , demili tari zation and inspection had to be 
105 reached . 
Accordingly , on June 1 3 ,  1958 , the first o f  a series o f  privat e  
preparatory mee tings o f  the so-called Informal Working Group o n  
t\ntarctica was held i n  Washington with the expectation that the 
Treaty Conference would be held within a few months . 106 These 
expectations were to be dashed , however ,  and it was no t until 
October , 1959 , that the Conference could be opened . By that time 
sixty preparatory mee tings had been held . The major stumbling 
block to progress was the obs truction of the Soviet Union which 
insis ted , firs tly , that the working group would not discuss 
subs tantive issues and should confine itself to determining the 
time and place of the Conference and the rules of procedure ; 
secondly , tha t the proposed Conference should be open to any 
country wishing to participate ; thirdly , that the only proper 
topics for inclusion in the treaty were scientific cooperation and 
! , 
! peaceful uses o f  Antarc tica ; and finally , any reference to 
105 Plo t t ,  op . c i t . ,  p 1 9 6 . 
106 P . M . Quigg , A Pole Apart :  The Emerging Issue of Antarctica , 
McGraw-Hill , New York , 1 983 , p 145 .  United S tates' document­
ation about proceedings at these preparatory meetings were 
classified at the time when Quigg was writing his study . 
Memoranda for the mee t ings were discovered , however , in the 
priva te collection of papers of Admiral George Dufek , held a t  
the George Arents Research Library , Syracus� University . 
For a later analysis o f  the Dufek papers , see , P . J . Beck , 
·Prepara tory Meetings for the Antartic Treaty 1958-5 9 , "  
Polar Record , Vol . 22 ,  No . 14 1 , 1 985 , pp 653-664 . 
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107 terri torial claims was unacceptable . 
In July , 1 9 5 7 , soon af ter these preparatory mee tings- had 
commenced , India submi tted that the " Ques tion of Antarctica" be 
placed on the agenda for discussion at the 1 3 th regular session of 
the General Assembly of the United Nations . Although the 
submission was subsequently withdrawn , due to the heavy agenda of 
the General Assembly , India continued to be convinced that the 
entire sub j ect should be discussed at the United Nations . 10B 
All this time , the preparatory meetings continued with the Soviet 
Union maintaining its obstuctionist stance . The United States had 
anticipated at the onset that Argentina and Chile would raise 
major obstacles to any Antarctic agreement and this proved to be 
109 the case . Both countries , along wi th Aus tralia , were reluc tant 
to accept any proviso for an international adminis trative 
107 Quigg , op . cit . ,  p 146 . 
lOB K . Ashluwalia , "The Antarctic Treaty : Should India Become a 
Party to I t ? " The Indian Journal of International Law , Vol . I ,  
1 9 60-6 1 ,  pp 4 74-475 . This was not the first time that India 
had expressed an interest in Antarc tic affairs . In 1 9 5 6 , 
India had made a formal proposal ( "The peaceful utilization 
of Antarc tica " )  for inclusion in the agenda of the 1 1 th 
regular session of the U . N .  General As sembl y .  This proposal 
was no t pressed and i t , too , was subsequently withdrawn 
because of the opposi tion of Chile and Argentina and the 
lack of support from Bri tain and the Uni ted State s .  See , 
ibid . , pp 473-474 . 
109 It can be sugges ted that the choice of Ambas sador Daniels as 
leader of the U . S .  nego tiat ing team was related to the ex­
pectation of difficulties arising from Argentina and Chile . 
As mentioned beforehand , Daniels was a specialist in Latin 
American af fairs . 
Co' 
\ 
\ 
r 
\ 
\ 
I 
� 
\ 
\ 
\ \. 
103 
body . 1 1 0  But there were o ther maj o r  difficultie s , too . For example 
Japan , along with the Soviet Union , wanted wide participat�on in 
any Antarctic agreement , while Australia pushed for a limited 
group and the United States argued that the participants remain 
those that had been invited to confer about an Antarctic Treaty . 
Taking a different tack, Britain wanted a limited number o f  
countries involved in the admini strative arrangements but was 
agreeable to the accession of a wide range of countries to a 
1 1 1  general agreement . 
By March , 1 9 5 9 , however , eleven of the twelve countries had 
nego tiated toward substantial agreement without significant change 
in the Soviet position . At this time , the leader of the United 
States team, Ambassador Dani el s , told the Planning Board of the 
U . S .  National Security Council that he saw only a '50-50 chance 
that the Treaty Conference would come into being . , 1 1 2  In the 
following month , however , the si tuation was to change . Several 
weeks after a lunchtime meeting between Daniels and the Sovie t  
Ambassador to Washington , Mikhail Menshikov , the Soviet position 
at the preparatory meetings altered to one of active participation 
1 1 3  and flexibility . Thereafter , rapid progress was achieved at the 
1 10 Hanes s ian , "The Antarctic Treaty 1 95 9 , "  op . cH . , p 46 2 .  
1 1 1  Ibid . , pp 4 62-463 . 
1 12 Memorandum o f  a March 10 , 1 9 5 9 , meeting made by James E .  
Mooney , Deputy U . S .  Antarctic Proj ects Officer , Department 
of Defense , in the Center for Polar Archives , R. G . 330 cited 
in Quigg , op . ci t . , p 146 . 
1 13 Quigg , o p . ci t . ,  pp 146-14 7 . 
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meetings and by May , 1959 , enough basic agreement had been reached 
for the Uni ted S tates to announce that the formal Conference on 
Antarct ica would be held in Washing ton commencing on Oc tober 1 5 , 
1959 . 
Although progress at the Washington Conference was initially 
rapid , the almo s t  exclusively private proceedings were by no means 
1 14 contention free . For example , France did not ini tially agree to 
a draft article of the Treaty concerning the freezing of claims to 
sovereignty and i t  was not until November 5 ,  1 9 5 9 , that the French 
accepted the 1 1 5  no tion . Chile was also concerned about the 
provisions governing accession ( o f  new member s )  to the Treaty and 
at one stage proposed , to the cons ternation of other delegations , 
that there should be provision for any party to denounce the 
Treaty on two years' no tice , 1 1 6  after ten year s . I n  addition, i t  
was not possible t o  secure agreement about the compulsory 
1 14 By October 20 it had been announced that general agreement 
had been reached ' that Antarctica should be used for peaceful 
purposes only and that all measures of a military nature 
should be prohibited . '  Three days late r ,  it was also 
announced that 'General agreement had been reached on 
international cooperation in scient ific investigation in 
Antarctica . '  See , "Press Release No . 2 ,  October 20 , 1 9 5 9 "  
and "Press Release No . 3 ,  October 2 3 ,  1 959 , "  Conference on 
Antarctica , Department o f  State Publication 7060 , Inter­
national Organization and Conference Series 13 , Septembe r ,  
1960, p 40 . 
Australian Foreign Minister : The Diaries o f  R . G . Casey , 1 9 5 1-
6 0 ,  T . B . Millar ( ed . ) ,  Collins , London , 1 9 7 2 , pp 330-333 . 
Ibid . , pp 333-334 . Casey records that the mat ter was left 
for the U . S .  to work through diploma tic channels in Santiago , 
in an effort to get this proposal withdrawn . 
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reference of d i s putes to the International Court of Jus tice due to 
1 17 the ob j ec t ions of Argentina , Chile and the Soviet Union . 
Finally ,  the only maj or new matter which arose for negotiation 
during the Conference ( a t  the instigation of delegates from the 
Southern Hemisphere countries ) was the notion of banning all 
nuclear explos ions in Antarctica . Although a concern of the South 
American countries during the I . G .Y . , for unknown reasons this 
1 1 8  subject had not been discussed during the preparatory meetings . 
The Soviet delegation had not anticipated the issue being raised 
and it was a sub j ect which the United States wished to avoid 
incorporating in the Treaty . After considerable debate , however ,  a 
formal proposal by the Argentine delegate banning all nuclear 
explosions and the disposal of radioactive wastes from the 
Antarc tic continent and adj acent islands was accepted by the o ther 
1 1 9  delegations . This cleared the way for the completion o f  the 
agreement and on December 1 ,  1 9 5 9 , after six weeks of negotiation , 
the Antarctic Treaty was signed by the authorized repre sentatives 
of the twelve countries at a special ceremony folloWing the fourth 
120 and final plenary ses sion of the Conference . 
1 17 Ashluwalia , op . c i t . ,  pp 48 1-48 2 . 
1 18 Plo t t , op . ci t . ,  p 201 . 
1 19 Ibi d . 
120 See Appendix B for the text of the Antarcti'c Treaty . 
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3 . 5  The " Triumph of Science" Image Reconsidered 
In the light of the foregoing di scussion , it is clear that the 
dominant " triumph of s cience " image of the origins of the 
Antarctic Treaty is both superficial and misleading . While there 
can be no doubt that scientific cooperation in Antarc tica in the 
years immediately before and during the I . G . Y .  played a 
significant role in reducing and minimi zing overt fric tion between 
countries involved in the region , 1 2 1  the crucial turning point in 
the chain of events that led to the signing of the Antarctic 
Treaty was the Soviet announcement at the I . C . S . U .  ad hoc group 
meeting in Stockholm in September , 195 7 , that the U . S . S . R .  
intended t o  continue and extend i t s  ac tivities in Antarctica . It 
has been shown that immediately before this announcement was made , 
a proposal to extend I . G . Y .  ac tivities in Antarctica did no t enjoy 
widespread support from many I . G . Y .  national commi ttees , let alone 
their respective government s  who would have been required to fund 
such operations . The Soviet announcement ,  however ,  set in motion a 
number of initiatives which converged on the path toweard an 
Antarctic agreement . These included the renewed Brit i s h ,  
Australian and New Zealand discus s ions i n  late 1957 and early 1958 
about 'ways and means ' of reducing the sources of friction and 
conflict in Antarctica which had characteri zed the region during 
the 1940's and early 1950 ' s . There were also the U . S .  State 
Department and Congressional s tudies during the same period which 
1 2 1  A key factor in this was the "gentlemen ' s  agreemen t "  among 
participating countries to " freeze" temporarily Antarctic 
territorial claims at their exis t ing status . 
, i ,  
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ultimately resulted in President Ei senhower's invi tation to the 
eleven other countries participa ting in the I . G . Y .  Antarctic 
program to confer with the aim of concluding an agreement . 
Clearly , the statement by Coplin et al ci ted earlier that ' the 
salience of the [ Antarctic ] i s sue was very high for the scientists 
while i t  was lower for o ther national and transnational actors '  
does conside rable violence t o  the facts of the 1 2 2  case . In the 
United States , for example , there is no indication that the S tate 
Department and Congressional committee needed to be pres sured 
about the Antarctic si tuation once the Soviet intentions were 
clear . QUilty's contention that ' the idea [ o f  the Antarctic 
Treaty] aros e  from scientists • 
1 2 3  , i s  also misleading . The 
United S tates ' plan which formed the basis o f  the eventual 
agreement and which was communicated to interes ted countries 
during February , March and April , 1 9 5 7 , built on the earlier U . S .  
modus vivendi proposal s dating from January ,  1950 . Even the so-
called "gent lemen's agreement " under taken at the C . S .A . G . L 
Antarctic Conference in 1955 (which temporarily "froze Antarctic 
territorial c laims at their exis ting status ) was a version of thi s 
modus vivendi principle a proposal originally presented to the 
124 United States by Chile in July , 1 9 4 8 , 
122 Cited on page 60 . 123 Cited on page 6 1 . 
124 Moreover , this "gentlemen's agreement" was proposed , not by 
scient i s t s , but by the leaders of the Argentine and Chilean 
delegations at the C . S . A . G . I .  Conference who were those 
countri e s '  prespec tive ambassadors in Paris . 
, , 
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In short then , the " triumph of science" image i s  an inaccurat e  
portrayal of events leading up to the s igning of the Antarctic 
Treaty . But why was the Soviet announcement at Stockholm such a 
'��i�:-' 
.£" turning point in Antarctic affai r s ?  The answer to thi s  ques tion , 
-j:-
-'; "'." 
it can be sugges ted , lies in the interrelationship between 
Antarctic affairs during the 1940 ' s  and 1 9 50 ' s  and basic 
s tructural forces operative in world politics at this time . Jus t 
as the Second Industrial Revolution and the New Imperiali sm shaped 
Antarctic affairs during the first four decades of the twentieth 
century , underlying s t ructural change s  began to impac t upon 
Antarctic affairs during the two decades following the outbreak o f  
World War II . Thes e  changes , referred t o  throughout the course o f  
this chapter , concerned the changing dis tribution of power 
associated with the rise of the Uni ted States and the Soviet Union 
to superpower s tatus , the intens ification of American-Russian 
rivalry af ter 1947 to become the Cold War , coupled with the 
declining importance o f  European countries and the gathering 
s trength of anti-coloniali sm . 
It has been shown that factors associated with these underlying 
structural forces shaped Antarctic affairs in significant way s . 
The Argentine and Chilean claims to Antarctic territory reiterated 
throughout the 1 9 40 ' s  and 1 9 5 0 ' s  were expre s sions of anti-
colonialism in the Wes tern Hemisphere . The United States ' deci s ion 
-�: 
� not to support the South American countries , despite i t s  strong 
, anti-colonial s tance at the time , was based in large part upon 
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concern not to act agains t the interests of allies ( i . e .  Britain) 
during the worsening Cold War situation in Europe where solidarity 
was deemed neces sary in the face of perceived Soviet belligerence . 
The demand of the Soviet Union in 1 9 5 0  to be part of any 
discussions about the Antarctic problem dashed American hopes and 
designs of excluding their "mos t  probable enemy" from Antarctica , 
while the international arrangements assoc iated with the 
International Geophysical Year provided the Soviet Union , a 
country interes ted in Antarctic research for the same sorts of 
reasons as the United State s , with the ready opportunity to 
establish i t s  presence on the Antarctic continent in a way which 
minimized poli tical difficulties with claimants . I t  must also be 
noted that by the mid 1 9 5 0 ' s , the focal point of the Cold War was 
shifting from Europe toward other parts of the world such as the 
iddl d h 1 2 5 " h M e Eas t an Sout Asia , and t e expans ion of the Soviet 
Union into Antarc tica , part and parcel of this shift , became a 
matter of poli tical and strategic signif icance for not only the 
United States , but concerned Southern Hemisphere countries such as 
Australia . Moreover , in the the wake o f  Sputnik , there was a 
generalized fear of the Soviet Union establishing rocket-launching 
1 2 6  sites in Antarctica for use against other countries .  
Thus , faced with the penetration of Antarctica by its Cold War 
125 On this point see , LaFeber ,  op . cit . ,  pp 125�194 , and Ambrose , 
op . cit . ,  pp 2 1 2-244 . 
126 H .J . Taubenfe1d , "A Treaty for Antarc tica , "  International Con­
ciliation , January , 1 96 1 , p 26 1 .  
" ' 
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adversary , the United S tates sought t o  "neutralize" the region by 
proposing a treaty which provided , not only for continued 
scientific cooperation and a way around the "Antarctic problem" 
between Britain , Argentina and Chile , but also for the non-
militarization of Antarc tica and the es tablishment of inspection 
rights . Non-militarization and inspection rights were new notions 
in the context of Antarctic affairs . They had not been contained 
in any of the previous Uni ted States '  proposal s for 
internationali zing the regio n .  Indeed , back in 1 948 , the U . S .  
Secretary of Defense Forres tal wro te to the Secretary o f  State 
that ' It would not be in the military interest for Antarc tica to 
be maintained as a demili tari zed area . , 1 2 7  But a decade later , the 
si tuation had changed . By the mid and late 1950 ' s ,  both the Soviet 
Union and the Uni ted States were seeking ways to maximi ze their 
influence in the world while avoiding ma jor conflict wi th each 
other . Soviet-Ameri can relat ions were experiencing a slight " thaw" 
as each country was concerned to reduce international tensions in 
128 order to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war . To this end , in 
1 955 , the Uni ted S tates had called for an "open skies " agreement 
with the Soviet Union involving the exchange of plans of each 
country' s  mi li tary fac ilities and allowing aerial inspection of 
each country ' s  terri tory to ensure against surprise at tacks . This 
127 The Secretary of Defense ( Forres tal ) to the Secre tary of 
S tate , Washington , 12 Apri l , 1948 , Foreign Relations of the 
Uni ted S tates 1 948 , op . cit . ,  p 973 . At this - time , Antarc tica 
was used by the Uni ted States mi li tary forces as a venue for 
training personnel and testing equipment in polar conditions . 
128 On this point see , LaFeber , op . cit . ,  and Ambrose , op . cit . 
i .  " 
1 1 1  
proposal was quickly re jected by the U . S . S . R . , however , on the 
it would infringe on Soviet territorial grounds that 
1 2 9  sovereignty . In 1 9 5 7 , the Uni ted States had also sugges ted a 
sys tem of international inspec tion of the Arctic area as part of 
its disarmament proposals to the Soviet Union . The U . S .  aim was to 
reduce the danger of surprise attack from acros s  the Arctic and 
130 the danger of miscalculation . 
Against this background , and with the Soviet presence on the 
Antarctic continent a new factor in Antarctic affairs , the United 
States sought to deal with this si tuation by proposing an 
agreement which , on the one hand , accommodated Soviet interes t s  in 
Antarctica thus preventing the region from becoming another 
flashpoint in the continuing Cold War , and on the other hand , 
"neutrali zed " Antarctica through the non-militari zation and 
inspection provi s ions thereby limiting Soviet ac tivi ties in the 
region yet at the same time preserving American access to all 
par ts of the continent . In the words of U . S .  Secre tary of State 
Dulles , America proposed ' to e s tablish in Antarc tica an 
international regime which will prevent the monopoliz ing of any 
part of this new continent for the mili tary purposes of any nation 
but assure an "open door " for the peaceful pursui ts of all 
129 LaFeber , op . ci t . ,  p 1 8 1 . 
130 In April , 1958 , the U . S .  renewed thi s proposal in the United 
Nations Security Council , but the measure was blocked by 
Soviet veto . See , Addre s s  by Secretary Dulle s ,  " Principles 
and Policies in a Changing World , "  The Depar tment of State 
Bulletin , Vol . XXXIX , No . 10 1 5 , December 8 ,  1958 , p 899 . 
, , 
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ki d ... 1 3 1  man n .  Thes e  objectives were rei terated at the Hearings 
before the U . S .  Senate Commi t tee on Foreign Rela tions which 
considered the Antarc tic Treaty before ratification , when Herman 
Phleger ( ini tially head o f  the U . S .  delegation to , and 
subsequently chairman of , the Conference on Antarctica) emphasized 
American desire to "neutral i z e "  Antarc tica so that i t  could not be 
used for any purpose except a peaceful purpo s e . Moreover , in 
response to a ques tion from the S enate Committee Chairman , Senator 
Fulbright , asking if the Uni ted S tates could have placed 
limitations on Soviet activity in Antarctica without entering into 
the Treaty with them as partne r s , Phleger tes t i fied , "'1 know of no 
other way than going down there and trying to throw them out . ... 1 3 2  
Although e x  p o s t  facto , Phelge r "' s  responses support the argument 
that as well as providing a blueprint for scientific inves tigation 
in Antarct ica , the Antarctic Treaty mus t  also be seen as an 
agreement established to limi t and control manifest and latent 
conflict pertaining to the region be tween Cold War opponents , as 
well as between claimants and non-claimants , and between rival 
claimants . Put simply then , the Antarc tic Treaty was no t a 
victory , or triumph , of science over politic s . It was not even a 
victory . As shall be shown in the following chapter , it was more 
a truce . 
1 3 1  U . S .  Secretary of State , John Fos ter Dulles , "Our Changing 
World , "  The Department of S tate Bulle tin , Vol XXXVIII , 
No . 987 , May 26 , 1958 , p 849 . 
132 Uni ted S tates Senate Commi t tee on Foreign Relations , Hearings 
The Antarctic Treaty , 8 6 th Congre s s , 2d Session , Uni ted 
States Government Printing Office , Washington , 1960 , pp 66-7 . 
CHAPTER 4 THE ANTARCTIC TREATY AND PAX ANTARCTICA 
In his no te o f  May 3 ,  1958 , to the eleven o ther countries inviting 
them to confer about Antarctica , u . s .  President Eisenhower 
proposed that ' jo int adminis trative arrangemen t s '  be worked out 
that 'would p rovide an agreed bas i s  for the maintenance of 
peaceful and orderly conditions in Antarct i ca for the years to 
come ; and would avoid the poss ibility of that continent becoming 
the s cene o f  international d iscord . , 1 For two decades following 
the signing of the Antarctic Treaty at the Conference on 
Antarctica held in Washington in late 1 9 5 9  and its entry into 
force in 1 96 1 , such hopes seemed to have been fulfilled . By 1964 , 
for example , U . S .  President Johnson wrote that 'preoccupation with 
world problems should not obscure situat ions like Antarctica where 
this country and o thers work together harmoniously to construct 
the proto types of peace . , 2 Johnson added that the Antarctic Treaty 
'serves not only as a pact guaranteeing freedom of scientific 
inquiry in the continent of Antarct ica but , more importantly , as 
an outs tanding example of practical cooperation between nations 
and a positive s tep toward a peaceful world . ,3 
1 Text o f  u . s .  No te reprinted in The Department o f  S tate 
Bulletin , Vol . XXXVIII , No . 98 8 , June 2 ,  1 9 5 8 , pp 9 10-9 1 2 . 
2 Message from the President o f  the United S tates Transmit ting 
Special Report on Uni ted S tates Policy and International 
Cooperation in Antarctica , 88th Congress ,  2 d  Session , House 
Document No . 358 , U . S .  Government Printing Office , Washington , 
1 964 , p 1 1 1 . 
3 Ibid . 
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Nineteen years later in 1 983 , the Australian Minis ter for Foreign 
Affairs , Mr . Bill Hayden , spoke similarly o f  Antarc tica . 
Expressing concern that the " Ques tion o f  Antarctica" had been 
placed on the agenda o f  the 38th Session o f  the United Nations 
General Assembly , Hayden s tated that any attempt to scrap the 
Antarctic Treaty and negotiate a new international agreement on 
Antarctica or to r enegotiate parts of the Treaty i tself 'would 
prove counter-productive and introduce uncertainty and possible 
instability into a regi on of hi therto unparalleled international 
4 harmony . ""  
Such remarks sugges t  that the Antarctic Treaty has been a 
remarkably successful measure when judged in t erms o f  engendering 
peace and order in a r eg i on which , as discussed in the previous 
chapter , had been the subject and scene o f  bit ter discord and 
enmi ty between several countries during the 1 94 0 ' s  and 1 9 50 ' s . 
This view of the Treaty has been shared by many . 5 But baldly 
at tributing peace and international order in Antarc tica during the 
1960 "" s , 1 9 7 0 ' s  and early 1 9 8 0 ' s  to the Treaty takes one very 
l ittle way towards unders tanding how this s tate o f  affairs came 
4 Statement by the Aus tralian Minis t er for Foreign Affairs , Mr . 
Bill Hayden , to the General As sembly o f  the Unit ed Nations , 
October 4 ,  1 9 83 , reprinted in Department o f  Foreign Affairs 
Backgrounder , No . 402 , October 5 ,  1983 . 
5 See , for example , J . F . Lovering and J . R . V . Prescott ,  Las t  o f  
Lands • • •  Antarc t ica , Melbourne University Pres s , Carlton , 
Victoria , 1 9 7 9 ,  p 1 8 3 ; and R . B . Bilder , " The Present Legal and 
Political Situation in Antarctica , "  The New Internationalism 
of the Use of Common Spaces , J . I . Charney (ed . ) ,  Allanheld , 
Osmun , Totowa , New Jersey , 1 98 2 ,  p 1 74 .  
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about . The literature of Antarctic affairs offers no detailed 
explanation of Pax Antarctica during this period . Much of it has 
emphasized how the Treaty provides a blueprint for scientific 
investigation and cooperation in the region. It is them implied 
that s cientific cooperation engendered regional peace and order. 
This image of the Antarctic Treaty as a blueprint for science 
seems to follow inexorably from the " triumph of science" accounts 
of the origins of the Treaty. Having demonstrated in the previous 
chapter , however, that the " triumph of science" image of the 
origins of the Antarc tic Treaty is superficial and misleading, a 
closer examination of this subsequent image is clearly required. 
4 . 1  The Doainant Image : A Blueprint for Science 
There can be no doubt that the Antarctic Treaty does provide a 
blueprint for scientific inves tigation and cooperation in the 
region . Article I of the Treaty provides that Antarctica should be 
used for peaceful purposes only : Article II for international 
cooperation and freedom of scientific inves tigation in the region; 
Article III for the free exchange of information regarding plans 
for scientific programs, scien tific personnel and scientific 
observations and resul t s ;  Article VII for inspec tion of any 
party's An tarctic operations by any o ther party to the Treaty to 
promote the objective s of the Treaty and to ensure the observance 
of i ts provisions ;  and Article IX for extablishing meetings of 
parties at sui table intervals and places for consulting together 
on measures including the facilitation of scientific research and 
international scientific cooperation in Antarctica. In addi tion, 
1 1 6  
Art icle IV provides that nothing contained in the Treaty should b e  
interpreted a s  ( i )  a renunciation of previously ass erted claims or 
rights , nor ( i i )  a renunci at ion o r  d iminut ion o f  any basis o f  
claim any party may have , nor ( ii i )  pre judic ing the posi t ion of 
any of the parties with regard to recognition or nonrecogni tion of 
claims or rights . Moreover , Article IV also provides that while 
the Treaty i s  in force , no act s  or activities should constitute a 
basis for ass er ting , supporting or denying claims or creating any 
rights and that no new claim , o r  enlargement of any existing claim 
should be made . The s e  provis ions of Ar ticle IV were based on the 
"gentlemen"'s agreement " which temporarily "froze" Antarctic 
territorial claims at their exis ting status during the 
International Geophysical Year and which ,  in turn , was a version 
of the Chi lean modus vivendi principle that was first proposed to 
the United States in 1948 . In effect , the guarantee contained in 
Article IV , that thei r  claims would not be weakened or threatened 
while the Treaty was in force 'gave the s tates with previous 
claims the assurance s  they needed to agree to free and unlimi ted 
access and operation of expeditions and s tations from other 
countries within their territories for a prolonged period . ... 6 On 
the other hand , the non-claimants 'had their minimum requirement 
met when they got free acces s  to and freedom of scientific 
exploration in all par t s  o f  Antarctica without conceding the 
rights of any of the claiman t s  or pre judicing their own right 
6 F . Solli e , "The Poli tical Experiment in Antarcti ca , "  Frozen 
Future , R . S . Lewis and P . M . Smith ( ed s . ) ,  Quadrangle , New York , 
1 9 7 3 , p 5 8 . 
either to make their 
internationali zation i f  
terminated . , 7 
and 
1 1 7  
own claims 
when the 
\ 
or to press for 
treaty should be 
Writing just over a decade after the Treaty had come into force , 
Sollie contended that an advantage o f  the arrangements provided by 
Article IV 'was that b y  removing politics from operations in 
Antarctica , i t  was possible to leave science to the scientists 
themselves and to let them continue to develop their own system of 
cooperation within the nongovernmental organization [ i . e .  SCAR] 
that had been developed in connection with the I . G .y . ,8 He 
maintained that much of the succes s  of Antarctic cooperation was 
due to the fact ' that activities have been concentrated on 
science , and that s cientific cooperation has not required a fully 
developed international organization at the government level nor 
substantial and subs tantive regulat ions involving controversial 
issues o f  9 jurisdiction and national prerogatives . '  He concluded 
that following the signing of the Antarctic Treaty , Antarctica had 
10 'been an international laboratory for scienc e . '  
7 Ibid . 
8 Ibi d . As discussed in Chapter 3 ,  SCAR ( Special Committee on 
Antarctic Research) was e stabli shed in late 1 9 5 7  by the Inter­
national Counci l  of Scientific Unions to plan for pos t-I . G . Y .  
scientific exploration i n  Antarctica . SCAR first met in Feb­
ruary 1 9 5 8 .  Its name was changed to the Scient ific Committee 
on Antarctic Research in 1 9 6 1 . 
9 Ibid . , P 6 1 . 
10 Ibid . ,  P 63 . 
1 1 8  
Indeed , the term " laboratory" , a s  employed by Sollie , was a widely 
used metaphor to depict the context within which Antarctic affairs 
had taken place during the fir s t  ten years or so of the Treaty 
era . Such imagery helped to convey , of course , the picture of 
Antarctica as a place where scientific experiments were conducted . 
For example , Sullivan wrote that �The Antarctic Treaty of 1959 has 
set an entire continent aside as a laboratory open for research by 
all and open to inspection by signatories who seek assurance that 
i ts provisions against military activity and nuclear testing are 
being adhered t � 11  o .  Fuchs commented , too , that "At las t , 
Antarctica had become an international laboratory a 
continent for science • • Let us hope that the scientists are 
allowed to continue their studies uninterrupted by outside 
influences from an over-populated world . �12 In a similar vein , 
Lewis maintained that , 
Antarctica has become a conspicuously successful model as a 
laboratory for human and international affairs . • •  In 70 years , 
Antarctica has evolved from an arena where Amundsen and Scott 
raced their yelping dog teams for the pole to an international 
cluster of scientific set tlements , often working in concert . In 
this frigid land , where there is no cold war nor crime , man has 
been able to PI3ceive his survival in terms of cooperation rather than conflict . '  
11  W . Sullivan , " Introduction , "  Frozen Future , R . S . Lewis and 
P .M . Smith ( eds . ) ,  Quadrangle ,  New York, 1 973 ,  p xi . 
12 Sir Vivian Fuchs , "Evolution of a Venture in Antarctic 
Science , "  Frozen Future , R . S .Lewis and P .M . Smith ( eds . ) ,  
Quadrangle ,  New York , p 238 , P 248 . 
13 R . S .Lewis , "Antarctic Research and the Relevance of Science , "  
Frozen Future , R. S .Lewis and P .M . Smith ( eds . ) ,  Quadrangle , 
New York , 1973 ,  p 7 ,  p 10 . 
\ 
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Lewis added that 'Perhaps the greatest experiment in this icy 
laboratory has been man himself , and his ability to adapt his 
outlook and 
i , 14  cooperat on.  
his drives to an environment which requires 
Nothwithstanding a gradual increase in international interest in 
Antarctic affairs during the late 1970's and early 1980's , related 
mainly to resource exploration and exploitation issues in the 
region , this image of Antarctica as a 'continent for science' 
continued . For example , The New Encyclopaedia Britannica reference 
to the region concludes that Antarctica , 
'provides a unique laboratory not only for natural science but 
also for political science . Antarctic and other IGY activities , 
the historic signing in 1959 of the Antarctic Treaty reserving an 
entire continent for nonpolitical scientific use , and the ensuing 
international community of polar-science efforts pointed the 13Y 
for gradual thawing of the Eas t-West Cold War of the 1950' s  • • •  ' 
Upon inspection then , it turns out that the dominant image of 
Antarctic affairs during the first two decades of the Treaty era 
presents a picture of ( i )  the Antarctic Treaty providing a 
blueprint for scientific activity ; (ii )  the ensuing scientific 
activity being nonpolitical and cooperative in nature;  and ( iii ) 
this engendered international peace and order in the region . The 
first thing to be said about this image , however , is that it 
leaves some important considerations out of account . While there 
14 Ibid . ,  p 10 . 
15 The New Encyclopaedia Britannica : Macropaedia , Vol . l ,  15th 
Edi tion , 1982 , p 965 . 
, 
1 20 
can be no doubt that with the Antarctic Treaty providing a 
blueprint for science , international cooperation in scientific 
matters pertaining to Antarctica has been enjoyed during the 
1 6  Treaty era , the picture presented is nevertheless a one-sided 
view. It does not take full account of the conflict management 
function of the Antarctic Treaty and its attendant arrangements , 
which also contributed to regional peace and order in Antarctica 
during this period . Nor does it acknowledge the political-
s trategic dimensions of scientific activity in the region . These 
considerations shall be  discussed , taking the second one firs t , in 
the following sections of this chapter . 
4.2 The Science-Po1itics Nexus 
A common phrase in the foregoing discussion of the dominant image 
is that the Antarctic Treaty is -for science . "  It has been shown 
that this notion is bols tered by contentions that Article IV of 
the Treaty removed 'politics from operations in Antarctica-
therefore making it 'possible to leave science to the scientists 
themselves' and that the Antarctic Treaty reserved 'an entire 
continent for nonpolitical scientific use . '  Such comments imply 
that scientific activities in Antarctica during the Treaty era 
16 For example , scientists and observers from Argentina , France , 
India , Japan, New Zealand , the Soviet Union and the United 
S tates have taken part in Australian scientific expeditions 
to Antarctica , moreover , Australians have accompanied Argent­
ine , British , French , Japanese ,  New Zealand , Soviet and Amer­
ican expeditions . Furthermore , international cooperations in 
times of emergencies in the region has been readily forth­
coming . See ,  Australians in Antarctica , Australian Government 
Publishing Service , Canberra , 1 98 1 ,  p 3 9 .  
\ \I 
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have been kept free of political considerations . As Taubenfeld 
argues , comments like this are �either naive or cynical , for 
scientific activities have themselves political overtones • 
whatever advances science furthers strategic techniques :  a s tation 
useful for gaining knowledge of our environment is ultimately 
strategically important by its very nature . � 17 Taubenfeld goes on 
to suggest that government s  would not allocate resources to such 
activities as they have done in Antarctica , if research did not 
tend to have political results , however indirect . lS He concludes 
that in �a world of rapid technological change and frequent 
important scientific discoveries , it is too much to assume that 
science can be completely apolitical , even if the scientists  
involved would like it  that way and really believe it to  be so . �19 
In support of Taubenfeld , it  is clear that many Antarctic research 
projects have had political-strategic dimensions . For example , 
Antarctic upper atmospheric physics s tudies and studies of noise 
transmission under sea-ice have had relevance for defence 
20 navigation and communications systems . Meteorological s tudies in 
Antarctica and studies concerning the practice of medicine in cold 
weather and the pyschological effects of isolation on 
17 H.J. Taubenfeld , "A Treaty for Antarctica , "  International 
Conciliation , No . 531 , January , 1961 , p 255 . 
18 Ibid . 
19 Ibid . 
20 F .M.Auburn, Antarctic Law and Politics , C .Hurst & Co . ,  London , 
Croom-Helm (Australia) ,  Canberra , 1982 , p 96 . 
\ 
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expeditioners have had mili tary relevance , 21  too . Logistical 
support activities such as ice-breaking and aircraft runway 
construction on ice , associated with Antarctic scientific 
research , also have had application to Arctic poli tical-strategic 
2 2  operations . Thus , despite verbiage about the purely scientific 
nature of Antarctic activities , as in the case of of other fields 
23  such as space research , their politica l-strategic dimensions are 
unmistakable . 2 4  
This science-politics  nexus is also illustrated in other ways . 
Caro argues ,  for example , that one of the major reasons for doing 
21 Ibid . ,  p 9 5 . 
22 Ibid . 
23 On this point see , Sir Bernard Lovell , The Origins and 
International Economics of Space Exploration , Edinburgh 
Univers i ty Press ,  Edinburgh , 1973 ; A . B . Ulam, Expansion and 
Coexistenc e : The History of Sovie t  Foreign Policy , 19 17-67 , 
Secker & Warburg , London , 1968 , esp . p 609 . 
24 It is o f t en pointed out that World War II emphasized , and the 
Cold War confirmed , the importance that governments at tached 
to scientific research , ' for out of the laboratories of scien­
tists come i deas which contribute to the technology of war and 
defense . '  ( See , G . B . Baldwin , "The Dependence o f  Science on Law 
and Government - the International Geophysical Year - A Case 
Study , "  Wisconsin Law Review , Vol . 19 64 , January , 1964 , p 95 . )  
While World War II  has been labelled ' the physicists' war' 
par excellence , and World War I has been termed 'the chemists' 
war' ( see , B . Ro s e  and S . Rose , Science and Society, Penguin , 
Harmondsworth , 1970 , Chapters 3 and 4) it would not be too 
gross a g eneralization to suggest that a significant prop­
portion o f  scientific activity has a lways had political­
strategic dimensions . For a classic s tudy of the relationship 
between science and military technique during the seventeenth 
century , see R . K . Merton , Science , Technology and Society in 
Seventeenth-Century England , Harves ter Press , Sussex , 1978 , 
especially Chapters IX and x .  
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science in Antarctica is that 'science is the present-day vehicle 
for the assertion of national sovereignty by those nations with 
territorial claims and perhaps the means adopted by other nations 
to frustrate the same claims . '  Nothwiths tanding the provisions 
of Article IV of the Treaty , which amongst other things suspend 
sovereignty claims , Caro argues that 'the best way to support 
future aspirations is through active participation in scientific 
programs . ,26 Indeed , science has been used in this way by 
Aus tralia one of the s tated aims of its Antarctic policy in the 
Treaty era has been the 'maintenance of a balanced scientific 
program as a contribution to world science and in support of 
27 Australian sovereignty and the Antarctic Treaty system . 
The United States has also used Antarctic science as a vehicle to 
support future aspirations in the region . Kistiakowsky , Special 
Assistant to U . S .  President Eisenhower for Science and Technology , 
25 D .E . Caro , "The Role of Science in Aus tralian Antarctic 
Policy , "  Issues in Australia's  Marine and Antarctic Policies , 
R . A . Herr , R . Hall and B .W . Davis ( eds . ) ,  Public Policy Mono­
graph , Department of Poli tical Science , University of Tas­
mania , 1982 , p 141 . Caro also argues that there are two other 
reasons for doing science in Antarctica : first , because 
Antarctica is a unique environment , scientists , with their 
innate curiosity , wish to study its special features ;  second , 
because the continent and its surrounding ocean may well 
contain exploitable resources , science plays the dual role 
as tool for exploration and discovery and also as the means 
for the establishment of effec tive regimes of the protection 
of the environment . 
26 Ibid . ,  p 142 . 
27 Antarctic Research Policy Advisory Committee , Initial Report 
to Government , November 1979 , Australian Government Publish­
ing Service , Canberra , 1980 , p 5 .  Emphasis added . 
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although writing shortly before the Antarctic Treaty had actually 
entered into force , states that the u . s .  Antarctic program 'is set 
as an orderly , sound , scientific effort but wi th political 
awareness that there are other attributes to the scope and 
excellence of the u . s .  effort there . ,28 These attributes , 
Kis tiakowsky says , have to do with 'the relation of research to 
possible territorial claims . ,29 
In sum , then , the notion that scientific activities in Antarctica 
during the Treaty era have been kept free of political 
considerations , is erroneous . The political-strategic dimensions 
of Antarctic science mus t  be acknowledged and emphasized . So , too , 
mus t  the conflict management function of the Antarctic Treaty and 
its attendant arrangements . It is to this consideration that 
attention is now turned . 
28 G . B .Kistiakowsky , " Science and Foreign Affairs , "  The Depart­
ment of State Bulletin , Vol . XLII , No . 1078 , February 22 , 1960 . 
29 Ibid . In this article , Kistiakowsky also hints at another 
political dimension of u . s .  Antarctic scientific activity . 
Approvingly , he maintains that 'science is today one of the 
few common languages of mankind ; it can provide a basis for 
understanding and communication of ideas between people that 
is independent of poli tical boundaries and of ideologies . '  
Over time , Kis tiakowsky continues , 'these personal relation­
ships established with Soviet scientists , who form a major 
portion of Russia's intellectual elite , can provide a bridge 
between our culture and perhaps bring about a gradual erosion 
of the militant aspects of Communist ideology . '  Such a 
statement is an example of so-called "convergence theory" -
the theory , popular during the late 1950's and early 1 960' s , 
that involves the conception that the differences between the 
capitalis t  societies ( especially the United States ) and the 
socialis t  societies ( especially the Soviet Union) are becoming 
and should become diminished . For a discussion of the theory , 
see Z . B . Brzezinski and S . Huntington , Political Power : U . S .A . /  
U . S . S . R . , The Viking Press ,  New York , 1963 . 
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4.3 The Antarctic Treaty and Conflict Management 
I t  was concluded in the previous chapter that as well as providing 
a blueprint for scientific investigation in Antarctica , the 
Antarctic Treaty must also be seen as an agreement established to 
limit and control manifes t  and latent conflict pertaining to the 
region. Perhaps the mos t  difficult problem tackled in the Treaty 
concerns the t erritorial claims to sovereignty controversy which 
had arisen and escalated during the 1 940's and 1950 ' s . The key 
measure in the Treaty which deals with this thorny issue is , of 
course , Article IV . As mentioned beforehand , this article provides 
that previous sovereignty claims are " frozen" while the Treaty is 
in force and that no act occurring whiled the Treaty is in force 
is to serve to assert , support or deny any claim or to create any 
rights .  Furthermore , new claims or enlargements of existing claims 
are prohibited . 
It is important to note , however , that although Article IV is 
30 rightly described as ' the cornerstone of the Treaty' it does not 
settle the issue concerning sovereignty claims and rights in 
Antarctica . As Taubenfeld says , 
'As it  stand s , the Treaty cannot be considered as a final 
settlement of the Antarctic question . Problems of national 
interes t  and prestige may have been "frozen . "  They have not been 
removed ,  though no doubt i t  was the hope of many of the 
30 Auburn , op . cit . , p 104 . 
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31 signatories that they would die away . 
In short , then , conflict has still existed during the treaty era , 
concerning the sovereignty issue but has been latent . For this 
reason , it is more accurate to describe the Antarctic Treaty as a 
32 truce . 
Notwithstanding the fact that the sovereignty problem has been 
dealt with by Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty , albeit not 
finally , it would be a mistake to assume that the framers of the 
Treaty envisaged a conflict-free Antarctic future . Apart from 
Article I which declares that 'Antarctica shall be used for 
peaceful purposes' and that 'There shall be prohibited , inter 
alia , any measures of a military nature , such as the es tablishment 
31 Taubenfeld , op . ci t . ,  p 300 . During his testimony at the 
U . S .  Senate Hearings which considered the Antarctic Treaty 
before ratification , Herman Phleger made a similar comment : 
'This treaty does not settle all of the problems of Antarctica 
for all time , nor does it attempt to do so . It does , however , 
represent a significant advance in the attempt , based on U . S .  
initiative , to bring some form of international order to a 
large area of the earth's surface where none has existed here­
tofore . '  See , United States Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations , Hearings : The Antarctic Treaty ,  86th Congress , 
2d Session , United States Government Printing Office , Wash­
ington , 1960 , p 43 . 
32 Although Article XII provides that the Treaty is of indefinite 
duration , it may be modified or amended at any time by unanim­
ous agreement of the contracting parties . Moreover , after 
thirty years , any of the contracting parties can request a 
conference of all the contracting parties to review the 
operation of the Treaty . Modifications or amendments to the 
Treaty may be proposed at such a conference by majority 
agreement and if not agreed to within a period of two years 
any contracting party may withdraw on two years ' notice . 
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of military bases and fortifications , the carrying out of military 
f f .. 33 h manoeuvres ,  as well as the testing 0 any types 0 weapons , t e 
other key measures drafted to help manage conflict pertaining to 
the region are Article IX and Article X I . 
Article IX provides for periodic Consultative 
representatives of the contracting parties -
Meetings of 
"for the purpose of exchanging information , consulting together on 
matters of common interes t  pertaining to Antarctica , and 
formulating and considering , and recommending to their 
Governments , measures in furtherance of the principles and 
objectives of the Treaty , including measures regarding : -
( a )  use o f  Antarctica for peaceful purposes only ; 
( b )  facilitation of scientific research in Antarctica ; 
( c )  facilitation of international scientific co-operation 
in Antarctica ; 
( d )  facilitation of the exercise of the rights of inspection 
provided for in Article VII of the Treaty; 
( e )  ques tions relating to the exercise of jurisdiction in 
Antarctica ; 
( f )  preservation3�nd conservation of living resources in Antarctica . "  
Writing a decade after the Treaty had come into force , Paul 
Daniels (one of the principal architects of the Treaty , as 
33 Article I can be seen as a conflict-control measure by the 
way it aims to limit activities in the region to those with 
peaceful purposes and prohibit s  any measures of a military 
nature . In a sense , it is a much wider extension of the 
agreement s  between Britain , A5gentina and Chile not to send 
warships south of latitude 60 South during the late 1940" s  
and 1950 " s  which sought t o  defuse the tense relations that 
existed between the rival claimants at the time . Of course , 
as argued in the previous discussion of the science-politics 
nexus , seemingly peaceful activities might well have military 
dimensions . For a detailed discussion of Article I ,  see , 
Auburn, op . cit . ,  pp 94-98 . 
34 Article IX ( 1 ) , The Antarctic Treaty . 
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mentioned in the previous chapter )  maintained that this  measure is  
of  great significance because it provides an opportunity to  
exchange information and to  discuss current problems of mutual 
interest which 'gives some assurance that misunderstandings will 
. d h f i dl i · 11 t ·  ,35 H not ar1se an t at r en y cooperat on W1 con 1nue . e 
acknowledged that 'there is much unfinished business' concerning 
Antarctica and that 'There are a number of problems which either 
have arisen or may arise requiring international agreements and 
. .  d . . ,36  J01nt eC1S10ns . Three of the major problems he identified at 
this time were firstly , the confused legal situation in Antarctica 
resulting from the lack of general agreement on the exercise of 
jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases ; secondly , problems 
concerning the equitable exploitation of living resources in the 
Southern Ocean ; and thirdly , questions to do with the rights of 
ownership and development of mineral resources of commercial value 
should they be discovered . 3 7  
Such "unfinished busines s "  was certainly recognized by the framers 
of 38  the Treaty . It was clearly anticipated that the consultative 
provision may not be sufficient to prevent or limit future 
35 P . C . Daniels ,  "The Antarctic Treaty , "  Frozen Future , R . S .Lewis 
and P .M . Smith ( eds . ) ,  Quadrangle , New York , 1973 , pp 40-4 1 .  
3 6  Ibid . 
37 Ibid . , P 44 . 
38 See , for example , Phleger's testimony at the U . S .  Senate 
Hearings which considered the Antarctic Treaty before ratif­
ication - U . S .  Senate Committee on Foreign Relations , 
Hearings : The Antarctic Treaty , op . cit . , pp 36-46 and 55-67 . 
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conflicts concerning such problems , hence , a disputes-settlement 
measure was drafted as Article XI . This provides that "If any 
dispute arises between two or more of the Contracting Parties 
concerning the interpretation or application of the present 
Treaty , those Contracting Parties shall consult among themselves 
with a view to having the dispute resolved by negotiation , 
inquiry, mediation , conciliation , arbitration, judicial settlement 
3 9  o r  other peaceful means of their own choice . '  Moreover , Article 
XI provides that if such means fail to resolve the disput e , the 
mat ter may be referred to the International Court of Justice , but 
only with the consent of all parties to the dispute . 
It is obvious , then , that Article IX and Article XI of the 
Antarctic Treaty were drafted to serve as conflict-management 
measures .  Several analyses of these particular provisions 
conclude , however , on a very critical note . Writing shortly after 
the treaty had been signed , Hayton , for example , contended that 
'the crucial processes of disputes-settlement [Article XI ] and 
decision-making [Article IX] provided by the treaty are very weak , 
permissive , and add little , 
opportunities and obligations 
if anything , 
of 
to the present 
involved . AO the nations 
Taubenfeld also commented that Article IX 'sets the rather limited 
pattern for a mechanism for future political cooperation' and 
39 Article XI ( 1) , The Antarctic Treaty. 
40 R . Hayton, "The Antarctic Settlement of 1959 , "  American Journal 
of International Law, Vol . 54 ,  No . 2 ,  April ,  1 9 60 , p 365 . 
Emphasis Hayton's .  
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represents a 'lost opportunity for a creative experiment '  in 
international administration . 41 Later analyses are similarly 
critical of the Treaty's disputes-settlement , consultative and 
decision-making provisions . Jain echoes Taubenfeld' s comment , 42
 
while Auburn maintains that the 'dispute-settlement procedure has 
been aptly termed the worst solution imaginable,43 and he 
concludes that the Consultative Meetings set up under Article IX 
are 'clumsy and inefficient,44 and its administrative procedures 
very limited 'both in theory and practice . ,45 
For what s tated reasons do these commentators make such 
criticisms? Considering the disputes-settlement provision first , 
it is pointed out that there is not a shred of compulsion in 
referring disputes to the International Court of Justice if they 
are not settled by peaceful means of the parties' own choice . As 
Hayton emphasizes , 'A dispute cannot be taken to the Court without 
" the consent , in each case , of all parties to the dispute . " ,46 
Thus , Article XI does not provide any obligatory means of 
41 Taubenfeld , op . cit . ,  p 288 , P 316 . 
42 S . C . Jain , "Antarctica : Geopolitics and International Law, " 
The Indian Year Book of International Affairs , 1974 , published 
under the auspices of the Indian Study Group of International 
Law and Affairs , University of Madras , Madras , 1974 . 
43 Auburn , op . cit . ,  p 139 . 
44 Ibid . ,  p 296 . 
45 Ibid . ,  P 165 . 
46 Hayton , op . cit . ,  p 363 . 
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resolving disputes but merely lists traditional means that have 
47 always been available to any nation . Adding to this , Auburn 
argues that Article XI 'is not merely an ineffectual means of 
dealing with possible disagreements ;  it  turns back the clock . ,,48 
He points out that it can be argued that Article XI 'removes the 
effect of general agreements between signatories to submit 
disputes to the International Cour t . ,49  By this he means that 
Article XI of the Antarctic Treaty could give a country the 
opportunity to avoid referring a dispute to the International 
Court that would not have been avoidable in the absence of the 
50 
Treaty . 
Turning to the consultative provisions of Article IX, Hayton takes 
issue with Paragraph 4 which s tates that the measures recommended 
by the Consultative Meetings ' shall become effective when approved 
by all the Contracting Parties whose representatives were entitled 
t ti i i h i h ld id h ,5 1  o par c pate n t e meet ngs e to cons er t ose measures . 
This provision obviously grants a veto to every party taking part 
in the Meetings and Hayton concludes that 'The outlook for 
47 Ibid . 
48 Auburn, op . cit . ,  p 139 .  
49 Ibid . 
50 On this point , also see Hayton, op . ci t . , p 364 . There are 
several other reasons put forward by Auburn to support his 
view of Article XI . These are more complex and hypothetical 
and beyond the scope of the discussion here . See , Auburn , 
op . cit . ,  pp 138-142 . 
5 1  Article IX ( 4 ) , The Antarctic Treaty . Emphasis Hayton's , 
op . ci t .  
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expeditious agreement is thus rather bleak on anything but the 
mos t  innocuous matters . ,52 Paraphrasing Hayton , Auburn makes the 
same point and also  takes another tack when he argues that the 
lack of an international secretariat is a 'major deficiency in the 
Treaty 53 system . ' Asserting that the 'existing framework is 
rudimentary' ,  Auburn states that the Treaty 'did not set up even 
the most minimal form of international organization . ,54 For him , 
there must be an organization and a continuous exercise of 
responsibility for Antarctic decision-making if the parties are to 
carry out their assumed duties with some semblance of order . 
The expectations of the Treaty framers that conflict pertaining to 
Antarctica would arise came to 55 pass . During the two decades 
following the entry into force of the Treaty, Antarctic affairs 
were characterized by conflict , albeit of a generally low 
intensity .  Myhre's  s tudy of the firs t five Antarctic Treaty 
52 Hayton, op . cit . ,  p 364 . 
53 Auburn , op . cit . ,  p 155 . 
54 Ibid . 
55 The term "confli c t "  is being used here in its wides t  sense as 
meaning all relations between sets of actors that involve an 
incompatible difference of objective . Conceived in this way , 
following Dahrendorf , the term does not as such imply any 
judgement as to the intensity of relations caused by differ­
ences of obj ective , thus "conflict "  may assume to forms of 
war, of debate , or of negotiation . It does imply, however , 
that war , debate and negotiation are essentially motivated 
by the same type of social relationship and are therefore 
different manifestations of an identical force . See , 
R .Dahrendorf , Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society , 
Routledge & Kegan Paul , London , 1959 , p 135 . 
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Consultative Meetings , from 1961 to 1968 , reveals that 
negotiations between members on such matters as historical sites , 
mail service , administrative arrangements , criminal jurisdiction, 
flora and fauna conservation and pelagic sealing resulted in 
'great differences of opinion, '  'argument , '  'opposition , '  
'intractability , '  'heated dispute ' and so forth . 56 More 
significantly , during the late 1970's , increased interest in and 
activity related to the exploitation of Antarctic natural 
resources resulted in the region gradually becoming an "issue 
area" on the wider international political agenda following 
demands by s everal countries and transnational bodies that the 
Antarctic Treaty be replaced and the region internationalized . 
This came about as Antarctica became entangled in a constellation 
of global issues concerned with resource scarcity , North-South 
57 relations , and environmental conservation . This was , in turn, a 
consequence of a structural change in world politics that occurred 
during the late 1960's and 1970 ' s . The world had entered ' the era 
of 58 interdependence . '  Pos t  World War II alliances languished , 
56 J .D .Myhre , "The Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings , 1961-
6 8 :  A Case Study in Negotiation , Cooperation , Compliance in 
the International System , " Unpublished Ph . D .  Thesis , London 
School of Economics and Political Science , December ,  1983 
57 North-South relations refers to the relations between indust­
rialized developed countries (mostly in the Northern Hemi­
sphere) and developing countries (mostly in the Southern Hemi­
sphere) . 
58 R . O . Keohane and J . S . Nye , Power and Interdependence , Little , 
Brown and Company , Boston , 19 77 , p3 . 
\ 
134 
blocs loosened and some countries switched alliances as 'the Cold 
war sense of security threat slackened , foreign economic 
competition and domestic distributional conflict increased . ,59 
Moreover , the newly independent nations pressed for a new 
international economic order to remove all ves tiges of 
colonialism, to offset inequities and to obtain restitution for 
what they believed to be prior injuries . 
A major characteristic of this new era was the larger and more 
diverse nature of the international political agenda . In addition, 
issues on this agenda were not subordinated to military security . 
United States Secretary of State Kissinger described the situation 
aptly in 1 975 when he s tated that , 
'progress  in dealing wi th the traditional agenda is no longer 
enough . The problems of energy , resources ,  environment ,  
population , the uses of space and the seas now rank with questions 
of military security , ideology and territori�o rivalry which have 
traditionally made up the diplomatic agenda . '  
Kissinger might well have included Antarctica in his list of new 
global issues . For example , the prospect of harves ting the marine 
living resources of the Southern Ocean ( especially krill) and 
traces of hydrocarbons discovered at a number of Antarctic sites 
59 Ibid . ,  p 7 .  See also , E . B . Haas , "The Frailty of Complex 
Interdependence :  A Wors t-Case Scenario for the 1980 's , "  
Jerusalen Journal of International Relations , Vol . 5 ,  No . 4 ,  
198 1 ,  pp 1-13 . I t  mus t  be acknowledged that these phrases 
slip quickly over a very complex set of important changes 
which occurred during the late 1960's and 1970's . 
60 H.A.Kissinger , "A New Na tional Partnership , "  The Department 
of State Bulletin , February 17 , 1975 , P 199 , cited in 
Keohane and Nye , op . cit . ,  p 26 . 
.................. --------------------�-
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during the 1970' s ,  prompted several developing countries to demand 
that ( i )  the Antarctic Treaty be scrapped ; (ii)  the region be 
recognized as part of the "global commons " ;  and (iii) Antarctic 
resources be regarded as the "common heritage of mankind" and 
6 1  shared by all states . 
In turn , the prospect of harvesting Antarctic marine living 
resources and the mining of Antarctic minerals prompted several 
international nongovernmental organizations concerned about 
environmental conservation ( such as Friends of the Earth and 
Greenpeace International) to demand that Antarctica be declared a 
62 "world park" sacrocanct from the violations of exploiters . 
Both sets of demands were actively resis ted and denied by those 
countries which supported the Antarc tic Treaty regime . They argued 
that international regimes to manage resource exploitation 
problems and problems related to the conservation and preservation 
6 1  See , M . J . Peterson , "Antarctica : the last great land rush on 
earth , "  International Organization, Vol . 34 ,  No . 3 ,  Summer , 
1980 , pp 377-403 ; B .Mitchell , "Antarctica : a special case ? " 
New Scientist , Vol . 73 ,  No . 1034 , 13 January , 1977 , pp 64-66 ; 
B .Mitchell and J . Tinker , Antartica and its resources , Earth­
scan , London , 1980 ; S . A . Zorn , "Antarctic minerals :  a common 
heritage approach , "  Resources Policy , Vol . 10 ,  No . 1 ,  March , 
1984 , pp 2-18 . It has also been suggested that the share of 
revenue allocated to developing countries be greater than 
the share allocated to indus trialized , developed countries . 
In this way , the internationalization of Antarctica is seen 
as a step toward s the goal of reducing global inequality . 
62  K. D . Suter , World Law and the Las t Wilderness , 2nd Revised 
Edition , Friends of the Earth, Sydney , 1980 ; J . N . Barnes , 
Let' s  Save Antarctica , Greenhouse Publications , Richmond , 
1982 . 
............... ----------------------------
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of the Antarctic environment should be built on to the existing 
63 framework of the Antarctic Treaty . 
If the criticisms of the consultative arrangements and the 
disputes-set tlement provisions of the Treaty outlined above are 
valid , one would have to look elsewhere then , in the light of this 
continuing conflict in affairs pertaining to the region, when 
s eeking to explain Pax Antarctica . Whereas the criticisms of the 
disputes-settlement provisions seem justified , there are good 
reasons , however ,  for rejecting the critical comments about the 
consultative arrangements provided by , and set up under , Article 
IX of the Treaty . For a star t , issue can be taken with Auburn's 
s tatement that the Treaty 'did not set up even the most  minimal 
form of international organization . '  It can be argued , in 
contradistinction , that the Treaty es tablished a form of 
international organization in the Antarctic Treaty Consultative 
Meeting (A. T . C . M . ) and that mechanisms associated with this 
organization have played a major part in controlling conflict 
pertaining to the region . These mechanisms must be recognized when 
explaining Pax Antarctica in the Treaty era . 
4.4 The A.T.e .H. as an International Organization 
In accordance with Paragraph 1 of Article IX, the First Antarctic 
Treaty Consultative Meeting was held in Canberra from July 10 to 
63 See , K. Brennan "Criteria for access to the resources of Ant­
arctica : alternatives , procedure and experience applicable , "  
Antarctic resources policy , F . O . Vicuna ( ed . ) ,  Cambridge Uni­
versity Press , Cambridge , 1983 , pp 217-227 . 
137 
July 24 , 1961 , less than one month after the final Treaty 
ratification notices were deposited with the United States and the 
Treaty 64 had entered into force . Subsequent Meetings were held in 
Buenos Aires ( 1962 ) , Brussels ( 1964 ) , Santiago ( 1966 ) , Paris 
( 1968) , Tokyo ( 1970) , Wellington ( 1972) , Oslo ( 1975 ) , London 
( 1977 ) , Washington ( 1979) , Buenos Aires ( 1981 ) , Canberra ( 1983 ) 
and Brussels ( 1985 ) . Before each A .T . C .M . , one or a series of  
Preparatory Meetings were held to set  a provisional agenda , 
discuss issues and generally lay the groundwork for the ensuing 
Meeting . Moreover , this consultative mechanism also led to the 
establishment of special negotiating forums , accountable to , but 
distinct from, the A . T . C .M .  to discuss specific issues or groups 
of 6 5  issues . These have ranged from Meetings of Experts to deal 
with such problems as telecommunications to Special Consultative 
Meetings which have addressed , since 1977 , such topics as the 
drafting of Antarctic marine living resources and mineral 
resources regimes . 
The A . T . C .M . , in effec t , has governed Antarctica through 
66 recommendations and agreed measures adopted at the Meetings and 
64 The nomenclature "Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting" was 
designated in the Rules of Procedure which were adopted at 
this first  meeting held in Canberra in 196 1 .  
65  R . Tucker Scully , "Alternatives for cooperation and institut­
ionalization in Antarctica : outlook for the 1990 .... s ,  .. Ant­
arctic resources policy , F . O .Vicuna (ed . ) , Cambridge Uni­
versity Press , Cambridge , 1983 , pp 281-296 . 
66 Between the First A . T . C .M .  in 1961 and the Thirteenth A . T . C .M.  
in 1985 , 154 recommendations were adopted covering such 
matters as the exchange of informations on scientific programs 
and results , tourism , logistics , communications , the preserv­
ation and protection of the Antarctic environment . 
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instruments it has initiated such as the 1972 Convention on the 
Conservation of Antarctic Seals (which entered into force in 1978 )  
and the 1980 Convention for the Conservation o f  Antarctic Marine 
Living Resources (which entered into force in 1982) . As Daniels 
comments ,  it is through the A . T . C .M.  that ' the Antarctic Treaty 
acquires vitality , and a practical aspect going beyond more 
abstract and political concepts contained in the Treaty . ,67 In a 
similar vein , Scully concludes that the decentralized system of 
meetings , recommendations , conventions that has evolved over the 
past two decades 'has played an important part in the practical 
realization of the obligations of the Antarctic Treaty and the 
unique form of international cooperation which has taken place 
pursuant to it . ,68 
But nowhere in the literature of international relations is the 
A.T . C .M.  cited as an example of an international organization . The 
simple , common defini tion of the term " international organization" 
refers to organizations based on ( i )  formal agreement among 
governments ; ( ii )  possessing diplomatic forums ; and ( iii ) assisted 
by an associated international 69 bureaucracy . A more detailed , 
more precise , yet similar definition is provided by Wallace and 
67 Daniels , op . cit . ,  p 42 . 
68 Scully, op . cit . ,  p 292 . 
69 J . S . Nye , Peace in Parts : Integration and Conflict in Regional 
Organization , Little , Brown and Company, Boston , 1971 , p 5 .  
........... ------------------------��----
139 
70 Singer . Focussing upon international governmental organizations 
and disregarding international nongovernmental 
organizations ( NGO' s ) , Wallace and Singer develop the following 
criteria for inclusion as IGO's :  ( i )  the organization must  consist 
of at least two nation-s tate members of the international system; 
( ii)  the organization must  be created by a formal ins trument of  
agreement between the governments of national s tates ; ( iii ) the 
organization mus t  hold more or less regular plenary sessions at 
intervals not greater than once a decade ; ( iv) a permanent 
secretariat and some sort of permanent headquarters arrangement 
are required . In connection with this last criterion , Wallace and 
Singer contend that the 'crucial distinction here is  between ad 
hoc conferences or series of conferences whose s taffs do not 
function between meetings and true organizations ( even if labelled 
conferences or agreements )  possessing secretariats which perform 
i k ,7 1  ongo ng tas s .  
According to these definitions , then , the A . T . G .M .  is not an 
international organization . It is not assisted by an associated 
international bureaucracy . Although it consists of more than two 
nation-state members of the international system, it was created 
by a formal instrument of agreement between the governments of  
national states ( i . e .  the Antarctic Treaty) , and it holds regular 
70 M.Wallace and J . Singer ,  " Intergovernmental Organization in 
the Global System,  1815-1964 : A Quantitative Description, " 
International Organization , Vol .XXIV , No . 1-2 , Winter , 1970 . 
7 1  Ibid . ,  p 246 . 
................. -------------------------
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plenary sessions at intervals no greater than once a decade , the 
A . T . C .M.  does not have a permanent secretariat nor some ' sort of 
permanent headquarters arrangement . Perhaps Luard comes the 
closest to viewing the Consultative Meeting as an international 
organization . According to him, 
�A system has been established [ in Antarctica] ,  however tenuous , 
to ensure that these principles [of  the Antarctic Treaty] are 
fulfilled in the running of the territory through regular meetings 
of the parties to undertake supervision. These consultative 
meetings represent an embryonic form of international ad'2nistrat­
ion and the area may acquire far more in years to come . �  
But Luard shrinks from calling the A . T . C .M .  an international 
organization on the grounds that , �virtually no permanent 
machinery has been established ; there are no administrators , no 
73 officials ,  no police force , and no taxation. � 
Implicit in these definitions is the assumption that organization 
in some way necessarily involves bureaucracy (with its associated 
characteris tics of hierarchy , permanent officials ,  career 
structur e ,  and so forth) or a permanent secretariat (with a 
permanent 74  headquarters ) .  Such defini tions involving 
72 E .Luard , International Agencies : The Emerging Framework of 
Interdependence , Macmillan , London , 1977 , p 106 . 
73  Ibid . 
an 
74 Other definitions which include notions of �bureaucratic 
s tructure� ,  �permanent bodies �  and �permanent secretariat� are 
those of Pentland , Gerbet and Archer , respectively . See , 
C . Pentland , " International Organizations , "  World Politics -
An Introduction , J . N . Rosenau , K . W . Thompson , G . Boyd (eds .) , 
The Free Press ,  New York, 197 6 ,  p 626 ; P . Gerbet , "Rise and 
development , "  International Social Science Journal , Vo1 .24 , 
No . 1 ,  197 7 ,  p 7 ;  and C .Arche r ,  International Organizations , 
Allen & Unwin , London , 1983 , p 35 . 
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international bureaucracy or permanent secretariat are , however ,  
unduly narrow and analyses based on such restrictive conceptions 
of organization fail to explore a range of significant phenomena . 
For example , an organizational form other than the solely 
bureaucratic or the permanent secretariat is that which Weber , one 
of the founding fathers of modern social theory, describes as the 
75 "direct democratic" organization . 
Weber insists that in every form of administration , it  is always 
neces sary that some executive powers be in the hands of somebody . 
Members of direct democratic organizations usually have difficulty 
in conceiving of o thers as super-ordinated and are thus concerned 
to reduce or restrict the accumulation of these powers and to 
ensure that those in authority �are held obligated to act solely 
in accordance with the will of the members and in their service by 
i f h h i i h � 7 6  I h h di v rtue 0 t e aut or ty g ven to t em . n s ort , t e rect 
democratic organization is based upon the interaction of two 
ideas : "equality" and "minimization" . This means that in such 
organizations : ( i )  it  is assumed that every member is equally 
qualified to conduct the affairs of the organization ; and (ii)  the 
scope of power of 77 command is kept a t  a minimum . Accordingly, 
�administrative functions are rotated , or determined by drawing 
75 M Weber , Economy and Society , G . Roth and C .Wittich ( eds . ) , 
University of California Press , Berkeley , 197 8 ,  Vol . l ,  
pp 289-290 , Vol . 2 ,  pp 948-952 . 
7 6  Ibid . ,  p 289 . See also , J .J . R. Thomas , "Weber and direct dem­
ocracy , "  The British Journal of Sociology , Vol - XXXV ,  No . 2 ,  
June , 1984 , pp 216-240 . 
77  Weber , op . cit . ,  p 948 . 
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78 lots , or assigned for short periods by election. '  Moreover , 'all 
important decisions are reserved to the common resolution by all ; 
the adminis trative functionaries have only to prepare and carry 
out the resolutions and to conduct "current business" in 
79 accordance with the directives of the general assembly . 
Weber also s tates that such measures as the principle of rotation 
or of selection by lot in filling offices , 80 that every member 
takes a turn, makes it possible to avoid the position of power of 
technically trained persons or of those with long experience and 
command of official 80 s ecrets . He goes on to add that direct 
democratic adminis tration occurs in organizations which fulfil the 
following conditions : ( i )  the organization is local or o therwis e  
limited in the number o f  member s ; ( ii )  an equality of status 
prevails among the members ; ( iii)  the adminis trative functions are 
relatively simple and stable : ( iv) there is  some minimal training 
81 in determining ways and means . 
This form of organization , Weber states , can be found in certain 
political communities such as the Swis s  Landesgemeinden , certain 
townships in the United States and in some universi ties . I suggest 
that the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting can be added to 
this lis t .  It is an example of a direct democratic organization at 
78  Ibid . 79 Ibi d .  
8 0  Ibid . ,  p 289 . 
8 1  Ibid . ,  P 949 ; Thomas , op . cit . ,  p 227 . 
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the international level . Although not possesing all the 
characteris tics described by Weber ,  the A . T . C .M .  has mos t .  
In the first place , the A . T . C . M. is limited in the number o f  
members . The twelve original members of the A . T . C .M .  were the 
twelve original signatories of the Antarctic Treaty Argentina , 
Australia,  Belgium, Britain , Chile , France , Japan, New Zealand , 
Norway, South Africa , the Soviet Union and the United States . 
Membership of the A . T . C .M .  was also afforded to Poland ( in 1977 ) ,  
West Germany ( in 1 9 8 1 ) , India and Brazil (both in 1 983 ) , Uruguay 
and China ( both in 1985 ) . Secondly ) " sovereign equality" prevails 
among the members of the A . T . C . M. whereby each member ,  as a 
sovereign s tate , i s  entitled to the same participatory rights in 
the Meet ing and the same benefits to be derived from i t ,  
regardles s  of i t s  size , population , wealth o r  power . Moreover , 
members also share the same 82 obligations . Thirdly , the 
administrative functions of the A . T . C . M.  are rotated to coincide 
with the rotation of hos t ship . This procedure was established a t  
the First Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting in Canberra , when 
it was agreed , a s  an interim measure , that subsequent Meetings 
should be hos ted , and the administrative functions performed , by 
members in alphabetical order in the English 8 3  language . 
82 On the notion of " sovereign equality" see , P . E . Jacob , A . L .  
Atherton, A . M .  Wallenstein , The Dynamics o f  International Org­
anization , Revised Edition , The Dorsey Pres s , Homewood ,  Ill­
inoi s , 1 97 2 ,  pp 23-25 . 
83 These arrangement s  also applied to the Preparatory Meetings 
of the A . T . C .M .  
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Accordingly,  Argentina hos ted and administered the Second 
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting . Although initially viewed 
as an interim measure , the principle of rotation of hos t ship and 
adminis t ra tive functions has continued through all Consultative 
Meetings that have been held . It can thus be said to be a s table 
84 procedure . Fourthly , the recommendations formulated by the 
A . T . C .M .  are subject to a double unanimity rule : they have to b e  
approved b y  all of the repres entatives a t  the Meeting , 85 and they 
only become effective when approved by all the contracting parties 
of the Antarctic Treaty whose representatives were entitled to 
86 participate in the Meetings . 
As a direct deomocratic organization , the A. T . C .M.  i s  thus far 
from �rudimentary� , to use Auburn's term .  Nor do the Consultative 
Meetings represent 'an embryonic form of administration� as Luard 
contends . Indeed , when viewed as an example of direct democracy , 
the A . T . C .M.  i s  quite a sophis ticated form of organization linked 
as it is to a set of poli tical ideals concerned with the 
minimization and equali zation of administration . Moreover , 
organizational features o f  the A . T . C .M. , concerned with 
84 Leaving aside Poland , West Germany , India , Brazil,  China and 
Uruguay , who have become members of  the A . T . C .M.  only rec­
ently, two member-countries' cities are missing from the list 
that have hosted regular Mee tings - namely , Moscow and Joh­
annesburg . Quigg no tes that some members are not eager to hold 
Meetings in thes e  cities and the Soviet Union is adamant in 
refusing to meet in South Africa . See , Quigg , · op . cit . ,  p 158 . 
85 Rule of  Procedure 23 . 
86 Article IX ( 4 ) , The Antarctic Treaty . 
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minimization and equalit y ,  a s  outline above , have played an 
important part in the management of conflict pertaining to 
Antarctica . 
4 . 5  Conflict Management and the A .T . C .M. 
The three major mechanisms of the A .T . C .M.  which have served to 
control conflict are the process of exclusionary social closure , 
the unamimity rule and the privatization of organizational 
proceedings . The latter mechanism has , of course , made it  
difficult  to gain more than a sketchy unders tanding of  how the 
A . T . C .M .  has opera ted and it must be acknowledged that the adduced 
evidence to support this claim i s , by i ts nature , indirect ,  
inconclusive , though it can be sugge s ted , plausible . For these 
reasons , the following analysis should be considered as a 
tentative first insight into an important , though shadowy area of 
Antarctic affairs . 87  
87 Writers such as Auburn acknowledge the difficulty of  procur­
ring details about the deliberations of the A . T . C .M .  ( See , 
Auburn , op . ci t . ,  pp 156-159 . )  From a scholarly point of view 
this i s  an unsatisfactory s ituation . The writings of diplom­
ats , civil servants and scientis t s  who have attended Consult­
ative Meetings discuss little , if anything , about the specific 
proceedings . Several Australian diplomats were interviewed in 
the course of this study, however , their responses to quest­
ions about the proceedings of the A . T . C .M .  were unders tand­
ably vague . Myhre's recent s tudy of the firs t  five Consult­
ative Meetings is a very welcome addition to the literature 
of Antarctic affairs . ( See , Myhre , op . cit . )  Much of it is  
based on document s ( such as position papers and reports by 
members of U . S .  delegations to those Meeting s )  which are held 
in the Polar Archives at the U . S .  National Archives . But even 
Myhre ' s  s tudy i s  limited in the s ense that observations and 
conclusions drawn in these papers and reports represent only 
U . S .  accounts of proceedings . 
.... ........ ------------����= 
146 
But before discussing how these mechanisms have functioned , it is 
necessary to clarify what is meant by the terms . The firs t ,  
exclusionary social closure , is the term used to describe the 
appropriation of social or economic opportuni ties that have been 
monopolized by a group . This monopolization is directed against 
o ther groups who share some positive or negative characteristics 
and involves the singling out of these characteris tics as the 
justificatory basis of exclusion . Its purpose , as Weber says , 'is 
always the closure of social and economic opportunities to 
outsiders . ,88 In the context of Antarctic affairs , exclusionary 
social closure refers to the process by which membership of the 
A . T . C .M .  has been res tricted to a limited number o f  eligibles ( or 
in more Weberian terms , the process by which decision-making 
opportuni ties pertaining to Antarctica have been appropriated , or 
monopolized , by the restricted membership of the A . T . C .M. ) .  
As noted earlier , membership of the A . T . C .M .  remained at the 
original twelve signatories for the first sixteen years of its 
operation . These countries acquired so-called "consultative 
89 status " through Paragraph 1 of Article IX which simply states 
88 Weber , op . cit . ,  pp 342-344 . 
89  " Consultative status" is the right to participate in the 
A. T . C .M • •  Parties of the Antarc tic Treaty with consultative 
status are generally known as Consultative Parties . The term 
"contracting party" covers , then , two groups - those with con­
sultative status and those who have acceded to the Treaty but 
who do not have consultative status . By 1984 , this latter 
group numbered sixteen : Bulgaria , Cuba , the Peoples Republic 
of China , Czechoslovakia , Denmark , Finland , German Democratic 
( continued next page) 
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that 'Representatives of the Contracting Parties named in the 
preample o f  the present Treaty [ a s  the twelve countries are ] shall 
meet at the C i ty of Canberra wi thin two months af ter the date of 
ent ry int o  force of the Treaty , and thereafter at suitable 
intervals and places • • 90 . '  These twelve countries , it will be 
recalled � were those that had participated in the Antarctic 
program of the International Geophys ical Year and the exclusionary 
device that restricts participat ion o f  o thers in the Consultative 
Mee tings calls upon intending new members to make the same sort of 
effor t : Paragraph 2 of Article IX p rovides that 
'Each Contracting Party which has b ecome a party to the present 
Treaty by accession under Article XIII shall be entitled to 
appoint representatives to participa t e  in the meetings referred to 
i n  Paragraph I o f  the present Article , during such time as that 
Contracting Party demonstrates i t s  interest in Antarctica by 
conducting substantial scientific research activity there , such as 
the establishment o f  a scientific s tation or the despatch of a 
scientific expedition . '  
Thus , countries that have not conduct ed substantial scientific 
research in Antarctica are excluded from membership of the 
A . T . C .M.  and countries that wish to participate in the Meetings 
have to pay this entry fee . 
Poland and Wes t  Germany were able to meet this research 
qualification in 1 9 7 7  and 1 98 1 , respectively , by establishing 
Republic, Hungary , Italy,  the Nether lands , Papua New Guinea , 
Peru, Romania , Spain , Sweden and Uruguay . ( China and Uruguay , 
as noted previously , acquired consultative status in 1985 . )  
90 Article IX ( 1) ,  The Antarctic T reaty . 
9 1  Article IX ( 2 ) , The Antarctic Treaty ( emphasis added) . 
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expensive shore research s tations in Antarctica whose work , it is 
reported , seemed to have lit tle connection with their interests in 
the region which were mainly concerned with its fishery 
92 potential . In 1983 , Brazil and India were deemed to have met the 
memberships criterion, too , and joined the A . T . C .M .  as its 
fifteenth and sixteenth members . Uruguay and China also gained 
consultative sta tus in 1985 and became the A .T . C .M . 's  seventeenth 
and eighteenth members . 
In just over two decades ,  then, only six countries had joined the 
original twelve signatories as Consultative Parties of the 
Antarctic Treaty ( four since 1983) and by 1984 , sixteen other 
countries had become non-consultative signatories . Although the 
Treaty has been open for accession by any member s tate of the 
United Nations , or by any o ther s tate which may be invited to 
accede to the Treaty with the consent of all the contracting 
parties whose representatives are entitled to participate in the 
93 A . T . C .M . , there seems good reason to agree with Auburn that 
'Not only is the high entry fee of ' subs tantial scientific 
research' a hindrance to seeking [ consultative ] s tatus , but it is 
also a disincentive to any such nation even acceding to the Treaty 
when it can have no say in decision-making . ,94 In short ,  
9 2  "Icebox hotting up , "  The Economist ,  Oct . 8 ,  1983 , p 49 . Auburn 
reports  that West Germany had to invest DM 260 , 000 ,000 to meet 
this research qualification ( see , Auburn, op . cit . ,  p 153 ) . 
93 Article XIII , ( 1 ) ,  The Antarctic Treaty . 
94 Auburn , op . cit . ,  p 152 . 
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observations tha t the A . T . C .M .  has been an exclusive club seem 
95 well founded .  
The second mechanism o f  the A . T . C .M .  which has served to control 
conflict is the rule o f  unanimity . As noted earlier , one of the 
Rules of Procedure o f  the A . T . C .M .  provides that .... The 
recommendations formulated by the Mee ting shall be approved by all 
of the representatives present and shall be se t forth in the final 
.... 96 Th report . us , a s  Triggs notes ,  the Consultative Parties .... have 
each retained a veto over the means by which the objects and 
principles of the Antarctic Treaty are to be implemented . .... 97 In 
this way , both claimant and nonclaimant states have ensured that 
no activity or prac tice prejudicial to their positions on the 
territorial s tatus o f  Antarctica will be made without their 
consent . Moreover , Paragraph 4 o f  Article IX of the Treaty 
provides that the recommendations referred to above do not become 
effective until they have been approved by all of the Consultative 
Parties . This requiremen t , in effect , has given a second veto to 
the Consultative Parties and thereby provided an additional 
safeguard to both claimants and nonclaimants .  
95 "Icebox ho tting up , "  The Economis t , op .cit . ;  L . Kimball ,  
"Testing the Great Experiment , "  Environment , September , 1985 . 
96 Rule of Procedure 23 . 
97 C . Trigg s ,  "The An tarc tic Legal Regime : A Workable Compromise 
or a " Purgatory of Ambiguity " ? " ,  Case Western Reserve Journal 
of International Law, Vol . 1 7 ,  No . 2 ,  Spring , 1985 , p 208 . 
.... ........ ------------���==�-
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The third conflict management mechanism , the privatization of 
A . T .C .M.  proceedings , has presented itself in two ways . First ,  
most deliberations at the A . T . C .M .  have been conducted in private 
- a practice established with the sixty preparatory meetings held 
prior to the 1959 Conference on Antarctica . This has been provided 
by Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure , which states that �The 
opening plenary session shall be held in public ; other sessions 
shall be held in private ,  unless the Meeting shall determine 
o therwise . �98 In general ,  there have been five different types of 
sessions - open plenaries , closed plenaries , closed working-
groups , closed sessions between a limited number of members ,  and 
informal negotiations - and although each Meeting has a different 
form as far as types of sessions are concerned , it has usually 
been only the fir s t  and las t  plenary sessions that have been open 
99  to  the public and pres s . Second , the procedural rule s tated 
above , which originally applied to " sessions " of the A . T . C .M. , has 
also been interpreted ( at the 1972 Seventh Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Meeting ) to cover the official documents of the 
Meeting , too , and at the 1975 A .T . C .M.  it was declared that all of 
100 the documents at the Meeting were confidential . 
Having clarified , then , what is meant by exclusionary social 
closure , the unanimity rule and the privatization of proceedings 
98 Rule of Procedure 7 .  
99  T .Hanevold , " The Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings - Form 
and Procedure , "  Cooperation and Conflict , Vol - VI ,  1971 , p 194 . 
100 Auburn , op . cit , p 158 . 
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of the A . T . C .M.  how have these mechanisms served in the management 
of conflict pertaining to Antarctica? The answer to this question, 
it can be suggested , lies in the way these mechanisms have 
101 restricted , what Schattschneider terms , the scope of conflict . 
According to Schattschneider , every conflict consists of two 
parts :  ( i )  the few actors who are engaged at the centre ; and ( ii )  
102 the audience that is irresis tibly attracted to the scene . It is 
important to keep in mind the relations between these two parts  
because the audience , or a section of it , is likely to do things 
that determine the outcome of the conflict .  For example ,  if C 
intervenes in a conflict between A and B the nature of the 
conflic t  is changed . C may join A and tip the balance of forces in 
A's favour , or C may support B and turn the balance the other way, 
or C may disrupt the conflict or attempt to resolve the mat ter by 
imposing on both A and B .  Thus , no matter how C intervenes , the 
conflict will be altered by the transformation of a one-to-one 
conflict into a tWo-to-one conflict or a triangular conflict .  
Moreover , every new intervention thereafter by D ,  E and F will 
change the balance of forces involved and alter the conflict . Put 
101 E .E . Schattschneider , The Semisovereign People , The Dryden 
Press , Hinsdale , Illinois , 1960 . 
102 Although Schattschneider does not define what he means by 
"conflict " ,  he uses the term for contest s ,  disputes , clashes , 
tensions , fights ,  and so forth . To Schattschneider , they may 
take place in debates , meetings , political campaigns and 
hearings . Accordingly , for Schattschneider , 'at the root of 
all politics is the universal language of conflict . '  ( See , 
Ibid . )  p 2 . )  He is thus using the term in its most general 
form as employed in this study . 
.......... ----------------���====�-
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another way,  too , every abandonment of the conflict by any of the 
participants changes the ratio as well . 103 This reasoning leads 
Schattschneider to conclude that ' the outcome of every conflict is 
determined by the extent to which the audience becomes involved in 
it , , 104 or in other word s , ' the outcome of all conflict is 
d i d b h f i i .... 105 eterm ne y t e scope 0 ts contag on . 
Schattschneider goes on to argue that it i s  extremely unlikely 
that participants in a conflict situation will be reinforced 
equally as the scope of conflict mUltiplies the balance of  
forces will almos t  certainly not remain cons tant . Thus , if  there 
were a hundred times as many spectators in the audience who 
sympathized with A rather than B ,  A would have a strong motive for 
trying to spread the conflict while B would have a strong interest 
in keeping it  res tricted . I t  follows , then , 'that conflict s  are 
frequently won or lost [and one can add , contained]  by the success 
that the contestants have in getting the audience involved in the 
fi h i 1 di i h b , 106 g t or n exc u ng t ,  as t e case may e .  
Thus control of the scope of conflict is a crucial factor in the 
management of conflict .  Exclusionary social closure in the 
A.T . C .M.  has served this function in an important way . As 
mentioned beforehand , the Antarctic Treaty is not a final 
settlement of the Antarctic sovereignty issue : the Treaty is a 
103 Ibi d .  pp 2-3 . 104 Ibid . ,  P 2 .  
105 Ibid . 106 Ibid . ,  p 4 .  
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truce . Generally speaking , conflict over the sovereignty issue has 
been latent during the Treaty era ( due in large part to Article IV 
of the treaty) however it has resurfaced on a number of occasions . 
For example , during the first five Consultative Meetings , conflict 
about the sovereignty issue became manifest during nego tiations on 
such topics as historical sites , mail service , criminal 
jurisdiction and the Agreed Measure for the Conservation of 
Antarctic Flora and Fauna . 107 Furthermore , conflict concerning the 
sovereignty i ssue was the 'most difficult matter that parties had 
to consider' during the special and regular A. T . C .M.  negotiations 
between 1978 and 1980 which developed the international convention 
on exploitation and conservation of marine life in the Southern 
108 Ocean . The process of exclusionary social closure has limi ted 
the scope of the continuing conflict concerning this particular 
issue by simply making it difficult (or illegitimate) for the 
"audience" to be drawn to the centre of Antarctic politics and 
thereby changing the balance of forces involved . In short , 
exclusionary social closure has helped to maintain the Antarctic 
i i i ·  109 sovere gnty s sue equat on Lntact .  
107 Myhre ,  op . cit . 
108 J . N . Barnes , "The Emerging Convention on the Conservation of 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources : An Attempt to Meet  the New 
Realities of Resource Exploitation in the Southern Ocean, " 
The New Nationalism and the Use of Common Spaces ,  J . I . Charney 
( e d . ) ,  Allanheld , Osmun , Totowa , New Jersey , 1 982 , esp 
p 265 . Barnes no tes that ' Inspite of may disclaimers to the 
contrary , it seems apparaent that the claimant states init­
ially attempted to enhance their Antarctic claims through 
the mechanism of the new living resource regime . '  
109 To borrow a metaphor employed by Schattschneider in another 
( continued next page) 
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It is ironical that the unanimity rule , a much maligned aspect of 
the A . T . C . M . , has also played a major part in restricting the 
scope of conflict . It has done this in several ways . First , issues 
over which intense conflict has exis ted among members (or is 
considered likely) have not been brought before the Meeting , or if 
raised , have been quickly withdrawn . For example , at the 1962 
Second Consultative Meeting held in Buenos Aires , Britain proposed 
that the ques tion of criminal jurisdiction be accepted as Item 14 
for discussion. 1lO Both Chile and Argentina protested about the 
inclusion of this matter because of the link between criminal 
jurisdiction and sovereignty . After a lengthy argument it was 
decided to divide the agenda into two sections : Items 1 to 13 were 
approved ; while Items 14 to 18 were delayed as representatives 
sought instructions from their governments . 
At the beginning of the second week of the Meeting , Britain 
however , withdrew its proposal even though the United States had 
in the meantime persuaded Chile to discuss the ques tion . 
Apparently , Britain felt that so much hos tility towards mere 
discussion of the mat ter would ensure the defeat , through the 
unanimity rule , of  any but the mos t  vague 111  recommendation . In 
context , Antarctic politics during the Treaty era has been 
more like a modern football game rather than the original , 
primitive version of the sport . In the lat ter , everyone was 
free to join in as the game moved back and forth across the 
countryside , whereas the former is played on a measured field 
by fixed number of players in the presence of an audience 
excluded from the playing field . 
110 Myhre , op . ci t . ,  pp 124-125 . I I I  Ibid . 
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this way , then , the unanimity rule has helped to limit the scope 
of decision-making to "safe" issues and thereby res tricted the 
1 1 2  scope o f  conflict . 
But , of course , not all contentious issues have been able to be 
deflected in this way. Hanevold comments that the 'unanimity 
principle probably prevents controversial matters from being 
discussed [ at the A . T . C .M . l ,  which may have as a consequence that 
the most  difficult problems are accumulated until something 
happens that makes it impos sible not to discuss them . ,113 A case 
in point was the Antarctic resource management issue . In a 
statement made before the U . S .  Senate Subcommittee on Oceans and 
International Environment of the Committee on Foreign Relations in 
1975 , U . S .  Assistant Secretary Ray comments that in the first ten 
years of the Treaty's existence , and at the firs t five 
Consultative Meetings held during that period , the resources topic 
was conspicuously absent from agendas and discussion because one 
or several Consultative Parties feared that any multilateral 
approach to resources management would be detrimental to their 
112 Hanevold makes a similar point when he says in his analysis 
of the A . T . C .M.  that a delegation may withdraw a proposal to 
'prevent a crisis ' or 'because it wants to express  its will 
to preserve the friendly atmosphere . '  See , Hanevold , op . ci t . ,  
p 197 . Bachrach and Baratz point to this same function of 
the unanimity rule of the New York City's Board of Estimate .  
See , P . Bachrach and M. S .Baratz , "Two Faces of Power , "  
American Political Science Review , Vol . 5 6 ,  1962 , pp 947-952 . 
113 Hanevold , op . cit . 
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114 in that area . She acknowledges that during 
this period 'the United States was also loath to raise the subject 
, U5 But in the late 1960's and early 1970' s , as world 
politics entered the age of interdependence , concern about 
resource scarcity and prophecies of biospheric catastrophy in the 
wake of overpopulation and the wasteful , po11utive use of 
116  resourceS began to  be  voiced in the Western world . Against this 
background , the Antarctic resource managment issue was finally 
raised by Britain at the Sixth Antarctic Treaty Consultative 
Meeting in 1970 where it was agreed to place on the agenda for the 
Seventh Meeting ( to be held in 1972) the i tem: "Antarctic 
Resources - Effects of Mineral Exploitation . " ll7 
At the Seventh Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting the issue was 
'still highly charged and agreement was reached only to postpone 
discussion until the subsequent eighth consultative meeting • • 
[held in Oslo in 1975 ] • • •  in order that governments would have 
114 U . s .  Antarctic Policy , Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
Oceans and International Environment of the Commi ttee on 
Foreign Relations , United States Senate , 94th Congress , 1st  
Session , United States Government Printing Office , Washing­
ton , 1975 , p 5 .  The name ( o r  names) of the Consultative 
Party ( or Parties) was (or were) deleted from the text . 
115 Ibid . 
116 See , for example , World Eco-Crisis , D .A .Kay and E . B . Skol­
nikoff ( eds . )  wi th an introduction by M . F . Strong , The Uni­
versity of Wisconsin Press , 197 2 ;  and Club of Rome , The 
Limi ts of Growth : A Report for the Club of  Rome's  PrOject 
on the Predicament of Mankind , D . H.Meadows et aI , New Amer­
ican Library , New York , 1972 . 
117 U . S .  Antarctic Policy , op . ci t . 
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time to give the subject careful consideration . ,1 18 
By this time , resource scarcity was a major item on the 
international political agenda - the world was in the grip of the 
so-called "oil crisis"  following the escalation of world oil 
prices and a brief , incomplete embargo by the Arab members of the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries ( OPEC) in the 
aftermath of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war . At the Eighth Antarctic 
Treaty Consultative Meeting held in 1975 , mos t  of  the discussion 
was devoted to the minerals resource issue , where a majority of  
Consultative Parties favoured a moratorium on exploration until  
the technical , environmental and political problems could be 
resolved . 119 The United State s , however , overtly opposed a 
moratorium because ,  as one U . S .  S tate Department spokesman would 
later explain : 'There was a feeling on our side at that time , that 
a moratorium was not so much a delay to permit rational 
consideration as a decision not to examine the issue at all , at a 
time when perception of resource scarcity and hydrocarbon scarcity 
d i , 120 were awn ng . 
In the end , the issue could not be avoided and tacit agreement was 
finally reached among the Consultative Parties to refrain from 
Antarctic resource exploration and exploitation until some ground 
118 Ibid . ,  p6 
119  P .W . Quigg , A Pole Apart , McGraw-Hill , New York , 1983 , p 194 . 
120 Cited in Quigg , ibid . 
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121  rules had been agreed upon . The wheels were subsequently set in 
mocion to prepare , first , a suitable regime for the conservation 
of Antarctic marine living resources to be followed by a mineral 
122 resources regime . 
This brief account of the broaching of the Antarctic resource 
ma�gement i ssue by the Consultative Parties illustra tes how the 
unanimity rule served to defer a controversial issue (and 
restricted the scope of conflict) until such time as external 
pressure made avoidance extremely difficult . At that point , i t  can 
be sugges ted that another aspect of the unanimi ty rule helped to 
rescrict the scope of conflict ,  too . In contradistinction to the 
majority rule , which is frequently touted as a more useful joint 
decision-making mechanism and which pays more attention to the 
size of majori ties and the winning of victory, the unanimity rule 
123 can be said to encourage the maximization of agreeement .  Thus , 
when unanimi ty is achieved , issues are resolved in such a way that 
there is no member who has a need , or indeed , ground s , to appeal 
to o thers for support .  In other words , with the unanimity rule 
there are no aggrieved minorities , as may be the case with 
121 Ibid . 
122 For a comprehensive account of the negotiations leading up to 
the completion in 1980 of the Convention on the Conservation 
of Antarctic Marine Living Resources , see , Barnes , "The 
Emerging Convention • • • , " op . cit . 
123 On this point see , K . Tornudd , "From Unanimity to Voting and 
Consensus : Trends and Phenomena in Joint Decision-Making by 
Governments , "  Cooperation and Conflict , Vol -XVI I ,  1982 , pp 
163-177 • 
s 
159 
majority voting , to appeal for help from "outsiders" and thus 
expand the scope of conflict . Moreover , it can also be suggested 
that unanimity, in this way , has made it difficult for countries 
excluded from the A . T . C .M.  to latch onto a specific issue for the 
124 purpose of criticizing the Treaty sys tem.  
Hanevold makes a similar point about the unanimity rule and the 
maximization of agreement in his analysis of the A . T . C .M .  He 
maintains that ' the unanimity rule seems to have a restrictive 
effect on the formation of coalitions . ,125 This is largely because 
coalition-building accomplishes little a particular proposal 
cannot be passed without the approval of all . Thus Hanevold 
argue s ,  this engenders 'Free and open discussion' which prevents 
126 suspicion from arising . 
The privatization of A. T .C .M.  proceedings has restricted the scope 
of conflict in another way , too . This mechanism has made it  
possible for members of the A . T. C .M. to  conduct their negotiations 
in a frank and , paradoxically , open manner .  It has allowed them to 
strike bargains to resolve conflicts unencumbered by 
considerations and attitudes to do with other bilateral 
124 Vidich and Bensman describe a similar effect of the unanimity 
rule in their discussion of village politics in an American 
rural community _ See , A . J . Vidich and J . Bensman , Small Town in 
Mass Society , Princeton University Pres s ,  Princeton , New 
Jersey , 1958 , pp 108-136 .  
125 Hanevold ,  op . cit . ,  p 192 . 
126 Ibid . 
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127 matters . As Spencer points out � at first sight the list of 
Consultative Parties to the Antarctic Treaty 'appears to be a 
virtual random conglomeration of heterogeneous countries • 
that can be relied to have widely differing views on almost any 
given subject  outside Antarctica � as well as on Antarctica 
i If , 128 I d d tse . n ee � during the Treaty era bilateral relations 
between the members of the A . T . C . M .  have fluctuated widely over a 
number of  g lobal and regional issues such as the Soviet 
intervention in Afghanis tan, South African apartheid policies and 
the Falkland Islands/Islas Malvinas controversy . But these have 
not spilled over into the A. T . C .M. , nor have conflicts at the 
Meetings been linked to other global and regional issues . A 
graphic illu s tration of this point concerns the 1982 Falkland 
Islands War between Britain and Argentina , two Consultative 
Parties of the Antarctic Treaty. During this imbroglio , not once 
o did hos tilities extend south of latitude 60 South into the area 
covered by the Treaty . Moreover , both countries attended Antarctic 
127 In his diary notes of the Washington Conference on Antarct­
ica � the Australian Head of Delegation , Richard Casey , makes 
a similar point . Commenting on the private nature of most of 
the negotiations there � Casey remarks that 'If it [ the Con­
ference] had been in public , attitudes could have been taken 
from which people could not subsequently retreat without los s  
o f  face . '  Thus he concludes that 'This Antarctic Conference 
was an outstanding example of the possibilities of compromise 
being achieved between diverse interests , by reason of the 
Conference being held behind closed doors . '  Australian 
Foreign Minister : The Diaries of R . G . Casey 1951-60 , T . B .  
Millar ( ed . ) ,  Collins , London , 197 2 , p 334 . 
128 C . Spencer , "The evolution of Antarctic interests , "  Austral­
ia's Ant arctic policy options , S . Harris (ed . ) , CRES Mono­
graph 1 1 ,  Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies , 
Aus tralian National University , 1984 , p 122 . 
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discussions at the height of the hos tilities . As Spencer 
emphasizes , 'The successful exercise of restraint [ in such 
matters ] is a reflection of the value placed by consultative 
parties upon putting a political 'cordon sanitaire' around 
Antarctica . , 129 The privatization of A . T . C .M .  proceedings has been 
an important part of this cordon restricting the contageousness of 
130 conflict . 
In sum, then , the critical comments about the consultative 
arrangments provided by , and set up under , Article IX of the 
Treaty by such writers as Hayton,  Taubenfeld , Auburn and Jain must 
be rejected . Such arrangements have not been 'weak' or 
'permissive'  as Hayton contended , nor have they represented 'a 
lost opportuni ty for a creative experiment ' as Taubenfeld decried . 
The lesson for both Hayton and Taubenfeld in the light of the 
foregoing analysis is that ' the test of a treaty is not how it 
d b h i k , 131  I h b h h 1 rea s ut ow t wor s .  t as een s own t at as an examp e 
of a direct democratic organization at the international level , 
the central consultative arrangement - the A . T . C . M .  - has been a 
129 Ibid . 
130 It can also be suggested that the A . T . C .M.  practice of 
rotating administrative functions has helped to privatize 
organizational proceedings for the simple reason that it may 
well be more difficult for outside dissidents to focus on a 
moving target . 
131 This apt comment was made by Herman Phleger at the Hearings 
before the U . S .  Senate Committee on Foreign Relations which 
considered the Antarctic Treaty prior to ratification.  See , 
United States Senate Commit tee on Foreign Relations , 
Hearings : The Antarctic Treaty, op . cit . ,  p 41 . 
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sophis ticated form of  o rganization based on the interaction o f  
political ideas concerning minimization and equality .  Further 
evidence was found to show how three mechanisms of this 
organization - exclusionary social closure , the unanimity rule and 
the privatization of organizational proceedings - have played an 
important part in the management of  conflict pertaining to 
Antarctica by limi ting i ts scope . These mechanisms must therefore 
be taken into account when explaining Pax Antarc tica in the Treaty 
era . The dominant image of  the Antarctic Treaty as , solely , a 
blueprint for science with ensuing scientific activity engendering 
international peace and order in Antarctica must , accordingly , be 
modified . 
This argument , in turn , lends support to the advocates of 
regionalism who contend that regional actions , mediated through 
international organizations , promo te regional poli tical order by 
'fractionating' or 'encapsulating'  regional conflicts from more 
intractable global 132 ones . Moreover , it  follows from this 
132 Among the advocates of regionalism have been John Burton , 
Edward Hallett  Carr,  Wins ton Churchill and Walter Lippman . 
See , J .W . Burton , Peace Theory , Alfred A.  Knopf , New York, 
1962 , esp . pp 136-148 ; E .R . Carr , The Twenty Year Crisis , 
1919-193 9 : An Introduc tion to the Study of International 
Relations , ( 2nd ed . ) ,  St .Martin's Press ,  New York, 1946 , pp 
224-239 ; W . S . Churchill , The Hinge of Fate , Roughton Mifflin 
Co . ,  Boston ,  1959 , pp 711-7 12 , 804-807 ;  W. Lippman , U . S .  War 
Aims , Li ttle , Brown and Company , Bos ton , 1944 , pp 80-85 ; 
A . Syed , Walter Lippman's Philosophy of International Pol­
itics , University of Pennsylvania Press ,  Philadephia , 1963 , 
p 196 . On 'fractionating' or 'encapSUlating' disputes , see 
R . Fisher , "Frac tionating Conflict , " International Conflict 
and Behavioural Science , R . Fisher (ed . ) ,  Basic Books , New 
York , 1964 ; and A . Etzioni , " On Self-Encapsulating Conflicts , "  
Journal of Conflict Resolution , Vol . 8 ,  1964 , pp 242-255 . 
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theoretical consideration , that common definitions of  the term 
"international organization" are unduly narrow. A wider conception 
is required to allow for the inclusion of organizational forms 
other than the " permanent bureaucratic . "  One such organizational 
form exemplified by the subject of much of this chapter - the 
A . T . C .M .  - is the "direct democratic . "  Clearly , such a wider 
conception promises a more satisfactory analysis of the role of 
international organization in world politics by preventing a range 
of relevant phenomena being closed off from investigation by 
definitional fiat . 
Finally , i t  has been intimated that as the world entered the " era 
of interdependence" in the 1970 ' s , Antarctica gradually became 
entangled with other global issues concerning such matters as 
resource scarcity and North-South relations . By the late 1970's 
and early 1980 ' s , Antarctica was once more , an item on the 
international political agenda and it is to this development that 
attention is now turned . 
4 . 6  Further Developments in the 1980's - A Postscript 
If it is ironical that the much maligned unanimity rule has played 
a major part in restricting the scope of conflict pertaining to 
Antarctica during the Treaty era , it is equally ironical that the 
two of the conflict management mechanisms of the A . T . C .M .  which 
have contributed to Pax Antarctica - exclusionary social closure 
and the privatization of organizational proceedings - became , by 
around 1983 , the obj ect of quite vocal cri ticism by sectors of the 
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international community.  With decisions being made by the 
Consultative Parties concerning the exploitation of Antarctic 
marine-living and mineral 133 resources ,  several developing 
countries and international nongovernmental organizations s tepped 
up objections to the so-called " exclusivity" and "secrecy" of the 
A . T . C .M .  and the Treaty system i n  general . While the specific 
details of this development in Antarctic affairs need not be 
elaborated here , a brief outline of this turn of events is  
134 warranted . 
133 The 1980 Convention on the Conservation of  Antarctic Marine 
Living Resources entered into force in 1982 . Negotiations 
between the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties concerning 
a legal regime to govern mineral resources  development in 
Antarctica also began in June , 1982 . 
134 For detailed analyses of  this development , see the following 
works by Beck : 
P . J . Beck , "Antarctica"'s Indian Summer , " Contemporary Review, 
No . 243 , 1 983 , pp 297-29 9 . 
P . J . Beck, " India in Antarctica : s cience and politics on ice , "  
Nature , Vol . 306 , 1 0  November , 1983 , pp 106-107 . 
P . J . Beck, "Antarctica : a case for the UN? " The World Today , 
Vol . 40 ,  No . 4 ,  April ,  1984 , pp 165-172 . 
P . J . Beck , "The United Nations and Antarctica , "  Polar Record , 
Vol . 22 ,  No . 137 , 1 984 , pp 137-144 . 
P .J . Beck , "The United Nation s '  Study on Antarctica , 1984 , " 
Polar Record , Vol .  22 , No . 140 , 1985 , pp 499-504 . 
P . J . Beck, "Antarctica at the United Nations , 1985 : The End 
of  Consensus ? "  Polar Record , Vo1 . 23 , No . 143 , 198 6 ,  
pp 159-166 . 
P . J . Beck , " Challenges to the Antarctic Treaty Regime : The 
External Political Challenge , "  paper presented to 
the Aus tralian , Britain and Antarctica Conference 
held at the Aus t ralian S tudies Centre of the Inst­
itute of Commonweal th Studies , University of London 
on 4 June , 1986 . 
-\ 
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A key event which prompted increased interest in Antarctica was 
the successful conclusion of the 1 982 United Nations Law of the 
Sea Convention . At the signing of this Convention in Jamaica in 
December , 1982 , the Malaysian delegate urged that 'it is time now 
to focus our attention on another area of common interest • 
Antarctica , where immense potentialities exis t  for the benefit of  
mankind . ,135 This statement was followed by moves in March , 1 983 , 
at the Non-Aligned Summit Meeting held in New Dehli where the 
Malaysian Prime Minister , Dr . Mahathir bin Mohamad secured the 
backing of the Non-Aligned Movement for a proposal calling for a 
comprehensive s tudy on Antarctica to be undertaken by the United 
Nations . Subsequently , in September , 1983 , Malaysia and Antigua 
and Barbuda succeeded in having the topic of Antarctica placed on 
the agenda of the forthcoming 3 8th Session of the United Nations 
General Assembly (U. N . G .A . ) .  There , the so-called "Question of  
Antarctica" was debated and a resolution passed calling upon the 
U . N .  Secretary-General t o  prepare a comprehensive , factual and 
objective study on all aspects of Antarctica for the 1984 U .N . G . A .  
The s tudy was completed i n  November , 1984 , and a t  the 39th Session 
of U . N . G .A . , critics of  the Antarctic Treaty system ,  led by 
Malaysia , called for the Treaty's replacement by a new 
international regime , objected to the exclusive and secret nature 
of the A . T . C .M .  and the membership of South Africa , and raised 
135 Cited in Beck, "Antarctica : a case for the UN? " op . ci t . ,  
pp 169-170 . 
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questions about the distribution of Antarctic resource benefits . 
The Consultative Parties , in turn , highlighted the merits of the 
Treaty sys tem and refuted the criticisms . No further action was 
taken at this point , however ,  apart from placing the item on the 
agenda for the 1985 U . N . G . A .  
Whereas the 1983 and 1984 U . N . G .A .  debates on the "Question of 
Antarctica" had resulted in the passage of consensus resolutions 
acceptable to all delegations , the 40th Session of U . N . G .A .  held 
in 1985 witnessed the breakdown of consensus when three 
resolutions were adopted in spite of strong opposition from the 
Consultative Parties . The first resolution (L82 ) , introduced by 
Malaysia , called for an expanded and up-dated U . N .  study on 
Antarctica; the second (L83 ) , introduced by Pakis tan and 
reflecting concern about the secret and exclusive nature of the 
Special Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings on Mineral 
Resources , called for the Consultative Parties to provide 
information to the U . N .  on these minerals regime talks ; and the 
third (L8S) , submitted by Mauritius on behalf of African states , 
expressed concern about South African involvement in the Antarctic 
Treaty system and urged ' the Antarctica Treaty Consultative 
Parties to exclude the racist apartheid regime of South Africa 
from participation in the meetings of the Consultative Parties at 
the earliest possible date . , 136 Thus , by the end of 1985 , 
136 Cited in Beck, "Antarctica at the United Nations , 1985 : The 
End of Consensus ? "  op . cit . , p 162 . 
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consensus abou t  the " Question of Antarctica" had broken down at 
the U . N .  and views had become polarized . The situation appeared 
"'unstable . .... 137 
While these events were unfolding , the Consultative Parties had 
not been idle . In September ,  1983 , when the 38th Session of 
U . N . G . A .  was getting under way , the Consultative Parties made a 
number of decisions involving , ( i )  the admission of India and 
Brazil 138 as new Consultative Parties ; ( ii )  the admission of non-
consultative parties as observers to the A . T . C .M. ; and ( iii) the 
making o f  A . T . C .M.  documents ,  reports and recommendations more 
139 easily availab le .  
The first decision , the admission of India and Brazil as 
Consultative Parties , was cited by the Soviet delegate at a 38th 
Session of U . N . G .A .  First Committee debat e ,  as illustrating the 
open nature of the Antarctic Treaty system and he urged other 
140 governments to participate in the Treaty . But it is important 
to note that at the time of their admission as Consultative 
137 Ibid . ,  p 164 . 
138 See , "Fifth Special Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting , 
Canberra , 1 983 , "  SCAR Bulletin , No . 76 ,  January , 1 984 , printed 
in Polar Record , Voi.22, No .136 , 1 984 , p 101 . 
139 See , "Report of the Twelfth Antarctic Treaty Consultative 
Meeting , Canberra , 1983 , "  SCAR Bulletin, No . 7 6 ,  January , 
1984 , printed in Polar Record , Vol . 22 ,  No . 136 , 1984 , pp 101-
124 . 
140 Beck , "The United Nations and Antarctica , "  op . cit . , p 142 .  
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Parties both India and Brazil were influential members of the Non-
Aligned Movement ,  the grouping of largely developing countries 
that gave initial support to Malaysia's objections about the 
Antarctic Treaty system .  Indeed , India had been a long-term critic 
of the Treaty 141 system .  Moreover , there are reports that the 
Soviet Union, which had extensive links with India , made strong 
representations to  the Indian government to apply for consultative 
142 status . It  is also significant that both countries'  
applications were based as  much on Antarctic scientific research 
intended for the future , rather that what they had already 
achieved ( as in the case of Poland and West Germany) .  
When these considerations are taken into account , the decision of 
the Consultative Parties to grant India and Brazil consultative 
status smacks of cooptation . Cooptation is the process of 
absorbing new elements into the leadership or policy-determining 
structure of an organization as a means of averting threats to its 
stability or 143 existence . By giving another organization a 
position of influence in an organization , the coopter may gain the 
coopted's awareness and understanding of the problems its faces 
141 India"s desire to have the "Ques tion of Antarctica" dis­
cussed at the United Nations dated back to 1 956 - as pointed 
out in Chapter 3 of this s tudy . 
142 See , for example , R.Wilson , "Treaty takes a new direction 
on Antarctica , "  The Mercury , Hobart , September 30 , 1983 , p 8 .  
143 The classic organizational study of cooptation is by 
P . Selznick , TVA and the Grass Roots : A Study in the Sociology 
of Formal Organization , Harper Torchbook , New York, 1966 , 
see esp . p 13 . 
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and , thus , may increase the likelihood of future support by the 
144 organization coopted . Viewed in this way ,  it can be sugges ted 
that this decision had more to do with countering threats to the 
stability of the Treaty system rather than demonstrating the 
alleged "open nature " of it . 
The second decision by the Consultative Parties in September , 
1983 , ( the decision to admit non-consultative parties as observers 
to the A . T . C . M . ) can similarly be viewed as an attempt to counter 
the charges of " exclusivity . "  The non-consultative parties were 
invited to att end the Twelfth and Thirteenth Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Mee tings held in Canberra ( 1983) and Brussels ( 1985) 
145 respectively . As "observers " those that attended were able to 
participate in mos t  discussions and submit information documents ,  
although they were not able to take part in the Meetings' 
decision-making per se e 
The third decision was made in response to charges 
144 J . D . Thompson, Organizations in Action, McGraw-Hill , New 
York , 1967 , p 35 . 
that 
145 Non-consultative parties were also invited to take part as 
observers in the Antarctic minerals regime negotiations and 
the Meetings under the Convention on the Conservation of 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources .  At the Twelfth A . T . C .M .  
the following non-consultative parties attended a s  observers : 
Bulgaria , China , Denmark, Eas t  Germany, Italy,  the Nether­
lands , Papua New Guinea , Peru , Romania ,  Spain and Uruguay . At 
the Thirteenth A . T . C .M. , Bulgaria , Cuba , Czechoslovakia , Den­
mark , Finland , Eas t  Germany , Hungary , Italy , the Netherlands ,  
Papua New Guinea , Peru , Romania ,  Spain and Sweden attended 
in this capacity . 
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information on Antarctic activities and decision-making was 
insufficient and not easily accessible and that this circumvented 
the Consultative Partie s - accountability to the wider 
international 146 community . In an attempt to assuage such 
criticism about the privatization of A . T . C .M.  proceedings , the 
Consultative Parties made a recommendation to broaden the 
availability of the documents and reports of the Mee tings . Among 
the measures included the recommendation that a certified copy of 
the Final Report and Recommendations of regular Consultative 
Meetings be sent to the Secretary-General of the United Nations 
and that s tarting with the Thirteenth regular Consultative 
Meeting , any Consultative Party or non-consultative party which 
had been invited to the Meeting may make documents intended to be 
publicly available , 
147 prescribe . 
available on such terms as i t  may 
146 Kimball , op . ci t . ,  p 26 . The general question of opening up 
the A . T . C .M. by the publicat ion of documents , the wri ting of 
more extensive reports , as well as inviting non-consultative 
parties to Mee tings as observers was on the agenda of the 
Tenth A . T . C . M. in 1979 , however the item did not receive 
much attention at the time . ( See , Barnes , "The Emerging 
Convention • • •  , " op . cit . , p 281 . )  The ques tion was also 
discussed at the Eleventh A. T . C .M. in 1981 , where , although 
debated at length , no cons ensus was reached . The Sovie t  
Union, Argentina and Chil e  were the Consultative Parties 
that were opposed to the not ion of greater "openness . "  
( S ee ,  Quigg , op . ci t . ,  p 162 . )  
147 See , "Report of the Twel f th Antarctic Treaty Consultative 
Mee ting , Canberra , 1983 , "  op . cit . It was also decided at 
this Meeting that the Thi r teenth A . T . C .M.  would consider 
additional measures to improve the availability of inform­
ation about the A . T . C .M .  
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In the light of the discussion in the previous section of this 
chapter , i t  can be suggested that these attacks on the 
"exclusivity" and "secrecy" of the A.T . C .M. and the responses by 
the Consultative Parties , have implications concerning the scope 
of conflict pertaining to Ant arctica . Whereas the granting of 
consultative-status to India and Brazil may well have been a 
strategy designed to avert threats to the A . T . C .M.  and the 
Antarctic Treaty's stability or existence , cooptation can also be 
constraining in that it places new elements in positions to raise 
questions and disruptive issues . The same can be said for the new 
"observer" s tatus afforded to non-consultative parties . Several 
commentators have sugges ted that the consensual nature of 
decision-making at the A . T . C .M .  ( brought about by the unanimity 
rule) means that the non-consultative parties ' influence on the 
decision-making would in pract ice be significant and that the 
'distinction between ATCPs and Non-Consultative Parties is , 
therefore , likely to become less marked in the future . , 148 It can 
therefore be suggested that the widening involvement of new 
Consultative Parties ( not only India and Brazil , but also , since 
1985 , China and Uruguay) and non-consultative parties in the 
A . T . C . M .  has expanded the scope o f  conflict .  This has already been 
evidenced by the ac tions of two of the new Consultative Parties , 
148 R.Woolcott , "The interaction between the Antarctic Treaty 
system and the United Nations system , "  text of paper present 
ed on a personal basis by the Australian Ambassador to the 
United Nations at a workshop on the Antarctic Treaty system, 
Beardmore Glacier , Antarctica , 5-13 January , 1 985 , reprinted 
in Australian Foreign Affairs Record , Vol . 56 ,  No . 1 ,  January , 
1985 , p 2 .  Also see , Kimball ,  op . cit . ,  p 28 . 
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India and China , at the United Nations in 1985 , when they both 
supported 'for political reasons , '  U . N .  resolution (L85 ) which 
149 called for the expulsion of South Africa from the A . T . C . M .  
I t  can also b e  sugges ted that the decision to make A . T . C .M.  
documents ,  reports and recommendations more easily available has 
expanded the scope of conflict , too . The increased visibility of 
A . T . C . M .  proceedings might well mean that attitudes are struck 
there , rather than bargains , and concommitantly, bilateral 
conflicts elsewhere might become linked to Antarctic issues . 
One conclusion from the foregoing discussion is compelling . If the 
breakdown of consensus and the polarization of views concerning 
the "Question of Antarctica" at the U . N .  in late 1985 placed a 
ques tion mark about the s tability of the Treaty system, and Pax 
Antarctica , the decisions by the Consultative Parties from 1983 to 
widen the involvement in , and increase visibility about , the 
A . T . C .M.  have done likewise by expanding the scope of conflict . 
But this is  not the place to enter into a discussion about what 
the future holds for Antarctica . Some brief comments about this 
situation will be made in the final concluding chapter . 
1 49 Sydney Morning Herald , December 4 ,  1985 . Both India and China 
claimed that their support of resolution L85 should not have 
been seen as a breach of solidarity with Treaty members in 
their unanimous opposition to outside interference in the 
Treaty . Such disclaimers , of course ,  cannot disguise the 
breach of solidarity with one Treaty member - namely,  South 
Africa . In addition , Romania and Peru , two non-consultative 
parties who had participated as observers in the Twelfth and 
Thirteenth Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meetings also sup­
ported U . N .  resolution L85 . Indeed , Romania supported all 
three resolutions and Peru also supported L82 . 
= 
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION 
At the beginning of this s tudy it was claimed that the three 
dominant images associated with Antarctic affairs during the 
twentieth century which focus on science are in important respects  
deficient . It was sugges ted that political factors are more 
significant that the dominant images portray and that Antarctic 
affairs have not occurred in isolation , removed or divorced from 
world politics and the basic  s tructural forces that have shaped 
the modern world . The evidence presented in this thesis suggests  
that these interlinked propositions are valid . 
The first image , which focuse s  on scientific activity and 
exploration during the first four decades of the twentieth 
century , was found in Chapter 2 to have a shallow depth of field . 
Antarctic affairs during this period were also characterized by 
significant polit ical and economic factors concerned with the 
partition of Antarctica , which occurred between 1908 and 1939 when 
five countries asserted claims to about 85 per cent of the region.  
It was argued that the parti tion of  Antarctica was , in turn , an 
expression of two interlocked structural forces of world politics 
which first became operative during the closing years of the 
nineteenth century : the Second Industrial Revolution and the New 
Imperialism . It was shown that the partition of Antarctica 
involved the same sorts of political and economic factors which 
have been emphasized in explanations of the New Imperialism : 
problems , questions and opportuni ties which occurred on the 
1 7 3  
, 
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periphery of the world ; s trategic , security and diplomatic 
manoeuvring ; the need to control new sources of raw materials ;  and 
opportunities for the profitable investment of capital . These 
factors were largely , although not exclusively , concerned with the 
Antarctic whaling industry , the importance of which was engendered 
in large part by technological developments associated with the 
Second Industrial Revolution . Moreover , i t  was also shown that the 
revival of scientific activity and exploration during the "heroic 
age" of Antarctic affairs from the turn o f  the century to the end 
of World War I was also an expression of this underlying 
s tructural force and not an isolated phenomenon , as usually 
implied . 
The second , "triumph of science" image o f  the origins of the 
Antarctic Treaty was found , in Chapter 3 ,  to be both superficial 
and misleading . It was shown to overlook the interplay of 
political and s trategic considerations which were of major 
significance in the course of events that led to the signing of 
the Treaty in 1959 . Rather than a direct consequence of scientific 
cooperation during the International Geophysical Year , the idea of 
the Antarctic Treaty was initiated by the United States concerned 
to limit Soviet activities in the region , devise a way around the 
"Antarctic problem" between Britain , Argentina and Chile , and at 
the same time preserve American access to all parts of the 
continent . Deeper analysis revealed that such political and 
strategic considerations were , in turn , consequences of basic 
structural changes in world poli tics which impacted on Antarctic 
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affairs following the outbreak of World War II , viz .  the changing 
distribution of power in world politics associated with the rise 
of the United States and the Soviet Union to superpower s tatus , 
the intensification of American-Russian rivalry after 1947 to 
become the Cold War ,  the declining importance in world politics of 
European countries and the gathering strength of anti-colonialism . 
The third image , which depicts the Antarctic treaty as a blueprint 
for science , with ensuing scientific activity engendering Pax 
Antarctica , was found , in Chapter 4 ,  to be one-sided . Left out of 
account is the continuing conflict 
Antarctic treaty and its  attendant 
management function of the 
arrangements which also 
contributed to regional peace and order in Antarctica during the 
first two decades of the Treaty era . In Chapter 4 i t  was argued 
that the central consultative "arrangement " ,  the Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Meeting , can be viewed as an example of a "direct 
democratic" organization linked to a set of political ideals 
concerned with the minimization and equalization of 
adminis tration . It was also argued that organizational mechanisms 
of the A .T . C .M.  concerned with these political ideals also played 
an important part in the management of conflict pertaining to the 
region , and thereby contributed to Pax Antarctica . These 
mechanisms , the process of exclusionary social closure and the 
unanimity rule , together with the privatization of organizational 
proceedings , have served to control conflict by limiting or 
restricting its scope . Furthermore , it was also shown in this 
chapter how a structural change in world politics again began to 
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impact upon Antarctic affairs during the late 1970's and 1980's . 
As the world entered the " era of interdependence" ,  Antarctica 
became entangled in a number of global issues concerned with 
resource scarcity , North-South relations and environmental 
conservation. 
From this brief summary ,  two common threads are clearly visible : 
( i )  political factors have played a significant part in Antarctic 
affairs throughout the twentieth century; and ( i i )  s tructural 
changes in world politics have impacted upon Antarctic affairs 
throughout the same period . Indeed , it has been shown that the two 
threads are intimately related ; as Barraclough says , 'These 
changes are fundamental because they fix the skeleton or framework 
within which political action takes place . , 1 
On this view, one basic conclusion can be drawn . Antarc tic affairs 
during the twentieth century have demonstrably been an integral 
part of world politics . There is , therefore , the need to consider 
them in this way and not sui generis ,  as commonly asserted . 2 Thi s 
means , in short , that Antarctic affairs cannot be assessed 
realistically unless they are ranged firmly against the past and 
1 G .  Barraclough , An Introduction to Contemporary History , 
Penguin , Harmondsworth , 1967 , p 16 . 
2 Perhaps the boldest , and most recent statement of this view is 
by Quigg , who asserts that 'Everything about Antarctica is sui 
generis - its climate ,  its geography , it history , its assets , 
its management . '  See , P .W . Quigg , A Pole Apart ,  McGraw-Hill , 
New York , 1983 , p 218 . 
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analysed in the light of structural forces in world politics . 
This conclusion , in part , echoes a theme developed by Beck who 
points out that although the international debate about Antarctica 
in the 1980's has been characterised by several novel features 
such as the "common heritage" principle , 'an appreciation of the 
historical dimension remind s  one that recent events should be 
interpreted as merely another chapter in the long-running debate 
about whether Antarctica should be governed through either a 
3 limited or universal regime . '  Beck notes that hitherto ,  the 
limited approach has retained predominance and he sees it as 
4 'likely to survive the on-going UN-based challenge . '  
This might well prove to be so , when it is considered that the 
Treaty system includes mos t  of the U .N . 's most  powerful members . 
But it was also argued in the postscript to Chapter 4 that the 
decisions by the Consultative Parties from 1983 to widen the 
involvement in , and increase visibility about , the Antarctic 
Treaty Consultative Mee ting have also placed a ques tion mark about 
the stabili ty of the Treaty system and Pax Antarctica by expanding 
the scope of conflict . It can therefore be sugges ted that the 
Treaty system is perhaps more at risk now from within . 
3 P . J . Beck, "Challenges to the Antarctic Treaty Regime : The 
External Political Challenge , "  paper presented to the Austral­
ia , Britain and Antarctica Conference held at the Australian 
Studies Centre of the Inst itute of Commonwealth Studies , Uni­
versity of London , on 4 June , 1986 , p 9 
4 Ibid . 
--------------------��--- - - �--" --- -- - -" 
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To conclude , this prognosis i s , of course ,  not necessarily 
lamentable . Whil e  order in world politics is something valuable , 
it  should not be 5 taken to be a commanding value . Other values 
such as justice may take priority . Indeed , this seems to be the 
preference of many o f  the critics of the Treaty sys tem . Thus , 
before coming t o  any conclusion about the undesirability or 
otherwise of an uns table Antarctic situation , a thorough analysis 
of the relationship between order and justice in the context of 
Antarctica is clearly r equired . 
5 For a discussion about the relationship between order and 
justice in world politics , see , R . Bull ,  The Anarchical Society, 
Macmillan, London , 1977 , esp . Chapter 4 .  
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APPENDIX A - TEXT OF 1949 DRAFT DECLARATION ON ANTARCTICA, 
PREPARED BY THE U .  S .  DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
Assembled in the city of , Messrs . , 
duly authorized representatives of the Governments of Argentina , 
Australia , Chile , United States of America , France , Norway , New 
Zealand and the United Kingdom of  Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland have examined the Antarctic problem and having regard to 
the following point s : 
That in the Antarctic continent there s till exist vas t  regions not 
yet well explored or mapped ;  
That the scientific data which may be obtained from the Antarctic 
on meteorology , terrestrial magnetism ,  cosmic rays , geology , 
marine biology , et  cetera , are or can be of great value for marine 
and air navigation, in the use of telecommunications , the 
development of agriculture and many o ther human activities ; 
That it  i s  the desire of the respective Governments to maintain 
close and friendly relations and avoid any cause for international 
disagreement , and that it is desirable , therefore , to prevent 
conflicts of sovereignty or of any o ther kind from dis turbing such 
friendly relations ; and 
That their Governments are engaged in conversations and exchanges 
of views looking toward an amicable ,  mutually satisfactory 
solution of the territorial problem of Antarctica; 
Declare the following on behalf of their Governments :  
1 .  That they are disposed to consider and discuss suggestions for 
methods of s e ttling the territorial problem of Antarctica . 
2 .  That , for the period of this declaration , the establishment of 
new s tations , the carrying out of expedi5ions , or the exercise of  
like activities in  territory south of  60 south latitude will not 
prejudice the rights , as they now exist , of their respective 
countries within the region , and that the maintenance of present 
s tations , the establishment of new stations , the dispatch of  
expeditions or the carrying out of other activities during the 
period of this declaration shall not be invoked against o ther 
signatories of this declaration as a basis for claims to 
sovereignty in the region . 
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3 .  That each of the Governments here represented hereby grants 
authority to the Government and national of each of the other 
countries here represented to conduct exploration and scientific 
research in the area of its claim . 
4 .  That their Governments will carry out an exchange of scientific 
information regarding Antarctica , including the regular exchange 
of books , pamphlets , magazines , maps , navigation charts , 
photographs , schedules ,  computations , and in general , scientific 
data which they may possess or obtain regarding Antarctica . 
5 .  That their Governments will 
of technical and scientific 
expeditions under the flag 
facilities for provisioning 
with international usage . 
encourage the sending to Antarctica 
expeditions and will furnish to 
of any other declarant country 
and other facilities in accordance 
6 .  That their Governments will create a committee consisting of 
one member from each declarant country to which each country will 
report projected activities in the Antarctic area and the results 
of scientific investigations and research upon the completion of 
such activities . 
7 .  That the commit tee shall have authority to request changes in 
the plans of any country , but will provide information concerning 
prior plans of any other country which may be duplicated by new 
projects or which may occupy expedition sites which would 
inconvenience the project . 
8 .  The committee shall have authority , on behalf of the signatory 
countries , to grant permission to countries other than the 
signatory countries to conduct exploration and scientific 
investigation and research in the Antarctic area . However,  the 
signatories will not recognize such expeditions carried out during 
the life of this agreement as a basis for territorial claims . 
9 .  The signatories of this declaration will act in cooperation for 
the advancement of their common interests and protection of their 
rights in the area . 
The present Declaration will take effect from this date and will 
remain in effect for a period of five [ ten] years . Six months 
before the expiration of this time limit , the signatory 
Governments will consult one another regarding the advantages of 
meeting in an Antarctic Polar Conference .  If none of the signatory 
Governments should notify the o thers that it wishes to terminate 
this Declaration on the date referred to , it  will continue in 
effect for another like period . 
Done in the City of 
month of -'"'"'i-n-t':""h-e-y-e-a-r--=-1"=9-------
on the day of the ----
Source : Foreign Relations of the United States , 1949 , Vol . I ,  
United S tates Government Printing Office , Washington , 
197 6 ,  pp 807-809 . 
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APPENDIX B - TEXT OF THE ANTARCTIC TREATY OF 1959 
The Governments of Argentina , Australia , Belgium, Chile , the 
French Republic , Japan , New Zealand , Norway, the Union of South 
Africa , the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ,  the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland , and the Unit ed 
States of America , 
Recognizing that it is in the 
Antarctica shall continue forever 
peaceful purposes and shall not 
international discord ; 
interest of all mankind that 
to be used exclusively for 
become the scene or object of 
Acknowledging the substantial contributions to scientific 
knowledge resulting from international cooperation in scientific 
investigation in Antarctica;  
Convinced that the establishment of a firm foundation for the 
continuation and development of such cooperation on the basis of 
freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica as applied 
during the International Geophysical Year accords with the 
interests of science and the progress  of all mankind ; 
of Antarctica for 
of international 
and principles 
Convinced also that a treaty ensuring the use 
peaceful purposes only and the continuance 
harmony in Antarctica will further the purposes 
embodied in the Charter of the United Nations ; 
Have agreed as follows : 
ARTICLE I 
1 .  Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. There 
shall be prohibited , inter alia , any measures of a military 
nature , such as the establishment of military bases and 
fortifications , the carrying out of military maneuvers , as well as 
the testing of any type of weapons . 
2 .  The present Treaty shall not prevent the use of military 
personnel or equipment for scientific research or for any other 
peaceful purpose . 
ARTICLE II 
Freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica and cooperation 
toward that end , as applied during the International Geophysical 
Year, shall continue , subject to the provisions of the present 
Treaty . 
\ 
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ARTICLE III 
1 .  In order to promote international cooperation in scientific 
inves tigation in Antarctica , as provided for in Article II of the 
present Treaty , the Contracting Parties agree that , to the 
greatest extent feasible and practicable : 
(a) information regarding plans for scientific programs in 
Antarctica shall be exchanged to permit maximum economy and 
efficiency of operations ; 
(b)  scientific personnel shall be exchanged in Antarctica between 
expeditions and stations ; 
( c )  scientific observations and results from Antarctica shall be 
exchanged and made freely available . 
2 .  In implementing this Article , every encouragement shall be 
given to the establishment of  cooperative working relations with 
those Specialized Agencies of  the United Nations and other 
international organizations having a scientific or technical 
interest in Antarctica . 
ARTICLE IV 
1 .  Nothing contained in the present Treaty shall be interpreted 
as : 
(a)  a renunciation by any Contracting Party of  previously asserted 
rights of or claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica ; 
(b) a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Par ty of any 
basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica which i t  
may have whether a s  a result of  i t s  activities or those o f  its 
nationals in Antarctica , or otherwise;  
(c)  prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party as regards 
its recognition or non-recogni tion of any o ther State's right of 
or claim or basis of claim to terri torial sovereignty in 
Antarctica . 
2 .  No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is 
in force shall cons titute a basis for asserting , supporting or 
denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create 
any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica . No new claim, or 
enlargement of an exis ting claim , to territorial sovereignty in 
Antarctica shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in force . 
ARTICLE V 
1 .  Any nuclear explosions in Antarctica and the disposal there of  
radioactive was te material shall be prohibited . 
2 .  In the event of the conclusion of international agreements 
concerning the use of nuclear energy , including nuclear explosions 
and the disposal of radioactive was te material,  to which all of 
the Contracting Parties whose representatives are entitled to 
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participate in the meetings provided for under Article IX are 
parties ,  the rules established under such agreements shall apply 
in Antarctica . 
ARTICLE VI 
The P6ovisions of the present Treaty shall apply to the area south 
of 60 South Latitude , including all ice shelves , but nothing in 
the present Treaty shall prejudice or in any way affect the 
rights , or the exercise of the rights ,  of any State under 
international law with regard to the high seas within that area . 
ARTICLE VII 
1 .  In order to promote the objectives and ensure the observance of  
the provisions of the present Treaty , each Contracting Party whose 
representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings 
referred to in Article IX of the Treaty shall have the right to 
designate observers to carry out any inspection provided for by 
the present Article . Observers shall be national s  of the 
Contracting Parties which designate them. The names of observers 
shall be communicated to every other Contracting Party having the 
right to designate observers , and like notice shall be given o f  
the termination of their appointment . 
2 .  Each observer designated in accordance with the provisions of  
paragraph 1 of this Article shall have complete freedom of access  
at  any time to  any or all areas of  Antarctica . 
3 .  All areas of Antarctica , including all stations , installations 
and equipment within those areas , and all ships and aircraft at 
points of discharging or embarking cargoes or personnel in 
Antarctica , shall be open at all times to inspection by any 
observers designated in accordance with paragraph 1 of  this 
Article . 
4 .  Aerial observation may be carried out at any time over any or 
all areas of Antarctica by any of the Contracting Parties having 
the right to designate observers . 
5 .  Each Contracting Party shall , at the time when the present 
Treaty enters into force for i t ,  inform the other Contracting 
Parties , and thereafter shall give them notice in advance , of 
(a)  all expeditions to and within Antarctica , on the part of its 
ships or nationals ,  and all expeditions to Antarctica organized in 
or preceeding from its territory; 
(b) all stations in Antarctica occupied by its nationals ;  and 
(c) any military personnel or equipment intended to be introduced 
by it into Antarctica subject to the conditions pre scribed in 
paragraph 2 of Article I of the present Treaty . 
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ARTICLE VIII 
1 .  In order to facilitate the exercise of their functions under 
the present Treaty , and without prejudice to the prespective 
positions of the Contracting Parties relating to jurisdiction over 
all other persons in Antarctica , observers designated under 
paragraph 1 of  Article VII and scientific personnel exchanged 
under subparagraph 1 (b)  of  Article III of the Treaty , and members 
of the staffs accompanying any such persons , shall be subject only 
to the jurisdiction of the Contracting Party of which they are 
nationals in respect of all acts or omissions occurring while they 
are in Antarctica for the purpose of exercising their functions . 
2 .  Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this 
Article , and pending the adoption of measures in pursuance of 
subparagraph 1 ( e )  of Article IX, the Contracting Parties 
concerned in any case of dispute with regard to the exercise of  
jurisdiction in Antarctica shall immediately consult together with 
a view to reaching a mutually acceptable solution. 
ARTICLE IX 
1 .  Representatives of the Contracting Parties named in the 
preamble to the present treaty shall meet at the City of Canberra 
within two months after the date of entry into force of the 
Treaty , and thereafter at suitable intervals and places , for the 
purpose of exchanging information , consulting together on matters 
of common interest pertaining to Antarctica , and formulating and 
considering , and recommending to their Governments , measures in 
furtherance of the principles and objectives of the Treaty , 
including measures regarding ; 
(a) use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only; 
(b) facilitation of scientific research in Antarctica ; 
(c)  facilitation of international scientific cooperation in 
Antarctica ; 
(d)  facilitation of the exercise of  the rights of inspection 
provided for in Article VII of the Treaty; 
(e)  questions relating to the exercise of jurisdiction in 
Antarctica ; 
( f )  preservation and conservation of living resources in 
Antarctica . 
2 .  Each Contracting Party which has become a party to the present 
Treaty by accession under Article XIII shall be entitled to 
appoint representatives to participate in the meetings referred to 
in paragraph 1 of the present Article ,  during such time as that 
Contracting Party demonstrates its interest in Antarctica by 
conducting substantial scientific research activity there , such as 
the establishment of a scientific s tation or the despatch of a 
scientific expedition.  
a 
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3 .  Reports from the observers referred to in Article VII of the 
present Treaty shall be transmitted to the representatives of the 
Contracting Parties participating in the meetings referred to in 
paragraph 1 of the present Article . 
4 .  The measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall 
become effective when approved by all the Contracting Parties 
whose representatives were entitled to participate in the meetings 
held to consider those measures . 
5 .  Any or all of the rights es tablished in the present Treaty may 
be exercised as from the date of entry into force of  the Treaty 
whether or not any measures facilitating the exercise of such 
rights have been proposed , considered or approved as provided in 
this Article . 
ARTICLE X 
Each of  the Contracting Parties undertakes to exert appropriate 
efforts , consistent with the Charter of the United Nations , to the 
end that no one engages in any activity in Antarctica contrary to 
the principles or purposes of the present Treaty. 
ARTICLE XI 
1 .  If any dispute arises between two or more of the Contracting 
Parties concerning the interpretation or application of the 
present Treaty , those Contracting Parties shall consult among 
themselves with a view to having the dispute resolved by 
negotiation , inquiry ,  mediation,  conciliation , arbitration , 
judicial settlement or other peaceful means of their own choice . 
2 .  Any dispute of this character not so resolved shall , with the 
consent , in each case , of all parties to the dispute,  be referred 
to the International Court of Justice for settlement ; but failure 
to reach agreement on reference to the International Court shall 
not absolve parties to the dispute from the responsibility of 
continuing to seek to resolve it by any of the various peaceful 
means referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article . 
ARTICLE XII 
1 .  (a)  The present Treaty may be modified or amended at any time 
by unanimous agreement of the Contracting Parties whose 
representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings 
provided for under Article IX. Any such modification or amendment 
shall enter into force when the depositary Government has received 
notice from all such Contracting Parties that they have ratified 
it . 
(b)  Such modification or amendment shall thereafter enter 
into force as to any o ther Contracting Party when notice of  
ratification by it has been received by the depositary Government . 
Any such Contracting Party from which no notice of ratification is 
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received within a period of two years from the date of entry into 
force of the modification or amendment in accordance with the 
provisions of subparagraph 1 ( a) of the Article shall be deemed to 
have withdrawn from the present Treaty on the date of the 
expiration of such period . 
2 .  (a) If after the expiration of thirty years from the date of 
entry into force of the present Treaty , any of the Contracting 
Parties whose representatives are entitled to participate in the 
meetings provided for under Article IX so requests by a 
communication addressed to the depositary Government , a Conference 
of all the Contracting Parties shall be held as soon as 
practicable to review the operation of the Treaty . 
(b)  Any modification or amendment to the present Treaty which 
is approved at such a Conference by a majority of those whose  
representatives are entitled to  participate in the meetings 
provided for under Article IX, shall be communicated by the 
depositary Government to all the Contracting Parties immediately 
after the termination of the Conference and shall enter into force 
in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of the present 
Article . 
( c )  If any such modification or amendment has not entered 
into force in accordance with the provisions of subparagraph 1 (a)  
of  this Article within a period of two years after the date of its 
communication to all the Contracting Parties , any Contracting 
Party may at any time after the expiration of that period give 
notice to the depositary Government of its withdrawal from the 
present Treaty;  and such withdrawal shall take effect two years 
after the receipt of the notice by the depositary Government . 
ARTICLE XIII 
1 .  The present Treaty shall be subject to ratification by the 
signatory States . It shall be open to accession by any State which 
is a Member of the United Nations , or by any other State which may 
be invited to accede to the Treaty with the consent of all the 
Contracting Parties whose representatives are entitled to 
participate in the meetings provided for under Article IX of the 
Treaty . 
2 .  Ratification 
effected by each 
processes . 
of or accession to the present Treaty shall be 
State in accordance with its cons titutional 
3 .  Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall 
be deposited with the Government of the United States of America , 
hereby designated as the depositary Government . 
4 .  The depositary Government shall inform all signatory and 
acceding States of the date of each deposit of an instrument of 
ratification or accession , and the date of entry into force of the 
Treaty and of any modification or amendment thereto . 
a 
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s .  Upon the deposit of instruments  of ratification by all the 
signatory States , the present Treaty shall enter into force for 
those States and for States which have deposited instruments of 
accession . Thereafter the Treaty shall enter into force for any 
acceding State upon the deposit of its instrument of accession . 
6 .  The present treaty shall be registered by the depositary 
Government pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United 
Nations . 
ARTICLE XIV 
The present treaty, done in the English, French , Russian and 
Spanish languages , each version being equally authentic , shall be 
deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States 
of America , which shall transmit duly certified copies thereof to 
the Governments of  the signatory and acceding S tates . 
[ Here follow the French , Russian and Spanish 
texts of the foregoing . ]  
IN WITNESS WHEREOF , the undersigned Plenipotentiaries , duly 
authorized , have signed the present Treaty . 
DONE at Washington this first day of  December , one thousand nine 
hundred and fifty-nine . 
[ Here follow the French , Russian ,  and Spanish 
texts of the testimonial paragraphs . ]  
Source : Conference on Antarctica , Department of State Publication 
706 0 ,  International Organization and Conference Series 13 , 
September , 1 960 . 
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